The development of the legal parameters of the waqf institution in contemporary Iran and its socioeconomic impact by Jafar-Shaghaghi, Kayhan
The development of the legal parameters of the waqf institution in contemporary Iran and its 
socioeconomic impact
Submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (History)
at the University of St Andrews
July 2013
1
Kayhan Jafar-Shaghaghi
Abstract
This thesis argues that the laws of waqf in Iran lack modern relevance. Such laws have never been 
completely modernised, and the waqf system, no longer responsible for the delivery  of public 
goods, still holds a vast array of properties and resources. Many of the ongoing socioeconomic and 
political disappointments of Iran, which, at the core, are the weakness of the country’s private 
economic sector and its human capital deficiency, stand among the lasting consequences of the 
deficiency of resources which the institution of waqf has under its control.
Traditional Islamic law laid the ground for the economic infrastructure of the Middle Eastern 
countries until the late 19th century. Among the institutions that contributed to shaping the economy 
of the region are the Islamic law of inheritance, which inhibited capital accumulation; the absence 
in Islamic law of the concept of a corporation and the consequent weaknesses of civil society; and 
the waqf, which locked vast resources into unproductive organisations for the delivery of social 
services. It  is often argued that many of these obstacles to economic development were largely 
overcome through radical reforms initiated in the 19th century. However, the modern civil law of 
Iran has kept traditional Islamic law at the core of laws of waqf, and the process of modernisation of 
its laws remains incomplete.
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The Persian or Arabic language names and terms used and translated in thesis have been 
transliterated into the English alphabet following the Iranian Studies Transliteration Scheme 
1reflected in the table below. 
Please note that  there are two words, Waqf and Mutawalli, used throughout this thesis which do not 
conform to this scheme. As the majority  of the scholarly works on the topic use “Waqf” and 
“Mutewalli”, these spellings were used to maintain consistency across studies of waqf.
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Chapter I: Introduction
This thesis studies the modernisation of the institution of waqf from its legal point of view in 
contemporary  Iran. The study argues that modernisation of the waqf system was not sufficient 
enough to make a difference in the institution’s performance. The dated legal parameters of waqf 
prevent this institution from exploiting its full potential. Historically, waqf appears to have emerged 
as a credible commitment device to give property owners economic security in return for social 
services. The laws of waqf that shape the backbone of the institution have two main characteristics 
in their traditional settings: first, they are as inflexible as possible in order to protect property; 
second, they emerged when there was not an understanding of a legal person or a corporation. 
These two characteristics may have suited such an institution during medieval times, when the pace 
of change was very slow, but they are not appropriate for the speed of change which created new 
demands on social services after the age of the Industrial Revolution. Given the immense scale of 
assets which waqf holds and the inherit inflexibility which is embedded at the core of its traditional 
laws, the modernisation of this institution should have been of paramount importance. This study 
demonstrates that  the modernisation of the laws of waqf hardly exceeded the codification of the 
traditional laws into the civil law, which was nowhere near enough to make a difference.
The study of waqf laws during the 20th century fits within the broader discussion of the 
modernisation of Iran’s legal system as such laws form one of the main pillars of the socioeconomic 
development of the country in that period. Because the system has not been able to naturally 
progress and evolve, waqf locks resources into organisations that are likely to become dysfunctional 
over time. These institutions do not pose economic disadvantages at the time of their emergence, 
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nor do they ever cause an absolute decline in economic activity; rather, they become handicaps by 
perpetuating themselves over a long period of time. The main problem with such a system is its 
immense scale, which has continually  deprived Iran of much-needed assets for private economic 
sectors and the subsequent deficiency in human capital.
This study was initially inspired by the work of Timur Kuran. Professor Kuran has written a series 
of articles on Islamic institutions and the law. He considers Islamic law a major contributing factor 
to the underdevelopment of many  Islamic countries. Kuran identifies four key features of Islamic 
law that  he considers economically  inefficient and to be preventing the emergence of private trade: 
the Islamic law of inheritance prevents the accumulation of wealth; the absence of the concept of a 
corporation reduces the size of partnerships and joint stock corporations; the ban on charging 
interest on lent money results in the lack of a paper-money-based economy; and the institution of 
waqf locks a vast amount of resources in order to deliver social services—but does so very 
inefficiently.2
Kuran primarily employs deductive reasoning as his methodology, with a set  of hypothetical 
arguments. He argues that the   “waqf system could have turned the Middle East into a region rich 
in ‘social capital’ the capacity to undertake initiatives requiring social organisations. Identifying 
why this potential was not  realised is critical, then, to understanding the character of the Middle 
Eastern economy that eventually fell prey  to ‘European imperialism’ and remains underdeveloped 
relative to the post-industrial world”.3  Kuran identifies Islamic law, given its sacred origins and its 
resistance to change, which made it imperious to reasoning, as the main obstacle to the development 
of the waqf system. He claims, that “the historical pattern might have been different had the 
11
2 Kuran (2010)
3 Kuran (2001, p. 844)
regulations governing the waqf evolved into an enterprise enjoying corporate status. But no such 
transformation took place through indigenous means. Because of the very pecuniary motives that 
made waqf economically so significant, major reforms had to await the economic Westernisation 
drive that began in the 19th century.”4  As is the case in most of Kuran’s studies, he finishes by 
bringing the good news that, in the case of the waqf system, “today in the early  21st century, the 
waqf institution is equipped with adaptation facilities it traditionally  lacked. Most significantly, it 
now enjoys juristic personality. Traditionally, it was the manager who had been standing before the 
courts as an individual plaintiff or defendant. Another major reform is that a modern waqf is 
overseen by a board of mutawallis endowed with powers similar to those of a corporate board of 
trustees”.5
Claims that Kuran makes with regard to the waqf system and its modernisation will be critically 
appraised throughout this thesis, in the case of Iran. However, what is important in his work is his 
focus on institutions, which have long been ignored by  the economic historians of the Middle East. 
The importance of institutions is that if they  do not function well, markets will not function well.6 
Building institutions that  create incentive for people to invest and to increase productivity  is a 
model that the World Bank has adopted since the mid-1990s under the rubric of good governance. 
Development economics theories in general are divided into two main groups. Institutions like the 
UN focus on human development, which includes sustainable development, income equality, basic 
needs, etc. On the other hand, organisations like the World Bank place economic growth as their 
main indicator for economic development. There have been criticisms of almost every development 
12
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6North (1990); Williamson (1985); Rodrik (1999); Acemoglu (2001, 2005, 2008) 
theory. Political economists and sociologists, such as Andre Gunder Frank and Wallerstein, have 
criticised these policies on various grounds, including the fact that the U.S. was leading the 
policies.7  On the other hand, some development economists (inducing Kuran) and sociologists 
argue for certain aspects of Western culture as pivotal to the success of these models. 
Characteristics such as rationality  (based on Max Weber’s theory8), universalism, organisational 
interdependency and individualism, among others, have been identified as prerequisites for the 
success of these models.9 Hence, Islamic law has been viewed as an impediment to development, as 
it is in Kuran’s writing.
Such stands against local cultural and religious beliefs are bound to provoke criticism. Within a 
postcolonial context, critics argue that economic growth and development have substituted for the 
civilising mission of the colonial era. Kuran has been subject to two primary criticisms. First and 
foremost is the lack of a significant amount of empirical evidence to support his central thesis. 
However, his hypothesis could be subjected to future empirical scrutiny or other possible 
explanations. The second set of criticisms are of his comparative studies, in which he compares the 
decline of institutions and the economy in the Middle East  to economic success and prosperity in 
Europe.10 His approach to comparative studies can be subjective and incoherent, and his analysis is 
mainly based on legal, institutional and cultural development, not giving the same weight  to other 
factors, such as historical events or geographical conditions, which can contribute to the economic 
success of nations.11
13
7 Frank (1967); Wallerstein (1974) 
8 Weber (2001) 
9 Inkeles (1964); Bellah (1957) ; Mc Clelland (1964) 
10 Malik (2012) 
11 Frank (1998)
Recent studies of waqf have two common threads. All of those who have studied waqf from its 
socioeconomic point  of view have drawn a similar picture and come to similar conclusions. 
Shatzimiler, Carrol, Hoexter and many more who have worked on certain specific topics of waqf, 
whether preserving family fortunes, protecting the endowment from the “free riders,” or delivering 
social services, have used similar sources and come to similar conclusions. First  is that the laws of 
waqf are dated and essentially were unable to evolve with a speed that might have maintained the 
institution in a healthy way. The core of the problem is that traditional Islamic law did not 
understand a corporation or a legal personality.12  The lack of such a concept may not have been 
crucial in pre-industrial times, when the pace of social and technological changes was slow; 
however, it made waqf ill-prepared to meet the demand for modern public goods—things such as 
traffic control and the laying of tarmac on roads were completely  beyond the capacity of its legal 
structure.13 The second recurring theme is that these laws were radically  modernised and changed in 
the early  20th century, and there is no longer an issue with waqf laws being dated.14 Therefore, all of 
these studies support Kuran’s hypothesis.
14
12 Legal personality allows one or more persons to act as a single entity (a composite person) for 
legal purposes. In many jurisdictions, legal personality allows such composites to be considered 
separately from their individual members or shareholders. They may sue and be sued, enter 
contracts, incur debt, and own property. Entities with legal personality may also be subject to 
certain legal obligations, such as the payment of taxes. An entity with legal personality may shield 
its shareholders from personal liability. It must be mentioned that the shortcomings of the traditional 
laws of waqf have only been studied within the Sunni schools of law; these could be different from 
those generated from the Shi’ite school. Whether or not the Shi’ite school of law presented the same 
degree of shortcomings is addressed in this thesis.
13  For example, there is a huge number of wells and water conduits that were traditionally waqf in 
order to supply  water to the public. However, these water conduits were not  transformed into 
networks for providing cities’ water supplies such that water would come to each and every 
residence.
14 Hoexter (1998, pp. 474–95); Powers (1993, pp. 379–406); Carrol (2001, pp. 245–86); Shatzimiler 
(2001, pp. 44–74)
There are very few studies on waqf in Iran, and none of them are based on a socioeconomic point of 
view. Therefore, it  is interesting to investigate whether Iran follows the same pattern as the rest of 
the Middle Eastern countries whose waqf systems have been studied. On the surface and 
historically, Iran’s waqf shares a very similar story to those of other Middle Eastern countries. 
Twentieth-century Iran inherited a very dysfunctional waqf system. Iran in the 19th century was a 
country  with a history of conflict, arid lands and limited resources.15  At the beginning of the 20th 
century, aside from a rather efficient post and telegraph system, there were almost no industries or 
infrastructure to speak of, only a handful of schools and a country  generally  suffering from very 
poor healthcare.16  Healthcare, public education and infrastructure can all be categorised as public 
goods, which, historically, have been the responsibility of the institution of waqfs to provide. 
Waqfs, therefore, while collectively having the largest share of properties and endowments in the 
country, nonetheless failed to deliver what constituted their main reason for existing. 
Similar to other Middle Eastern countries, Iran underwent modernisation in the twentieth century, 
and its legal reformation was considered one of the main pillars of its development.  The process of 
modernisation in Iran was generally well received, particularly because in some aspects the new 
legal system was ahead of the rest of the Middle East. This created the general belief that Iranian 
15
15 Abrahamian (1982, p. 28).
16 Ibid.
civil law was largely  secular.17  The laws of waqf in Iran have also been codified and have 
undergone few additional changes during the last century. There is little written in Iran about the 
laws of waqf.  This lack of written scholarship might reflect that waqf is no longer a relevant 
institution with respect to delivering public goods, and that, because of waqf’s deep connections 
with Iranian clergymen, any writings on waqf run the risk of provoking this highly powerful and 
influential group.18 
The process of modernisation of Iran’s legal system
The main body of this thesis is dedicated to examining the laws of waqf in contemporary Iran. 
These are the laws which were initially codified into civil law in 1919 and which have remained 
more or less the same ever since. Three important events impacted the laws of waqf: in 1953, 1976 
and 1985.19  The codification of the laws in 1919 took place under the supervision of a few Islamic 
jurists.  Based on these jurists’ views, the most relevant fatwas of the Shi’ite jurists throughout 
history were selected and subsequently codified into civil law. The important point here is that the 
verdicts could have derived from jurists who issued fatwas as far back as the 13th century  and to the 
16
17  Scacht (1961, pp. 99–129); Anderson (1971, pp. 1–21; Abrahamian (1982, p. 140). Iran 
undertook huge modernisation plans, the most notable of which was started by Reza Shah; his main 
focus was modernising the country—in particular, the army, government bureaucracy and courts. 
Davar, the Swiss-educated jurist, was assigned the arduous task of completely  reorganising the 
Ministry of Justice. He replaced the traditionally trained judges with modern educated lawyers; 
introduced modified versions of the French Civil Code and the Italian Penal Code, despite the fact 
that some of their statutes contradicted Qu’ranic canons; and codified Sharia regulations concerning 
such personal matters as marriage, divorce and children’s guardianship. For example, Anderson 
points to the family  act of 1967 in Iran, which enabled an Iranian women to file for a divorce as a 
way of praising Iran’s legal transformation relative to rest of the Middle Eastern countries he 
examines. 
18 Najmabadi (1987, p. 206). For example, the first public anti-Shah’s speech of Ayatollah 
Khomeini in 1964 was related to a few waqf properties linked to a mosque, which were nationalised 
as a result of the White Revolution and subsequently were sold to peasants farmers.
19 Safar (2006, pp. 113–17)
20th century. In other words, the time when the fatwa was issued was not important, only the verdict 
was considered.
In 1953, as an attempt to modernise the waqf system, a law was introduced in which waqf could 
potentially update its administration. Finally, in 1976, waqf was given corporate status. This 
process, on the surface, seems to be a coherent development of the laws of waqf. However, as this 
thesis will demonstrate, the laws that were codified were merely versions of the traditional laws of 
waqf—which had their shortcomings.  They  were not clear, often contradictory  and case-based. 
Furthermore, when the waqf was given corporate status, its legal structure, which was rooted in the 
traditional laws based on an unincorporated model, needed to change and be updated. However, that 
process never took place. The legal structure of modern waqf laws, which was built on concepts 
alien to a legal personality, needed to be updated but remained unchanged. Hence, the contemporary 
laws of waqf kept the Islamic traditional law in their backbone, and the incompleteness of the 
modernisation of the laws kept them incoherent and often contradictory.
The development of these laws during the 20th century has been critically appraised in this thesis 
using the theory of legal rationalisation by Max Weber.  The following explains the terms and 
methodology in which this theory has been deployed.
Defining rationality
In the interest of proving the hypothesis, much emphasis has been placed on the idea of economic 
rationality.  The argument to large extent depends on comparing the traditional verdicts of jurists 
with what ultimately appeared in modern laws. In general, the idea has been that  modern laws are 
modern by  virtue of being rational; this is a concept that this study challenges. The concept of 
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“rationality” is derived from Weber’s extensive work on the sociology of the law, which was 
published after his death in volumes of his writing on economy and society.
An interesting point is that Weber himself was not very  clear about what he meant by rationality, as 
he used it in different contexts. To better understand his sociology of law, a brief discussion of his 
typology  of legal decision-making, and an explication of its relationship to economic development, 
is necessary. Weber’s specific emphasis on the rationality of the legal system emerged from his 
broad examination of law, which emphasised four central themes: coercion, legitimacy, 
normativeness and rationality.20 For Weber, the rationality of the legal system is about the degree to 
which the system is “capable of formulating, promulgating and applying universal rules.”21 
Furthermore, “rationality” signifies the use of “explicit, abstract, intellectually calculable rules and 
procedures instead of sentiment, tradition, and rule of thumb.”22
Weber used the term “formal legal rationality” in four different ways. First, to indicate the idea of 
being “governed by rules or principles”; second, in reference to the “systematic” nature of the legal 
order; third, as indicating that the method of legal analysis is focused on “the logical interpretation 
18
20 Trubek (1972, p. 725)
21 Ibid.
22 Wrong (1970, p. 26)
of meaning”; and finally, as indicating that techniques of dispute resolution are “control led by the 
intellect”.23
When forms of rationalisation are discussed, it is crucial to remember that these are oriented toward 
“values,” and that, for Weber, values are determined by sources external to the process of 
rationalisation. Therefore, the posited values influence the direction of the process of 
rationalisation. Weber himself may not have realised the importance of this assumption in 
discussing legal change. The majority  of Weber’s work emphasises objective rationality. 
Accordingly, he attempts to answer three questions: Which institutions in society  are being 
rationalised? What intermediate goals are being rationalised and in which direction are they being 
rationalised (i.e., the law can be rationalised to ensure the inequality  or equality of the members of a 
society)? What are the different forms that  rationalisation may take? Weber emphasises legal 
development as a process of increasing rationalisation. The importance of values in this process can 
be viewed as a counter-attack on the political and intellectual implications of Marx’s work.24
19
23  Kronman (1983, p. 70) acknowledges that the use of various meanings of the concept of legal 
rationality creates the impression that the term “legal rationalisation” is not well thought-out and 
introduces ambiguities into basic types of legal thought. Nevertheless, Kronman argues that a closer 
examination shows that the four meanings are interrelated and, taken as a whole, constitute the 
necessary  conditions for the formation of a rational legal system. A useful distinction is that 
between subjective and objective manifestations of rationality. Subjective rationality refers to the 
mental processes of actors, while objective rationality focuses on institutionalised norms. Weber's 
discussion of subjective rationality in his classification of types of social action derives from his 
contention that values and ideals, as well as economic forces, determine social structure. The 
importance of values becomes apparent in his typology of social action: (1) value-rational action, 
based on a belief in value for its own sake with respect  to some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other 
form of behaviour, independent of chances of success; (2) means/ends action, which aims at 
rationally balancing costs vis-à-vis alternative means to an end and the relative importance of 
possible ends; (3) traditional action reflective of customs; and (4) effectual action, based on 
emotional feelings. 
24 Hunt (1978, p. 123)
In short, the types of rationality  noted by Weber can be broken down into the following four 
categories based on their main characteristics. What has been said about rationality can be 
summarised in the table below. Furthermore, it is also expected that, as legal systems are 
rationalised, they move away from formal and substantive irrationality.
Forms of Legal Rules and Procedures
Irrational Rational 
1. Formal irrationality (magic, oracles) Formal rationality
1. Logical consistency and a completeness of rules 
(systematisation); 
2. Legal formalism (a tidiness of rules)
2. Substantive irrationality
(case-by-case decisions, unpredictable; 
determined based on outside criteria)
2. Legal formalism
(a tidiness of rules)
3. Limitations of rationality
(unsolvable problems,
“dialectical dilemmas”)
Instrumental rationality
1. The rules for making rules;
2. Autonomous legal rationalisation (generalisation);
3. Adaptive rationalisation (substantive rationality)
20
Based on the types of rationality outlined above, an Islamic judge or the jurists who have issued 
fatwas on waqf-related issues—and who are the main focus of this thesis—fall into the category of 
substantive irrationality.25 
Formal rationality involves the application of explicit, universal rules. Weber argued that  rules are 
not derived from a source external to the formal substantive legal rationalisation system; they are 
intrinsically legal. Here, he neglects both the legislative function of rule-making, a political process, 
and the executive function of rule enforcement—he carries the idea of legal autonomy too far. To 
the extent that legal analyses emphasise the development of closed systems of rationality, it follows 
that political, economic and legal systems have entirely  separate spheres of logic. The reality of the 
overlap of logic and rationality in the three systems does not support this view.
With a complete and internally consistent body of rules, decision-making becomes highly 
predictable. Vague or contradictory  rules can be dismissed in favour of a consistent, logical system 
of legal rules. Weber actually distinguished two sub-types of formally rational law: legal formalism 
and logically formal-rational law.26  Weber’s discussion is limited to the second sub-type, the 
logically formal-rational law, which he identified with European or continental law. The 
distinguishing feature of a formal-rational system is that the creators of the rules are bound by the 
rules they have created.27  He described the ideal role of the judge in a strictly  formal-rational 
system:
The judge is more or less an automaton of paragraphs: the legal documents, together with 
the costs and fees, are put in at the top, with the expectation that a judgment will emerge at 
21
25 Ibid.
26 Bendix (1960)
27 Weber (1945); Allen & Cain (1980)
the bottom, together with more or less sound arguments—apparatus whose functioning, 
accordingly, is by and large calculable or predictable. 
On the other hand, substantively rational decision-making relies on systematic general rules that are 
not strictly  legal. The rules may come from religion, ethics, political ideology or economics. A 
theocratic legal system that uses religious writings as the basis of its legal code and decision-
making is an instance of substantive rational law. Having an insanity defence intervene in cases 
involving legally defined crimes (e.g., murder), or using community  standards in order to define 
pornographic materials, are also instances of substantive rational law.
Framework of analysis
Waqf is one those very few institutions that  can trace its heritage over a millennium. Its legal 
structure also has evolved throughout this long stretch of time, and, as was mentioned earlier, the 
modern laws of waqf are merely the codification of the traditional laws that have been selected 
from the verdicts of the most prominent Shi’ite jurists in the past seven centuries or so. The verdicts 
may have derived from cases that now seem dated, unfamiliar or strange, and there seems to be no 
order in which the jurists have dealt with the issues. For example, a jurist recorded a question about 
whether objects made out of gold and silver can be converted into waqf, followed by the minimum 
age and sex for a founder of a waqf.
The next chapter in this thesis provides a thorough background on the main legal, socioeconomic 
and historical reasons behind establishing a waqf. Once the motives been studied, why and how the 
laws, which are case-based, have come about makes more sense. For the remaining chapter of the 
thesis, the first task for analysing the material used for this study was to put it  into an order. The 
laws of waqf have been broken down to the most basic ones, and, as the chapters progress, they 
become more and more complicated in order to showcase a waqf from its legal point  of view as best 
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as possible. At every stage of this process, the laws have been critically  appraised to highlight the 
consequences of sticking with the traditional laws and the advances that have been made throughout 
the modernisation of the laws of waqf. Those contributing factors to the performance of the waqf 
system and those laws that have been deemed incoherent or contradictory have been highlighted.
Discussion of sources
Most of the studies on waqf in recent years have been conducted on the waqfs of places that used to 
be part of the Ottoman Empire. Because of this area’s world-famous archives, especially those 
concerning waqfs, researchers have had access not only to the deeds and documents specific to the 
endowments being studied but also to the court cases in which those endowments have appeared. 
Therefore, it has been possible to draw a clear picture concerning the establishment of endowments 
in these countries, inclusive of the administrative and numerous other challenges that often landed 
them in court and eventually generated verdicts by jurists (the primary sources which have been 
used in this study).
Conducting a direct comparative study between Iran and any of those places is almost impossible, 
due to a lack of such archival information in Iran. However, the jurists in Iran did keep records of 
their verdicts on disputes and challenges related to waqfs. In most cases, the exact waqf and the 
specific details pertaining to it remain unknown; nonetheless, some invaluable information can be 
extracted from these cases based on their characters and respective verdicts. Interestingly, the cases 
that jurists registered in their own records share many similarities with the official records found in 
the Ottoman archives.
For example, Shatzmiller notes the following case:
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 In two fatwas written in the 14th and 15th centuries in Fez in Morocco, individuals used 
 building materials left over from the building of a mosque for private use; one used rocks, 
 the other sold an old pillar that  belonged to the waqf. The first claimed that the rocks had 
 been left  lying in a field; he used them to build a wall of a castle. He justified this in several 
 ways: first, he claimed that he had received a fatwa allowing him to do so, then that the
rocks had been excavated when the foundations were dug out, and that because the palace 
belonged to the state's treasury, the makhzen, he was justified in using the leftover material. 
 The jurist rejected his claim, saying that the rocks belonged to the waqf and could 
not be used for anything else, regardless of whether or not the government was involved. In 
the second instance, a man had removed a pillar from a ruined mosque and had installed it in 
the Friday communal mosque, The Jami', to replace an existing pillar. The discarded pillar 
was then sold to a private contractor, who built an arch and two elevations on it. The jurist 
said that the pillar could not be diverted to private use; therefore, the guilty  parties should 
return the property. The old pillar was returned and everything built  on it was destroyed. The 
related expenses were to be paid by the man who removed it from the mosque.28
Helli, a very prominent jurist from the same time period in Iran, wrote about this case: “If a 
wooden column in a mosque breaks, one may not sell that column to finance a new one. 
Moreover, the broken column shall be transplanted to somewhere else in that mosque.”29
The existence of many similar examples suggests that, although the material for comparative 
research is not identical, the nature of the problems is essentially the same; therefore, comparisons 
can be utilised in order to determine whether different jurists issue different verdicts on the same 
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28 Shatsmiller (2001, pp. 44–74) 
29 Shirazi (1998, p. 306)
issues. By studying the verdicts of jurists instead of court cases, the exact endowment of a given 
waqf, its founder, when it was established, and what happened to it afterward generally remains 
unknown. However, the problem that was presented to a jurist and his verdict provides much 
valuable information, which can help us to reconstruct the respective cases. Moreover, studying a 
jurist’s verdict opens previously  undiscovered avenues of research. Unlike court cases, which are 
rich in detail but limited in scope, the verdicts related to a specific jurist on the subject of waqfs are 
usually  no longer than one chapter in a book covering hundreds of different topics. In other words, 
by examining the cases and verdicts that were recorded by jurists, more legal ground can be covered 
than would be treated the case if one only  considered court cases. On the other hand, the court cases 
measure the effectiveness of the verdicts. If a verdict was reasonable, then it would have had an 
impact on the respective endowment, something that one cannot determine solely  by reading a 
jurist’s books.
This study relies heavily on primary sources, all of which were translated from Persian or Arabic 
into English. Finding the sources and identifying the correct ones for this study  was a process that 
began by  studying Iran’s modern laws related to waqfs. The search began with reading various 
journals and books that considered waqf, from which the idea behind this thesis (the role of waqf in 
socioeconomic development) was born. However, it  soon became apparent that there was very  little, 
if anything, written specifically on the waqf in contemporary Iran in English. The research included 
three trips to Iran in the summer of 2007 and two trips to Iran during 2008.
In the earliest journey, my first point of contact was the Waqfs Organisation (Edareye-Owqaf), 
where I learnt about their journal (Waqf, Mirath-e- Javidan). I also made contact  with historians, 
including the late Drs Iraj Afshar and Ayneh Vand from Tarbiat Moddares University, to ask their 
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views and expertise on the subject. Subsequently, books published on waqf, dissertations written on 
the subject, and all sixty issues of the journal, were purchased and shipped to St Andrews.
During subsequent journeys to Iran, the sole focus was finding sources which dealt  specifically with 
the laws of waqf.  Meetings were arranged with Dr. Ayatollah Mohaqeq-e- Damad and Dr. Nasir 
Katouzian, both of whom are among the most respected legal theorists in Iran. The former is a 
senior professor of law at the University  of Shahid Beheshti in Tehran and an ayatollah, the most 
senior rank in the Shi’ite school of law. The latter is an author of the most acclaimed series of books 
on the doctrine of laws in Iran and among the most prominent lawyers in Iran. The first set of 
primary sources was suggested by these two professors.  In addition to these meetings, various 
issues of waqf had already been learnt  through reading the journal of Waqf Mirath-e- Javidan, while 
meetings had been arranged with some of the authors who had contributed to the journal.
 
The sources are the published verdicts of various jurists. Most are in Persian, although some are in 
Arabic (most  of them were, in fact, originally in Arabic, but many were later translated into 
Persian). The traditional sources begin with early  Shi'ite scholars from the 14th century, namely 
Mohammad Jamaluddin al-Makki al-Amili (Shahid-e-Avval), who produced the very influential 
work Lom’e, and continue to the 20th century, with Ayatollah Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Vasileh. The 
important point to mention here is that, According to Article 167 of the Iranian Constitution, judges 
must make use of  “Islamic sources and fatwas” in matters concerning which the Iranian law books 
are silent. Waqf by  its nature is an Islamic institution and is anchored heavily in Sharia. Hence, in 
modern legal system of Iran Judges use the Islamic sources and fatwas on a regular basis to tackle 
the cases that are brought forward to them. These sources and fatwas date from the early days of 
Islam to contemporary times. Furthermore, the fatwas, if they are supporting the case, can be used 
regardless of the original time in which they were issued. In other words, a judge can cite a fatwa 
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that supports his case but was initially issued in the 13th century and another fatwa from the 20th 
century; both fatwas have equal weight in the eyes of the law. The major challenge when referring 
to those sources is that they can be unclear and contradictory, or appear to be strange according to 
modern understanding. Therefore, judges try to interpret the ways in which their cases would fit 
into one of those cases that have appeared in the sources.
These sources were also purchased in Iran and shipped to St Andrews. In order to secure access to a 
few rare sources, trips to the libraries of the Majlis and Tehran University were made. At all times, 
Iran’s primary reference books on contemporary  waqf laws were consulted, such as those used as 
manuals by  lawyers and judges in Iran; these were published by Dr. Emami and Dr. Katouzian. 
These were the sources used to establish which verdicts of the Ulama would be codified into Iran’s 
contemporary Civil Law. 
The second set of primary (and secondary) sources consisted of issues of the journal Waqf Mirath-e 
Javidan. This journal has been in publication in Iran since 1993 and deals exclusively with waqf in 
Iran. The main focus of the journal is the cultural side of waqfs, which is quite a vast subject. 
However, regular articles on legal issues and even statistics have been published, and these have 
been used throughout this study. 
The third component of the primary sources is indicative of the extensive range of waqf 
manuscripts (waqf deeds) that have been identified and collected in Iran. Special thanks are due to 
Mr. Sahebdivani,30  the mutawalli for one of the largest waqfs in Iran, for providing in-depth 
information about many of Iran’s endowments, as well as providing some of the manuscripts of the 
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30 This invaluable source came as a surprise to me. I met another Iranian student at St Andrews, 
who was pursuing a PhD in physics. When I explained my thesis topic, she informed me that her 
family has a few waqf complexes in Iran that are among the largest in the country. I am so grateful 
to her and the fact that she brought all of their waqf deeds to me from Shiraz.
related waqf deeds dating back to the 18th century. In addition to these deeds, several other 
manuscripts were used in my case studies. Needless to say, all of these manuscripts are in Persian 
and were translated into English. Last, but not least, most of the relevant secondary sources are in 
English and focus on the socioeconomic aspect of waqfs, which have also been taken into account. 
Chapter structure
Chapter 2: Motives behind establishing a waqf
The aim of this chapter is to familiarise the reader with the socioeconomic and political reasons that 
motivated people to convert their assets into waqfs throughout history. In order to understand and 
analyse the laws of waqf, it is vital to understand their relation to Islamic law as a whole. Waqfs are 
often perceived as pure acts of patronage and charity. However, in reality many  factors have 
contributed to the founding of waqfs. Many laws, such as the Islamic law of succession and Islamic 
laws regulating private property financing, have provided motivation for the establishment of 
waqfs. In other words, by converting a property into a waqf, one could potentially circumvent the 
law of inheritance, gain more security  over one’s private property, possibly use the waqf as a tool 
for financing projects, and so forth. Furthermore, many  socioeconomic factors have had a direct 
influence on decisions to convert assets into waqfs. Establishing a waqf could be a way of showing 
one’s piety, gaining credibility and status, or supporting a political cause. The aim of this chapter is 
to explore the historical development of the waqf and the primary reasons for establishing waqfs. 
This background is necessary for understanding why many of the laws of waqf were established as 
well as the extent of their effectiveness.
Chapter 3: The founding of a waqf
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This chapter considers the main players with respect to waqfs based on traditional Islamic law as 
well as which aspects have been codified into Iran’s modern civil law. This chapter lays the 
groundwork for the ensuing chapters. Who can establish a waqf, who can benefit from a waqf and 
what may or may not be converted into a waqf are the main subjects of discussion in this chapter. 
The answers to these questions not only shed light on certain issues and shortcomings related to the 
system, they also lay the ground for the next chapters, which deal with the players, their 
interactions, and the problems that ensue. This chapter shows the natural progression of waqfs in 
terms of reaching new beneficiaries and providing new goods. 
Chapter 4: Legal effects
The aim of this chapter is to show the legal transactions that take place between the main players 
associated with waqfs and the relationship between endowments and the state. The initial goal is to 
identify what  happens to the ownership of waqf properties. In order for a piece of property  to be 
protected by  the state, ownership needs to be clearly established; more importantly, transfers of 
ownership must be formally recorded. The debate begins with the act of establishing a waqf, at 
which point the founder allegedly loses his rights over his property, in spite of the fact that no new 
owner for the property has been selected. The second phase of the discussions revolves around the 
transaction of founding a waqf, and whether or not such a transaction can be considered a contract. 
Any verdict  concerning the ownership  of a waqf property is dependent on how this question is 
answered. In short, the jurists thus far have not provided a consensus verdict regarding the 
ownership of waqf properties. This might be considered one of the primary  reasons for the many 
problems which waqf properties face. These may all be related to the absence of a legal personality 
in traditional Islamic law and, as the study shows, granting waqf a corporate status was not enough 
to make all of its legal parameters relevant.
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Chapter 5: Administration
This chapter primarily  examines the administration of waqfs, as well as some of the other economic 
activities of waqfs, such as selling, renting, dividing, etc. By  introducing another player involved in 
waqfs, the mutawalli or administrator of a waqf, this chapter considers the legal framework within 
which a waqf must be administered. Ambiguities surrounding the ownership of waqf properties, 
their lack of corporate status, and many waqf-related concepts, such as the perpetuity, irrevocability 
and inalienability of waqfs, prevent mutawallis from deploying new means of technology  and 
managerial innovations, as well as from using their own judgement in order to best  exploit 
endowments. Much work was needed by  the legislators to improve the laws of waqf concerning 
mutawallis. However, as this study shows, many of the new concepts that were borrowed from laws 
related to modern corporations and incorporated into the laws related to waqfs were not  sufficiently 
woven into the fabric of the codified laws to make a difference. Furthermore, this study considers 
many of the problems with which waqfs have had to grapple, such as economic entities, and the 
impact this has had on neighbouring properties. Finally, a few case studies support the arguments, 
and the chapter chronicles the most recent  developments in waqf laws in Iran, such as the 
resurrection of terminated waqfs, and their broader socioeconomic impact.
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Chapter II: The motives behind establishing a waqf
This chapter considers three main questions. First, what have been the primary roles of the waqf as 
an institution within Islamic economies over the years? In most cases, the waqf has been studied 
from a charitable and patronage perspective. However, the waqf has played a much larger economic 
role in Islamic countries such as Iran than has generally been imagined. Second, what have been the 
immediate and long-term motivations behind establishing waqfs? The accumulation of properties 
converted into waqfs over the centuries is immense. There must, therefore, have been recurring 
patterns, the understanding of which is instrumental to a proper understanding of waqf laws. These 
will be examined in the following chapters. Finally, what are the main shortcomings and challenges 
with which waqfs must grapple? Altogether, this chapter should shed some light on the relative 
effectiveness of this institution in fulfilling its duties over the long term. 
Before discussing the economic roles of waqfs beyond charitable acts and acts of patronage, some 
of the fundamentals of the Islamic economy must be addressed.  There are four main aspects of an 
Islamic economy upon which all of the Islamic schools of law agree and which even modern 
Islamic economists might advocate. These four pillars are: the Islamic tax, Zakat, the law of 
inheritance, and a ban on charging interest upon lending money (which results in a lack of any 
financial institutions or corporations). These are the main elements characterising an Islamic 
economy. These four pillars create a peculiar economic environment, far from ideal for anyone 
attempting to operate in it.
On the one hand, the lack of financing means that development projects are unable to flourish or 
even begin in ordinary ways. Islamic taxation does not seem fair and creates inequality between 
different classes of society. One is left with very limited testimonial power, and the protection of 
one’s wealth through the formation of a corporation often has not been possible. The institution of 
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the waqf has been utilised as a way of overcoming these obstacles. The waqf is an institution that, 
on the surface, is charitable; more importantly, it is heavily rooted in Sharia, which gives it a great 
deal of stability.31 
The contributing factors that have resulted in the growth and, subsequently, the immense scale of 
the waqf as an institution in Iran are numerous. However, they can be narrowed down to a few of 
primary importance. These elements not only change based on historical context, they also 
influence the decisions of jurists in creating waqfs’ legal parameters, the focus of the next chapters. 
Among the main reasons why people convert their assets into waqfs, the protection of private 
property  ranks highest. In addition to the legal shortcomings of Islamic law, which does not accord 
much significance to such rights, the harsh historical events in Iran related to its many foreign 
occupations and consecutive dynastic changes have added to the ever-growing problem of 
protecting private property. These factors have contributed to the growing popularity  of, and 
advocation for, waqfs—a mechanism whereby the confiscation of property becomes more difficult 
and costly as well as an efficient system for sheltering wealth and escaping taxation.
The law of inheritance can also be circumvented effectively by  converting one’s assets into a waqf. 
The waqf empowers one with all of the testimonial wishes of which Islamic law deprives one 
(according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law, one has no testimonial rights beyond one third of 
his assets). By establishing a waqf, such restrictions can be circumvented, thus creating new 
possibilities.
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31  The origin of waqfs as they currently exist is the subject of dispute. Some advocates of waqfs 
trace them back to the early days of Islam and claim that they received the seal of approval from the 
Prophet himself. On the other hand, much contemporary research shows that  they began around 
100–150 years after the birth of Islam, as a result of significant changes in the Islamic community at 
the time. For more on this subject, see Appendix II.
Islamic law prevents the lending of money; this stipulation has created an economic environment 
without financial institutions. A waqf creates a mechanism that facilities the financing of 
development projects as well as the maintenance and operation of establishment. The activities of 
those waqfs that provide public goods rendered from revenue generated by  other waqf 
establishments.32 Moreover, the establishment of a waqf can be undertaken as an act of piety or with 
a political motivation in mind. In either case, the founder benefits by  gaining social status, as in 
most cases his or her name stays on the waqf indefinitely.
The waqf appears to be an ingenious system, one that  potentially could overcome the many legal 
obstacles that have resulted from the rigidities of traditional Islamic law. However, the waqf in 
reality  has more or less been a short-term remedy  rather than a long-term solution. Most research on 
waqfs has shown the many challenges with which institutions, and the jurists who were in charge of 
the legal aspects of them, have had to grapple, many  of which might never become rationalised. 
There are still many  shortcomings in the system, such as ambiguities over the ownership of waqf 
property  and the lack of the concept of a corporation. In reality, most founders of waqfs have only 
gained a temporary  solution regarding the future of their assets. In the long run, however, they 
become alienated from their endowed assets.
The Islamic economy and its fundamental characteristics
The law of inheritance
There are few economic rules in the Qur’an, which is not meant to function as a manual for 
economic management. One exception concerns the rules related to inheritance, which are the most 
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32  A waqf can be established to serve the ultimate purpose (i.e., a hospital) or the activities of the 
same hospital can be supported from a variety  of other waqfs . For example, the cost of heating and 
the maintenance of the same hospital may come from the generated revenues of a farm that has also 
been converted into a waqf in order to support the activities of that hospital.
detailed and most explicit. Two-thirds of any  estate is reserved, according to complex rules, for an 
extended list of relatives, including offspring, parents, siblings and even more distant relatives. The 
number of legal heirs can be large compared to those mandated by a wide array of other inheritance 
practices. The inheritance left to an individual’s discretion is limited to one-third of her or his 
estate.33 
This system has a visible distributional effect and limits the concentration of wealth in any given 
individual. At the same time, it  hinders the preservation of successful enterprises, or other 
properties, across generations. One could maintain a property undivided by  forming a proprietary 
partnership or by having a single heir buy out the rest. Nevertheless, the system’s net effect has 
been to fragment property, especially financial wealth. Moreover, “the explicitness of the Qur’anic 
commandments made it unlikely that wealth holders concerned about fragmentation would 
challenge them”.34
The concept of corporation
A striking aspect of classical Islamic law is the absence of corporate structures, collective 
enterprises possessing legal rights distinct from those of the individuals who finance or serve it. A 
corporation creates its own internal rules, possesses property, makes contracts, and files legal 
claims. Its members, as individuals, do not owe its debts. Its decisions do not require the approval 
of each of its members. It  can live on after its founders die or retire. Given the absence of corporate 
structures, Islamic law only  recognises individuals. Partners can sue one another, of course, as 
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33 Kuran (2004, p. 72)
34 Ibid., p. 74
parties to a contract, but a partnership has no legal standing as a distinct  entity. A third party  can 
thus sue one or more partners, but never the partnership itself.35
Timur Khan argues that “the prevailing inheritance system will matter, then, to contractual 
practices”.36  The greater the number of potential heirs, the greater the threat of early termination; 
partners recognise that  if many people have claims on their partnership’s assets, the resolution will 
be complicated, thus imposing high costs on all involved parties. They also recognise that  the larger 
the partnership, the greater the likelihood of a premature death within their ranks, and, hence, the 
more likely it is that the mission will terminate early. If heirs are likely to be numerous, then 
incentives will exist to limit partnership size as a means of minimising the risk of early termination. 
In mandating the division of estates among a potentially very long list  of relatives, the Islamic 
inheritance system has thus created a basis for keeping partnerships small.37
More important in the long run are a host of dynamic consequences. The prevalence of small 
partnerships has hindered Iran from meeting the challenges of organisational development. In the 
absence of expanding partnership size, no need arose to develop standardised accounting 
techniques, to create hierarchical management practices, or to address the problems of multi-polar 
communication. In other words, it was unnecessary to search for increasingly sophisticated 
organisational forms. Admirably adapted to the initial environment in which it achieved its classical 
form, Islamic contract law stagnated over the subsequent millennium.
The prohibition of interest
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36 Ibid., p. 86
37 Ibid., p. 89
Of all of the injunctions cited, the most celebrated is the prohibition on interest. The hostility  to 
interest is based on the belief that the Qur'an bans all interest, regardless of its rate or form. In fact, 
what the Qur'an bans is Reba, the pre-Islamic Arabian practice of doubling the debt of a borrower 
who is unable to make restitution on schedule, inclusive of both the principal and the accumulated 
interest. Reba tended to push defaulters into enslavement, so it was an acute source of social 
friction. From the earliest  days of Islam to the present, various interpreters of the Qur'an have held, 
accordingly, that the purpose of the ban on Reba was simply to block socially harmful financial 
practices. They  have suggested that the ban was intended, like the bankruptcy  laws of a modern 
state, to make creditors deal charitably with debtors who are unable to make timely payment.38
 The rationale for prohibition differs according to whether the loan is a consumption loan or a 
business loan, although the principle of fairness is central to both cases. If interest is charged on a 
consumption loan, the lender makes money without exerting any effort and without giving the 
borrower something in return. If interest is charged on a business loan, the lender's return is fixed 
while that of the borrower is variable (a bank deposit  is treated as a special kind of business loan, 
whereby the depositor is the lender and the bank the borrower).39
Transactions involving speculation caused by avoidable ignorance are considered objectionable, 
again on the grounds that they may result in unearned gain for one party and undeserved loss for the 
other. Thus, the sale of a pregnant camel is prohibited because her value depends on the sex of the 
offspring, which, until known, may generate speculation. Likewise, an orange tree in blossom may 
not be sold, because neither the quantity nor the quality of its yield can, at this stage, be predicted. It 
36
38Robinson (1974, p. 71)
39 Ibid., p. 112
is also considered illegal to trade a piece of cloth that has not  been examined carefully by  both 
parties, lest one or the other have misperceptions regarding the cloth's properties.40
The prohibition of interest, deceptively straightforward from an abstract point of view, poses a 
fundamental practical problem that many writers do not acknowledge. For example, assuming 
inflation, is the borrower of a consumption loan obligated to compensate the lender for changes in 
purchasing power? Some of the writers who address the issue refrain from taking a position; those 
who do are divided, with some saying that fairness requires the indexation of loans and others that  it 
bars indexation. Those who favour indexation note that whether the relevant price level should be 
based on the lender's consumption basket or that of the borrower is unresolved.41
Profit and loss sharing, the favoured alternative to interest in the case of a business loan, presents 
another problem, one that has received little attention. Suppose an elderly person takes his savings 
to the only Islamic bank in his neighbourhood, which offers him a profit-and-loss-sharing deal, 
whereby it receives 99% of any profits and, correspondingly, incurs 99% of any losses. Is this deal 
fair from an Islamic standpoint? If the answer is “no” or “not necessarily,” what constitutes the line 
of demarcation? One writer who takes up the issue states that the shares are to be determined by 
custom, as if a practice becomes fair by virtue of being customary.42  Another writer, using a 
mathematical model, contends that the shares are to be determined through the interaction of supply 
and demand for contracts—as if an equilibrium allocation could never be off-centre. Lastly, Murat 
Cizaka, a Turkish professor of economics, argues that a major factor underlying the Islamic world's 
economic backwardness has been the inadequacy of credit opportunities for entrepreneurs. The 
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development of the Islamic world will thus require, he argues, the establishment of vast numbers of 
venture capital firms, which will provide funds to promising companies in return for some of their 
shares.43
The Islamic tax (Zakat)
A waqf creates a suitable way for escaping taxation. Islamic tax is a very large and complicated 
matter, over which there is much disagreement and dispute between different schools of law and 
jurists. In this section, the main characteristics of such taxation in modern Islamic economies are 
highlighted.44
A much-proclaimed obligation is the redistribution scheme known as Zakat, which entails taxing 
specified wealth holders and income earners at  rates varying between 2.5 and 20% and using the 
proceeds to aid disadvantaged members of society, such as the poor, the handicapped, the 
unemployed, the dependents of prisoners, orphans, and travellers in difficulty. The coverage of 
Zakat is controversial. Some writers consider it to be limited to those categories of wealth and 
income for which rates were specified during the early years of Islam. Others consider it to include 
categories that until recently were unknown, such as factories and motorised vehicles. No consensus 
exists, however, among reformist writers regarding the limits of coverage and the applicable rates. 
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44  Kuran (1989). In the massive contemporary literature that has come to be known as "Islamic 
economics”, the claim is repeatedly made that an Islamic economic system would achieve a greater 
degree of economic justice than existing capitalist and socialist systems. An Islamic system, it is 
said, would be free, on the one hand, of the exploitation and severe inequalities characteristic of 
capitalism, and, on the other, of the class struggles and intolerable restrictions that are the hallmarks 
of socialism. Inconsistencies, ambiguities and disagreements exist, however, in all of the great 
bodies of literature concerned with creating a just world, diverse writings rooted in Judaism, 
Christianity, Marxist socialism, and Third World nationalism among them. Islamic economics, 
however, did not emerge from a drive to correct economic imbalances, injustices or inequalities. 
Nonetheless, the ideals of fairness and equality  are at the core of Islamic economic thoughts and 
writings.
Regardless of how they  perceive Zakat, all Islamic economists believe that it is a very  powerful 
instrument for bringing an economy in line with the principle of equality.45
The purpose of Zakat, as shown here, is to promote equality by redistributing wealth from the 
“haves” to the “have-nots”. It  is by  no means self-evident, however, that Zakat achieves this 
purpose. Because it entails taxing only some categories of income and wealth, and at various rates, 
its distributional impact depends on a society’s composition. Its narrow version places the burden of 
taxation entirely on categories of income and wealth that  were known during the early  years of 
Islam—notably  agriculture, mining and precious metals. With greater economic justice in 
industrialisation, and the explosion of the service sector, these sources of income and wealth have 
dwindled in importance, even in the least-developed countries. Additionally, most poor households 
in today's world are concentrated in agriculture, while most wealthy households exist outside 
agriculture.46
It is not clear, therefore, that Zakat would promote equality; indeed, it might well promote 
inequality. This conjecture is supported by a study of one of the narrow Zakat schemes currently in 
existence. Yet, what about the broader schemes that have been proposed? It is certainly possible that 
they  would play an equalising role, although this remains to be demonstrated. The impact of any 
particular scheme will depend on the characteristics of the economy to which it is applied. A 
scheme that serves as a strong equaliser in a contemporary economy dominated by industry  and 
agriculture could lose its potency as services—for which rates have not been specified—gain in 
importance. 47
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Only a proportional tax at a fixed rate along the pattern of Zakat is to be levied on the accumulated 
wealth of capable taxpayers without any distinction. Yet another Islamic economist sees merit in 
both positions: “Proportional taxation becomes Islamic if income and wealth are already distributed 
according to Islamic economic egalitarian criteria . . . However, in the existence of the 
misdistribution of income and wealth . . . a progressive system of taxation should be invoked.”48
Underlying this particular controversy is the fact that the principle of equality is subject to many 
different interpretations. Indeed, writers who agree that "moderate" inequality is acceptable often 
disagree over the limits of moderation. It is worth noting that  such disagreement is anything but 
new to Islam; even the early caliphs saw the limits differently.49
Regarding the disbursement of Zakat funds, writers disagree as to whether funds collected in one 
year can be spent during another. Related to this, a few reasons can be mentioned why, until now, 
the equalising effect of Zakat has been disappointing (in those countries where it has been applied). 
First, Zakat revenue is limited everywhere by low rates, vast loopholes and widespread evasion. 
Second, the costs of administering the system, inclusive of losses due to official corruption, have 
been high. Finally, large shares of the raised revenue finance causes other than poverty reduction, 
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religious education and pilgrimages to Mecca among them.50
Islamic tax is ambiguous; it  may not be fair, and its usage is limited. It is, therefore, not a reliable 
source of funding for public goods. The waqf, on the other hand, is more concrete. True, the 
founder has to follow a strict protocol as to how everything is established and so forth; nonetheless, 
a waqf can be spent on a vast variety  of public goods and provide numerous services (at least, this 
was the case during the preindustrial age), which gives it  a significant advantage over Islamic tax. 
The next section considers the main socioeconomic, historical and legal reasons behind the 
establishment of waqfs. The vast scale of the institution suggests that it has taken a long time for it 
to become widespread. Recent research in this area provides us with a wealth of knowledge 
regarding the main reasons why people convert their assets into waqf.51
Motives for founding a waqf
We have established that the legalities underlying waqfs were formally  ratified by sharia law. The 
main point made in the first section of this chapter is that the waqf is heavily anchored in the socio-
economic demands of society. In this section, the most important reasons as to why one might wish 
to establish a waqf will be considered. It should be noted, however, that such reasons have varied 
from time to time and from place to place. 
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There has been a general belief that  the founder of an endowment for a pious purpose will receive a 
reward in the next life. This wish can be observed in almost any testamentary endowment. For 
example, one founder expresses the desire to see “the face of God the almighty and the abundance 
of his momentous reward.” Most often, the waqf formula is followed by  selected citations from the 
Qur’an: for instance, “we will not waste the wage of him who does the good work,” meaning that 
the family waqf is founded on the presumed charity  and piety  of its founder. A specific waqf might 
be established for “the poor among my children and my children’s children”, or “for the poor and 
the Imam Hossein”, or “for the poor relatives of the founder, and his parents”. It  might be even 
more specific, designating only one side of the family. Alternatively, it  might  be for the benefit of 
the founder’s children and a designated mosque or school, or, in a less specific manner, for the 
benefit of his children and the poor or sick in general.
A family  endowment might be established for a variety of reasons. For example, it could be created 
as an act of piety, as a legal fiction to prevent revocation of a sale, to secure property  whose 
ownership is disputed, or to avoid confiscation. It can also be a sign of affection toward a dying 
husband, wife, or other individual. Whatever the motivation, and regardless of the true wishes of the 
founder, the endowment ultimately  serves the purpose of keeping the property  intact. Stated another 
way, it is established in order to ensure the entitlement of beneficiaries for the duration of the 
object’s existence, and in order to regulate the transfer of usufructuary52 rights from one generation 
to the next. The waqf institution provides the founder with the power to make decisions about the 
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52  This term comes from Roman law. Usufruct is the right of temporary possession and enjoyment of something that 
belongs to somebody else, so far as that can be done without causing damage or changing its substance. For example, a 
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days a usufructuary can be a trustee who enjoys the produce or income from property he holds in trust for somebody 
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future of his assets, something denied him by the law of inheritance. Moreover, by creating a family 
waqf, the founder can be more selective regarding which of his descendants will inherit his assets.
Thus, for example, a waqf may have been established for the founder’s sons and their lineal 
descendants, yet it is not uncommon to encounter clauses stating that if the line of males comes to 
an end the daughters and their descendants, frequently specified as waqfnamehes, shall take charge 
of the waqf.
Indeed, based on this, it has been suggested that, although, historically, female lineage has often not 
been treated equally, Muslim communities have been less patriarchal than previously thought. There 
are many  examples in which family waqfs were used to supplement the rights of female 
descendants. Despite the fact that, in most  cases, agnatic descendants still received a greater share, 
the shares could become more equal over time, with the arrival of grandchildren. For example, there 
have been waqfs for which the related revenues were to be divided equally among the founder’s 
male and female children and grandchildren. In a more specific way, we can divide the reasons 
behind establishing a waqf into a few categories.
The protection of private property
Among members of the wealthy classes, there have been those who stood to gain from certain 
provisions that enhance the attractiveness of founding a waqf. Accordingly, the specifics of the 
waqf system probably emerged as a compromise between the personal incentives of these officials 
and their incentives as servants of the state.
The search for well-specified and strictly  enforced property rights is a major theme in every society, 
past and present. The mere recognition of private property rights offers no solution, of course, as 
long as the state can revoke that recognition unilaterally. What is needed is some institution to 
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compel the state to relinquish that power by constraining its own future actions. In pre-modern Iran, 
the waqf served as a credible commitment device. The sacredness of the waqf has given it 
considerable protection against confiscation, as rulers were averse to developing a reputation of 
impiety. The credibility of their commitment to respect the inviolability of the waqf strengthened 
insofar as rulers pursued a hands-off policy toward waqf-owned properties. It was also reinforced as 
the main beneficiaries of the resulting security  strengthened the Islamic legitimacy  of waqfs through 
the spread of hadiths. Finally, the establishment of a pattern respecting the inviolability  of the waqf 
made it  all the more difficult for rulers to confiscate waqf assets without appearing impious. The 
waqf, then, served as a device that enhanced material security. It  also served as a vehicle for 
supplying public goods in a decentralised manner. From the standpoint of a waqf founder, these two 
functions are obviously in conflict.
It seems that what limited the wealth-sheltering function of waqfs is the demand for social services. 
The ruling class, which stood to lose tax revenue, generally  allowed the process, giving the waqf 
Islamic legitimacy on the provision that the founders were required to supply socially desirable 
services. Rulers had a stake in this requirement, for it relieved them of responsibilities believed to 
have been fulfilled under the rulership of the Prophet. Their implicit contracts with the founders of 
waqfs fostered growth and prosperity, thereby earning them legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects 
and solidifying their political power. To qualify these contracts as "implicit" is to note that no 
convention was held to restore conflicting social interests and establish a broadly  acceptable trade-
off. The institution did not  have to be developed from scratch because various ancient peoples—
Persians, Egyptians, Turks, Jews, Byzantines, Romans and others—had developed similar 
structures. Just as Islam itself did not emerge in a historical vacuum, so, too, did the first  founders 
of Islamic trusts, and the jurists who shaped the relevant regulations, almost certainly draw 
inspiration from models already  present around them. Yet the waqf is sufficiently different from 
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each of its pre-Islamic forerunners, so much so that it might be considered a distinctly Islamic 
institution. Although non-Islamic influences were obviously important early on, the waqf 
subsequently  took on a life of its own. Not only  did the waqf turn into a defining aspect of Islamic 
civilisation, it went on to become a source of cross-civilisation emulation.53
There is no limit on the size of a waqf created by individuals. There are many  examples where 
individuals have even designated their entire properties as family waqfs.54  A religious scholar 
might, for example, designate his immovable property, inclusive of orchards, farms, bathhouses and 
shops, as a waqf. More frequently, however, a founder will designate a piece of property, or a 
fraction of it, as a family waqf; these might be residential properties, such as a room (bayt), house 
(dar) or compound (rab), or non-residential properties, such as shops or a fraction thereof. Family 
endowments vary in size, as well: they might consist of a store, a bathhouse, agricultural properties 
such as orchards, or, in some cases, entire villages.55  Finally, it is not uncommon for a founder to 
designate just a part of a property  as a family waqf: for instance, half of a house, one quarter of a 
jointly held compound, half of a nonspecific share of several shops, or two-thirds of a well-known 
strip of land. It  is likely that, over the course of time, considerable segments of the urban and rural 
landscape have been converted from private into waqf property.
The most secure method of ensuring the perpetuity of a waqf (and its assets) is to include a religious 
institution such as a mosque or a school; in Iran, it  is not uncommon to designate a waqf in honour 
of the Imam Hossein as its ultimate beneficiary. Furthermore, a founder can establish certain 
personal affiliations with these institutions. For example, in one case the founder of a testamentary 
waqf stipulated that in the event that his descendants’ line came to an end, the waqf’s revenues 
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would revert to the imam of a mosque, who would use these revenues to renovate or restore the 
mosque and to help his students learn Qur’an. Other founders have designated specific individuals 
to become the ultimate beneficiaries of their waqfs—the muezzin of a mosque or religious 
functionaries who say prayers over the graves of family members (people may hire individuals to 
say prayers over the graves of family members).
The law of inheritance
Of all the economic rules in the Qur'an, those relating to inheritance are the most detailed. The law 
of inheritance restricts the individual's testamentary power to one-third of his or her estate, as the 
Qur'an specifically  allocates two-thirds to sons and daughters, spouses, parents and grandparents, 
brothers and sisters, grandchildren, and even possibly distant relatives. Based on Shi’ite 
interpretation, the testator is free to make bequests to relatives already entitled to a proportional 
share of the reserved two-thirds. However, the entire estate of a person who dies intestate is divided 
among all his legal heirs.56 
The act of founding a waqf empowers an individual to circumvent the law of inheritance. The 
Islamic law of inheritance specifically focuses on the extended family, something the institution of 
waqf can easily  circumvent. For example, earlier generations of beneficiaries can specifically 
exclude other generations. Moreover, the founder can designate his descendants as the first class of 
beneficiaries.57  This can entail the complete exclusion of many of the Qura’nic heirs, such as the 
parents, grandparents, and siblings of the founder, none of whom belong to the immediate family 
(encompassing the spouse and unmarried children).58
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The Islamic law of inheritance forces Qura’nic heirs to take their allocated shares. In this case, the 
agnatic heirs are subject to the rules of priorities and exclusion. The waqf is a very effective means 
of granting its founder a greater degree of flexibility vis-à-vis the law of inheritance. Unlike the law 
of inheritance, the waqf system enables the founder to pass his assets from one generation or series 
to the next successively. Conversely, under the law of inheritance, the founder’s assets would be 
apportioned among beneficiaries of different degrees of relationship to him. Finally, by  bypassing 
the law of inheritance, the founder can concentrate entitlement on immediate family members. The 
transmission of entitlement from the first series to descendants proceeds by branches. For example, 
when the doctrine of representation applies, immediate family can be protected from extended 
family in which sharia law has adapted. For instance, according to sharia law, an orphaned grandson 
or even a great-grandson is entitled to receive a share of what his ascendants would have taken if he 
had been alive at the time of the grandparent’s death. The waqf system makes it possible to 
circumvent the law of inheritance where challenging it  would be an impossible task, inasmuch as it 
is one of the only  clear commandments stated in the Qur’an. Therefore, by converting his property 
into a waqf, the founder is able to secure his property  from being fragmented; he can also prevent 
its division among his heirs.59
Piety
It is often said that Muslim piety contributed to the pervasiveness of the waqf system. Although 
piety has by no means been the most important factor, neither has it been insignificant. As in the 
medieval West, in the medieval Islamic world the rich commonly set aside a portion of their wealth 
for God so as to secure a place for their souls in heaven. Wealthy Muslims, out of a desire to 
perform good works, financed many mosques and Qur’anic schools. The concept of good works, as 
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in Christendom, included endowments for the benefit of the poor and the weak.60
In the pre-modern Islamic world, as in other pre-modern societies, piety served as a key indicator of 
truthfulness. People who did not fulfil the requirements of their religion—in the case of Muslims, 
those who did not attend Friday prayers—were considered unreliable witnesses in court. Precisely 
because establishing a waqf was considered a pious act, it  served to cultivate a favourable 
reputation. Forming a waqf served as a vehicle for achieving status and authority. To preserve their 
prestige, modern philanthropists often attach their names to structures built through their donations. 
The founders of waqfs often named their enterprises after themselves in the hope of immortalising 
the obtained status.
Politics
Governments have sometimes used the waqf system to pursue selected constituencies. Like gift-
giving in general, waqf formation could also be driven by a desire to spread an ideology. A donation 
to a modern university may  serve to win converts to a political agenda, as when a donor funds an 
ideologically  charged programme. So it  is that  the founders of educational waqfs frequently 
required the appointed teachers to be loyal to them personally  and resistant to ostensibly subversive 
ideas. The ultimate objective of these founders was to gain the political loyalty of students and, 
through them, control over public opinion.61
There are many cases that illustrate the vast investment by Iranians in religious sites (in Iraq in 
particular) throughout history. Most of the mosques, libraries, school and halls of residences in the 
cities of Najaf, Karbala and Kazemein have been established and maintained via waqfs in Iran over 
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the centuries. The Qajar kings, for instance, established many  waqfs in support of pilgrims to the 
holy cities in Iraq, in order to ensure that the ulama should preach to the pilgrims in a manner 
favourable to them.62  In the city  of Najaf, for instance, it was an Iranian merchant who introduced 
electricity to the city for the first  time, although his initial aim was to illuminate the shrine of the 
Imam Ali at night.63
Financing
The motives discussed thus far—piety, status and politics—do not exhaust the relevant factors. 
Another very important reason behind establishing a waqf is financing. This motive is so important 
that Hodgson considers waqf to be the primary vehicle for financing in Islam.64  For some founders, 
perhaps most of them, other than sultans and members of their respective households, the main 
motive was to shelter wealth. What fuelled this fourth motive was that the Islamic world never 
developed effective safeguards against opportunistic taxation or expropriation. Kings varied tax 
rates and forms when it suited their purposes. Where they could do so with impunity, part of the 
reason is that the Qur'an, the fundamental source of Islamic law, contains few specifics regarding 
taxation. As with any  rational ruler, sultans preferred taxation to confiscation, in order to maximise 
their subjects' incentives to pay  taxes, yet in fiscal emergencies they readily yielded to the 
temptation to confiscate. 65
This is because they could not  borrow directly from their subjects, at least not enough to meet their 
needs, a consequence of the fact that their repayment promises lacked reliability. The upshot is that 
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rulers regularly confiscated private property, often by invoking the Islamic principle that all 
property  belongs to God. The consequent weakness of private property  rights made the sacred 
institution of the waqf a convenient vehicle for defending wealth against official predation. The 
expropriation of waqf properties did occur, especially  following conquests or the replacement of 
one dynasty by another. However, when such expropriation occurred, it usually  generated serious 
resistance. A closely  related pecuniary motive for establishing a waqf was “asset laundering”. State 
officials who took over properties belonging to the government or to other individuals would 
transform them into waqfs as a means of legitimising their confiscations.66  For example, as 
McChesney shows, one of the major sources of revenue for Shah Abbas in developing his capital 
city of Isfahan was waqfs. Likewise, there are at  least 40 remaining waqfnamehs directly linked to 
the maintenance of Naqsh-e-Jahan Square.67
As Lambton states, small landowners and peasant proprietors who transformed their property into 
waqfs sometimes did so in order to obtain protection. For example, by converting their properties 
into a waqf for a shrine, they placed themselves under the protection of the shaykh of the respective 
order. "Political" motives for the constitution of waqfs, especially  in the case of rulers and their 
ministers, also, no doubt, played a part. Those who established charitable foundations and 
constituted waqfs for them might have expected to gain public respect, which, in turn, would bring 
followers and influence. Furthermore, in return for contributions to the upkeep  and subsistence of 
ulama through charitable foundations, rulers might expect their help and support in times of need. 
Such support was vital for them because of the respect with which the common people held the 
ulama. At the same time, the ulama, for their part, had a vested jrimi’ al-khayrrit.68  An estimate 
shows that in late-19th-century Iran, the generated revenues from waqfs amounted to roughly 
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4,000,000 tamans, approximately half the revenues of the state. Furthermore, the clergy drew a 
substantial income as the mutawallis of those waqfs and enjoyed considerable discretionary power 
as to expenditures.69  Without a doubt, one of the reasons why the clergy class played such a huge 
role in the politics of 20th-century Iran was their independent financial sources, of which waqfs have 
been among the largest contributors.
Precisely because of the frequent use of this motive, when a state attempted to take over a waqf, it 
usually  justified the act  on the ground that the waqf was illegitimate. Accordingly, its officials tried 
to convince the populace that the expropriated properties belonged to the state, or simply that  the 
waqf founder had never been the legitimate owner. However, there was no guarantee, of course, that 
a state's public relations drive would succeed, which is why  the waqf often served as an effective 
asset-laundering device. Still another pecuniary  motive for establishing a waqf was to circumvent 
the Islamic inheritance system.70
 
Potential problems and disputes
On the surface, the waqf system seems to be the best and the most practical solution for overcoming 
the barriers associated with Islamic law. On the one hand, it seems that the waqf system prevents 
the fragmentation of property  and strengthens stability and family tradition. On the other hand, in 
practice this mechanism can contribute to substantial family fragmentation. There are some 
principal reasons for this. First is the obvious exclusion of some of the Qura’nic beneficiaries. The 
second reason is that, by  converting a property  into a waqf the founder not only loses ownership 
rights to the property  but also, more importantly, ownership does not necessarily transfer to the 
beneficiaries (given the severance of the juridical connection between the property, founder and 
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beneficiaries).71  The third reason reflects the fact that the revenues of the waqf property are 
collected by  the mutawalli, in the form of rent or harvested crops, and are then divided between the 
beneficiaries. This seasonal enjoyment would be reduced over subsequent generations as the 
number of beneficiaries grew (as is likely). This might eventually  result in beneficiaries abandoning 
the waqf, as there might not be much reason for them to stick with it.72
The fact that the founder appointed in most scenarios is the most capable son or male agnatic 
descendant means it can only  be a short-term solution for the future of the family. However, this 
comes at  the expense of family fragmentation. Because the inheritance law does not deprive the 
beneficiaries of ownership rights, in practice the property can be jointly  shared as “musha,” at least 
for one generation. In the long run, however, the structural pressures and inconsistencies between 
the distribution of ownership  rights and the contributions of the different family members to the 
joint labour force will lead to the disintegration of the extended family.73
Property rights are indisputable and pivotal points for family cohesion, both in urban and in rural 
settlements. In most cases, in patrilineal societies, with regard to founders, we would expect agnates 
to take precedence over cognates. The cognates would thus become disadvantaged, both in the 
order of beneficiaries and in the transmission of entitlement to descendants. The right of 
transmission would be reserved for male agnatic descendants. Cognates could receive a share only 
if there were no agnates left.74 Ironically, although the waqf system is firmly  anchored in sharia law, 
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this institution can (as noted) circumvent another part of sharia law: the Islamic law of inheritance. 
In this case, the victory of tradition over sharia is evident.75
As a rule, females in both the patrilineal and matrilineal lines of descent enjoy the income of the 
waqf, but they  do not transmit their rights to their descendants. The main reason for this is fear of 
the family property becoming fragmented as a result of exogenous marriage. Restrictions on female 
marriages can perhaps be partially linked to the fragmentation of property, as well. However, with 
all the limitations that have been imposed on them, females were often granted the right to reside on 
waqf property and to maintenance until death or marriage.
The Islamic law of inheritance does not allow for a system wherein the state can be maintained 
from the outside. The waqf is a non-institutionalised customary manifestation of such a doctrine. 
The vital and interesting point here is the fact that sharia norms are regularly  invoked in waqfs. The 
requirement for transferring the right of usage of the property to the next generation is that family 
degrees be mitigated. Moreover, such compromise may also become subjected to a stipulation for 
transmission between different branches within the family. The waqf system empowers the founder 
to ignore the Islamic law of inheritance to a great degree. For example, the fractional shares 
according to sharia, a fundamental part  of the Islamic law of inheritance, can be bypassed when the 
same property is converted into a waqf. The founder gains a considerable degree of control over the 
future of his asset. He can decide how he wants his property  to be divided between members of the 
next generation or to keep it intact. Furthermore, depending on local tradition, it seems that in many 
cases the particular instructions in sharia regarding the inheritance of female descendants have been 
circumvented. In granting males twice the share of that for females, a property converted into a 
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waqf gives its founder the power to exclude any  heirs and to divide his assets according to his or her 
wishes.
In the twentieth century, as a result of modern reforms, the norm has been pushed such that 
entitlements are often divided on a per capita basis, rather than by gender or family degree. The 
waqf system has been used extensively in order to circumvent the Islamic law of inheritance so as 
to exclude certain heirs who are entitled to a share according the Qur’an. In some Middle Eastern 
countries, modern legislators have restricted founders’ freedom by coordinating the law of waqf 
with that of inheritance and even with wills. Therefore, the latitude for establishing a waqf in favour 
of a stranger or even a member of the family, for instance, has been limited to only one third of the 
property, the same as the quantitative limitation on Muslim wills. However, in the case of Iran no 
specific legal restriction has been imposed, as we shall see in subsequent chapters. Every dedication 
beyond that  limit enforces this practice, such that descendants, parents and the spouses of founders 
receive entitlements proportional to their share as per the compulsory inheritance rule, as stated in 
the Islamic law of inheritance. With a few changes, this is the case in most schools of law and in 
many countries in the Islamic world.76
The same patterns have been observed in family waqfs established by non-Muslims, whether 
Christian or Jewish, in sharia courts; they seem to have been inspired by the same motivations as 
Muslims.77  Furthermore, founders’ requirements are stated in very similar or even identical terms, 
although, in these cases, the stipulations are not a matter of Islamic law but rather of social practice. 
It is likely that the beneficiaries of the first series after the founder are named by the founder 
himself. However, the possibility that the rest of the components, such as transmission and mode of 
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entitlement, reflect the social philosophy of the judges and those who formulated the waqfs rather 
than the founder himself.78
Disputes
In a study of 101 disputes relating to family waqfs, in more than 75 cases both the founder and the 
beneficiary were mentioned. Seventy-five per cent  of them were established by parents, both fathers 
and mothers, on behalf of their children, and, to a lesser degree, on behalf of their grandchildren. 
Fathers have the higher degree of shares compared to mothers, at a ratio of six to one. The 
remaining 25% of the waqfs were established on behalf of someone other than the founder’s 
children or lineal descendants.79 The institution is regularly employed by  males in support of other 
males. For example, as Powers argues, the ratio of endowments established by  fathers in favour of 
sons relative to daughters is three to one. On the other hand, should a mother establish a waqf, it is 
likely that she will be more even-handed.80
Twelve per cent of established waqfs have been in favour of minor children. This shows that it has 
been common for parents to establish a family waqf soon after their children get  married and are 
ready  to produce their own offspring. This practice demonstrates the intention of the proprietors to 
create de facto arrangements for the ultimate devolution of their property while still in the early 
years of their lives. This phenomenon forces founders to devise special provisions for the inclusion 
of unborn children in the waqf. Furthermore, in cases of multiple wives it can become even more 
complicated. For example, some husbands have favoured the children of one wife over those of 
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another. At the same time, there have been cases where founders with multiple wives have treated 
the sons of co-wives equally.
In the case of testamentary  waqfs, the endowment is only formally established once the founder is 
dead (such cases are still disputed in the Shi’a tradition). The advantage of this is that the founder 
keeps control over the property for the duration of his life. However, the founder can only convert 
one third of his assets into a waqf; this is the cap  imposed on him by the Islamic law of inheritance. 
Furthermore, there is a second set of restrictions with which the founder must contend, whereby he 
may not be allowed to include his own children among the waqf’s beneficiaries (otherwise, he 
would have violated the Islamic law of inheritance). Therefore, the founder faces a number of 
challenges. On one hand, the founder wants to maintain control over his property, at least 
throughout his lifetime. Furthermore, he would like to select one or several of his children to be the 
main beneficiaries. On the other hand, the prohibition on bequests imposed by the Islamic law of 
inheritance does not include grandchildren whose father is still alive. One way of solving the 
problem is to appoint a grandchild, or even, in some cases, an unborn grandchild, as the beneficiary. 
This solution works because the minor grandchild is subjected to the guardianship of his father, who 
effectively acts as the beneficiary of the waqf. Additionally, this provides the founder with the 
opportunity to honour the offspring of one branch of the family over another.
In cases where a certain family  line becomes extinct, the revenues of that waqf can be channelled 
toward different beneficiaries. In most cases, the revenues revert to the public. It is common for the 
founder to include in the waqfnameh clauses specifying how the related revenues are to be spent 
under such conditions. For example, he might request that they are channelled toward “poor 
Muslims”, or “the poor of a specific district of a town or mosque,” or “the sick or more specifically 
to the lepers”. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to find waqfnamehs in which the founder has given 
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specific directions that, in the event that  the family  line becomes extinct, the revenues should be 
used to support students, ransom captives or free slaves.
Concluding remarks
Traditional Islamic law had several shortcomings with respect to economic growth and prosperity. It 
does not honour private property as much as it  should.81  It prohibits financing by demonising 
money  lending, deprives one of testimonial powers, and does not recognise corporations. Moreover, 
Islamic tax, Zakat, is not conclusive enough to provide the necessary public goods for society. From 
a century or so after the birth of Islam, the institution of the waqf in its current form came to play an 
important role in filling these gaps. It managed to root itself heavily  in sharia, in spite of not being 
mentioned in the Qur’an, and took dubious forms and functions even during the days of the Prophet 
himself. 
Socio-economic and historical factors have contributed to an ever-increasing demand for 
establishing waqfs. Waqfs, at least in the short-run, provide a quick solution for protecting wealth 
against confiscation, fragmentation and outright taxation. Moreover, the institution has been more 
efficient in the provision of public goods where Islamic tax has been ill-prepared to take on the task. 
Many historical factors have contributed to the ever-growing scale of endowments in Iran. Securing 
private property perhaps ranks among the most  prominent reasons. However, many  other factors, 
such as piety, politics and financing, have also played important roles as driving forces behind the 
growth of this institution.
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81  Abrahamian (1994, p. 44). According to Motahari, private property is a divine gift.  This is very different from the 
concept of private property, which, according to post-Enlightenment views on the topic, constitutes one of an 
individual’s natural rights.
In the long-run, however, the legal structure of the waqf has proved to be far from perfect or even 
efficient or sufficiently flexible to accommodate various demands in more complicated economic 
climates. The focus of the next  chapters will be to investigate and ascertain which laws of waqfs 
have made the institution unsuitable for the post-industrial age and, more importantly, to consider 
where the institution currently stands.
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Chapter III: Founding a Waqf
The laws of waqf constitute a collection of fatwas from different jurists over the course of history. 
These laws share important elements, among which is the lack of a legal personality and concept of 
corporation. The current task is to explore how and why the laws of waqf in Iran remain inefficient; 
they  not only prevent existing waqfs from exploiting their full potential, in light of the magnitude of 
their influence, they also cause economic stagnation. Every waqf comprises a founder, beneficiaries 
and an object. The modern laws of waqf have huge shortcomings in dealing with each of these 
players. The unincorporated nature of the laws does not allow for multiple individuals or third-party 
corporations to establish a waqf. Therefore, the endowments remain small in scale and do not 
benefit from the synergy that comes from resource pooling and the efficiency of economies of scale 
associated with larger organisations. Additionally, the traditional problems with the founder, who 
can potentially use waqf as a method of escaping his creditors or sheltering wealth, persist. 
Furthermore, the object or assets of the waqf define the waqf, and if for any  reason the object or 
assets terminate, the endowments cease to exist.82  To put it simply, the waqf and its assets are one 
and the same from a traditional legal perspective. Thus, terminating the assets has historically been 
used as a method to terminate a waqf in cases of dispute. This prevents the endowment from 
moving its location and from changing or upgrading its assets according to new needs and demands 
of the time. Finally, the unincorporated nature of the establishment of a waqf requires a waqf to be 
valid only if at any given time the beneficiaries and the object are present. Hence, beneficiaries such 
as terminally ill patients may not become qualified as beneficiaries.
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82 This could be deliberate or a result of natural causes. In either case, if a building is a waqf and the 
building collapses, the waqf is terminated. In cases in which the waqf truly had a corporate status, 
should the building collapse the waqf remains the same and has the option to rebuild the building or 
purchase another one, etc.
In order to prove this point, the laws of waqf have been dissected (by collecting various cases and 
the codified versions of their respective civil laws). In this chapter, the main players in every waqf 
will be introduced.  The task is to determine who is eligible to establish a waqf, or to be appointed 
as a beneficiary of a waqf, and what objects have the potential to be converted into waqfs. The aim 
is to show that many  of the contemporary legal parameters relating to these players in modern 
Iranian civil law have been borrowed from premodern legal discourse. Furthermore, the 
socioeconomic grounds behind the creation of some of these legal parameters during the premodern 
era, and their subsequent and broader impact on the economy, will be examined. Moreover, this 
chapter lays the groundwork for the more in-depth and detailed arguments found in subsequent 
chapters, which deal with the operation of the waqf as a unit, its economic contribution, and its 
future as an institution. As we will see, most  conditions for each player involved in a waqf derive 
from the various cases that jurists have addressed throughout history. With few exceptions, the laws 
found in modern Iranian civil law are merely codifications of one or more selected fatwas from 
cases issued by past and present jurists vis-à-vis the body of civil law. There are a few points that 
can be made in reviewing these laws. First, they are primarily economic in nature and, perhaps due 
to the lack of a specific bureaucracy, ended up on the desks of the clergymen who issued legal 
fatwas on them. Second, these laws follow the rationale of the premodern era; they might have been 
relevant during the preindustrial age but do not correspond sufficiently  to the needs of modern times 
and the rapid speed of change during the 20th century.
A waqf comprises three sets of players. These players must always be present in order for the 
principle of perpetuity to remain intact. These players are the founder, beneficiary(ies) and the 
object of the waqf. This chapter is divided into three sections, each of which deals with one of the 
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three categories of players. The first  section concerns the founder. Research demonstrates the extent 
to which the primary reason for establishing a waqf—including the sheltering of wealth or a desire 
to escape creditors—is still possible within the modern legal framework, although there have been 
attempts by legislators to minimise loopholes. However, the primary remaining problem is that the 
founder of a waqf needs to be an individual. There is no provision in the law for a group  of people 
or a corporation to establish a waqf.  This situation is the result of the unincorporated nature of the 
waqf laws.
  The second and third sections of this chapter consider the beneficiaries and object of a waqf. In 
both cases, civil law has merely added to what already existed in juridical form. The codification of 
such laws rationalises some of the potential ambiguities that existed in waqfs’ traditional laws. 
However, designation of a waqf’s main responsibility  regarding beneficiaries remains with the 
founder. The founder essentially  enjoys a great degree of latitude in choosing his waqf’s 
beneficiaries for many generations to come. The majority of cases involve disputes between later 
generations of beneficiaries and concern the division of the proceeds among them. Moreover, as we 
shall see, some of the main wishes underlying the establishment of a waqf, such as preserving 
family fortunes, can result in disparities between family members—and thus disputes. Finally, those 
objects that can be converted into waqfs will be explored. This section sheds light on the fact that, 
in most cases, an object must comply with traditional codes. However, one of the least transparent 
functions of a waqf demonstrates the important role it  has traditionally  played in financing the 
economy. In recent years, there have been attempts to highlight this aspect of waqfs in order to 
obtain legal permission to allow cash to be converted into waqfs. As will be discussed in detail, this 
policy could potentially rejuvenate many  stagnated waqfs by allowing them to sell dysfunctional 
assets and invest them in profitable ventures.
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The founder
The first and most important figure with respect to every  waqf is its founder: the individual who 
establishes the waqf. The reasons behind the establishment of the waqf, previously  mentioned, 
greatly inform his decision. Moreover, the waqf will most likely  be named after him. The question 
is, then: who can establish a waqf, and under what conditions? What  qualifications must  this person 
have, and what restrictions might be imposed on him by law?
According to Iranian civil law, the founder must be an adult, in good health, sane of mind, the 
actual owner of the designated property, and have a decent reputation. In order to understand the 
extent to which the laws have changed in accordance with the demands of the current age, the 
conditions and places in which they originally  appeared must be studied. In examining the historical 
record, it  becomes evident that  the eligibility of the founder has been based on three major factors. 
The first and most important consideration is that the law has been as inclusive as possible. This is 
due to the initial reasons behind establishing a waqf. The historical record shows that every time 
there has been an invasion of a country, a change in dynasty, an increase of taxes by the rulers, etc., 
the number of waqfs has increased.83  Therefore, the logical way in which to help landowners 
protect their properties from outright confiscation has been to create a process in which establishing 
a waqf is inclusive and simple enough that they can be founded simply and quickly. However, it has 
not gone unnoticed that, in creating a very easy mechanism for establishing a waqf, the system has 
been prone to abuse. This creates the grounds for the second juridical concern, which has been how 
to block loopholes and protect the institution from abuse. Finally, jurists have tended to follow 
certain principles, particularly the principle of perpetuity—without exception, the waqf must be 
kept in perpetuity. In the next chapter we will look at this principle in greater detail.
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83  For example, Lampton (1997, pp. 298–318) demonstrates that vast  amounts of land and 
properties were converted into waqfs just after the Mongol invasion of Iran in the 13th century. The 
same story can be seen repeatedly until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
With respect to the founder, the laws are very inclusive. The records show that a founder might be 
from either gender and might establish a waqf regardless of his or her religion. In other words, non-
Muslim founders were also welcome.84  The second set of considerations concerns those aimed at 
preventing the system from potential abuse; these effectively make the laws more complicated. The 
cases are divided into what appear to be the more common categories that  jurists have had to 
consider. The first category  includes those cases in which the true intention of the founder in 
establishing a waqf has not been to provide a public good but rather to circumvent the law of 
inheritance. As mentioned above, in this respect the waqf is a powerful tool, one that empowers the 
founder regarding the future of his or her property. The founder could assign only one or a few of 
his children as beneficiaries to a waqf, decide that the proceeds should be divided equally among 
his male and female children, or even appoint a stranger to become the sole beneficiary  of the waqf, 
and so forth. However, the founder’s decision could aggravate a family member. In some cases the 
founder has died soon after establishing a waqf, and family  members omitted from the waqf have 
made claims. For example, children might claim that their father was unaware of what he was doing 
at the time of the waqf’s establishment. He might have been too sick to realise the consequences of 
his actions, or perhaps had fallen prey to an opportunist  who convinced him to establish a waqf and 
deny some of his heirs their inheritance. The response from the jurists—and there is almost no 
disagreement among the Ulama—has been that if a person establishes a waqf during his final illness 
(Marad al-Mawt) the act  is subject to the restrictions regarding bequests (Vassiat); that is, the value 
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84 Khomeini (2007, p. 71), Minasian (1998, p. 153–56) 
In general, being a Muslim is not required; in principle, waqfs founded by  non-Muslims are valid. 
This is an issue upon which both the Imami Shia and the Sunni jurists agree. Khomeini argues that 
non-Muslims (he uses the word infidels) may establish waqfs for the refurbishment and restoration 
of their churches, synagogues and Zoroastrian temples. 
There has been no record to show that founding a waqf has been exclusive to men. However, 
according to some views, a married woman would need her husband’s authorization if the value of 
the waqf exceeds one third of her property, as in the case of gifts. There is much historical evidence 
that women could establish, and have established, numerous waqfs in Iran throughout history.
of the endowed property may  not exceed one third of the estate (such as constitutes his testimonial 
power). Consequently, his wishes should be treated in the same way as one would treat a will. Thus, 
many refer to this way of founding a waqf as a testimonial endowment.85 The rationale behind this 
tradition is to minimise the claims from a founder’s heirs that can be generated after learning that 
they will no longer be receiving their anticipated inheritance.
There is also a second set of claims related to health. In these claims, which pertain to both the 
founder and to his or her heir, it is argued that the founder was either insane or, at least, was not 
acting with complete sanity at the time that the waqf was established. The founder might have 
regretted his decision (once the waqf is established, the action is irrevocable) and sought to revoke 
his decision to convert his property  into a waqf. Similarly, the relatives of the founder may  have 
protested his decision to convert his assets into a waqf on the grounds that he was not sane at the 
time of his decision. The verdicts in such cases have been that an insane person may not establish a 
waqf.86 It  is possible that the popularity of such claims has led to fatwas specifically targeting those 
with bipolar disorder (those who may act normally at times and insanely  at other times). These 
cases have been brought forward by the relatives of the founder and by  the founder himself, who 
might have regretted his decision to convert his assets into a waqf. The verdicts suggest that, in such 
cases, if the waqf was established during the period when the founder was sane, then the decision to 
found a waqf is deemed valid; otherwise, it is considered that the waqf was not properly ratified.87 
Such verdicts naturally pave the way for abuse of the system. One can convert his or her property 
into a waqf and enjoy  certain benefits (tax reductions and the like), then, after a while, claim that he 
was not sane at the time, ask that the endowment be terminated, and subsequently sell the property. 
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85 Helli (1985, p. 465); Helli (1989, p. 443)
86 Helli (1985, p. 447). Allameh Helli argues that a “madman” is not eligible to establish a waqf.
87 Ibid.
This verdict also contradicts one of the main principles of waqf: perpetuity. One can still use waqfs 
for all of the purposes indicated above. Modern Iranian civil law states that the founder must have 
the right background (Ahliyyat). In other words, the founder must be trustworthy. The 
trustworthiness of a person is not something that can be measured in a standardised way. Therefore, 
although in some respects—as with respect to adulthood and ownership—the law has become more 
rational compared to traditional law, in others it  remains out-dated. The reason for stipulating 
trustworthiness in the law, as Katouzian elaborates, is because “theoretically, one can still establish 
a waqf and appoint his immediate family  to be the beneficiaries”. Katouzian argues that if the 
understanding from reading the Waqfnameh is that the founder is either sheltering some wealth or, 
even more importantly, escaping from his creditors, one can legally establish a waqf and appoint an 
immediate family  member as beneficiary. Because the founder thus loses his or her rights to his 
property, his creditors cannot make any claim on his or her wealth. As Katouzian elaborates, 
“trustworthiness is used to ensure that one is not going to take advantage of this legal loophole”.88
The third series of cases are related to waqfs wherein the founder may be intending to shelter his or 
her wealth, or to avoid paying taxes. One very popular type of case throughout history  that has been 
used for exactly that  purpose is a waqf established in the name of a minor child. By founding such a 
waqf, the actual owner of the property  has been able to claim that he or she no longer has ownership 
of the property and, therefore, should be exempt from paying taxes on that property; at the same 
time, he or she continues to enjoy benefits from the property, at least until the child reaches 
maturity. There are many cases in which jurists have tried to prevent such actions. The arguments 
come down to the following question: what is the appropriate minimum age for one to become a 
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88  Katouzian (2007, pp. 546–48). Furthermore, Article 56 of civil law expresses that if the founder 
has debts, he or she can only  establish a waqf after obtaining permission from his or her creditors to 
do so. Katouzian summarizes that, according to civil law, the conditions for a founder are as 
follows: the founder has to have the general capacity  to act and contract (Ahliyyat al-Ada) and he or 
she must be an adult, sound of mind, capable of handling financial affairs (Rashid), a free person, 
and not under interdiction for prodigality or bankruptcy.
founder? Although there is no set minimum age upon which all jurists have agreed, it seems that  the 
age of ten is what the majority have selected.89 This is the main reason why adulthood is mentioned 
in civil law—to avoid such abuses of the system.
Converting someone else’s property into a waqf
The final set of cases after a waqf has been established are those in which the founder was not the 
actual owner of the property. Such situations might have been deliberate or genuine mistakes. The 
common fatwa among the Imami jurists has been that if this occurs and later the actual owner of the 
property  does not protest against such action, the waqf is valid.90   On the other hand, some, like 
Ayatollah Yazdi, disagree with this ruling. He argues that, because the wishes of the owner were not 
fulfilled at the moment of the waqf’s establishment, the waqf cannot be ratified.91  The interesting 
aspect here is that the true wishes of the founder seem to be a more important issue for Yazdi than 
the problem of a possible violation of someone’s private property. In either event, Iranian civil law 
has attempted to avoid such cases by  enforcing the law that the owner should be the actual 
proprietor of the property.92  Again, one might assume that modern laws have rationalised the 
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89 Helli (1989, pp. 444–46). The verdict from the majority of the Ulama is that a child can establish 
a waqf. However, a set minimum age is not agreed upon; the age of ten is where disagreements 
seem to begin among jurists. Mohaqeq Helli and Allameh Helli both argue against a ten-year-old 
child being allowed to establish a waqf; Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi, on the other hand, 
argues that a ten-year-old child is old enough (in most relevant studies, adulthood has been 
mentioned as one of the primary  conditions for the founder of a waqf. However, the age that was 
considered to signal adulthood according to those fatwas is often not mentioned or is neglected).
90 Helli (1989, p. 444); Karaki (1989, p. 181) 
91 Yazdi (2002, p. 189)
92  (Katouzian 2005, pp. 542–43). Article 64 of civil law states that one can convert anything from 
one’s own wealth into a waqf, including property that is in temporary use by someone else. 
Therefore, if one has rented out one’s property, that property can be converted into a waqf even 
while it is rented out. In such cases, the tenants of the property must give the rent to the mutawalli, 
and the rent money is spent on the waqf’s mission. 
situation, but, as Katouzian argues, there is still a chance that one can effectively  establish a waqf 
without having actual ownership of the property or the permission of the owner. 93
One very  crucial point is that, in both the traditional and the modern version of the laws, the 
founder is always a single person. There is no mention as to whether more than one individual can 
establish a waqf as a joint venture, nor is there any discussion of or evidence that an institution with 
a legal personality  can establish a waqf. This is proof that the waqf is an unincorporated institution. 
Modern Iranian civil law claims that a waqf now has corporate status, which is contradictory  in 
terms of who may qualify to be a founder. There has never been mention of a corporation as a 
founder, nor even of a waqf founded in partnership. Most importantly, this fact demonstrates that a 
waqf cannot be effective on a large economic scale. When the pooling of resources is not allowed, 
such endowments can only be established and operate on a small scale, which limits the scope of 
their operation and, more importantly, prevents them from achieving an economy of scale.  A very 
recent example that is worth highlighting here is the case of the Islamic Azad University, which, 
after the disputed presidential elections of 2009 in Iran, was set to be converted into a waqf; this 
attempt was denied on legal and political grounds. Concerning the legality  of this matter, the 
Islamic Azad University was not the property of one individual; therefore, as an institution, it could 
not convert itself into a waqf.94  This case may come very  close to the traditional method of 
sheltering wealth and protecting investments from confiscations (as the Islamic Azad University is 
heavily connected to Rafsanjani, who was allegedly supporting Musavi during those elections). 
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93 Ibid. However, according to Iranian civil law, one cannot convert those parts of his or her 
belongings that are in permanent usage by someone else. Article 64 of civil law states that one can 
convert anything from one’s own wealth, and it may be in temporary usage by someone else. 
Therefore, if one has rented out one’s property, that property can be converted into a waqf, even 
while it is actually rented out. In such case, the tenants of the property had to give the mutawalli the 
rent, and the rent money has to be spent on the waqf’s mission 
94 bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2010/09/100929_107_iran89_larijani_azad_university.shtml. (2010/9/30 at 
11:32.32).
However, this case shows that the institution of waqf is not  suitable to the demands of this day and 
age. The case of the Islamic Azad University  might have been controversial in nature but 
nonetheless shows that, even in ordinary circumstances, large-scale corporate-type enterprises can 
no longer be converted into waqf, which limits the usability and scale of this institution.
The beneficiaries
The second part  of this chapter deals with the second set of players in a waqf: the beneficiaries. In 
short, the founder customarily begins by designating the first generation of beneficiaries, usually 
one or more children, and indicating whether males and females are to be treated equally. Next, the 
founder indicates what will happen to the revenue belonging to a beneficiary  of the first-generation 
beneficiary upon his or her death. If that beneficiary leaves behind a child, his or her share reverts 
to that child; if the beneficiary dies without a child, his or her share reverts to the surviving 
beneficiaries of the first generation or their descendants. Thus, the entitlement of extinct branches 
reverts to the surviving branches of the lineal descent group. Referring to the second generation of 
beneficiaries, the founder generally indicates that the revenue is “for their descendants and their 
descendants’ descendants”. Historically, such phrasing has been understood by  jurists as signifying 
that the entitlement now applies to anyone who qualifies as either a descendant (Aqabeh) of the 
founder or a descendant of a descendant; thus two (or more) generations of lineal descendants may 
qualify as beneficiaries simultaneously. Such an endowment is characterised as being Maqub (“for a 
descent group”). Depending on the verdict of different jurists, the founder may or may not appoint 
himself to be included among the waqf’s beneficiaries. The founder exercises a high degree of 
freedom regarding whom to select and whom to omit from benefitting from his or her waqf. In 
general, the founder might be motivated by  one or more of the three sets of intentions in identifying 
the beneficiaries of his or her established waqf. The first intention might be to circumvent the 
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Islamic law of inheritance. In this case, the founder can be selective as to which of his children 
should take over the endowment. The second set  of intentions (deriving, perhaps, from the 
founder’s common knowledge) entails being as detailed as possible concerning the beneficiaries, 
particularly with respect to future generations. Finally, the founder could be deliberately  vague 
regarding his or her intention to enjoy the benefits of establishing a waqf without it actually 
providing any services—in other words, making it very  difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to 
qualify as a beneficiary.
 
In traditional or classical doctrines, there is no distinction between the beneficiaries of the different 
types of waqf.95  However, in connection with attempts within 20th-century  Iran to codify  the law, 
legislators have sought to divide cases into those dealing with private waqfs and those dealing with 
public waqfs. This has constituted progress toward facilitating an understanding of the laws and 
their rationalisations to a greater degree. The main issue surrounding the laws related to waqfs’ 
beneficiaries is that the civil law does not necessarily provide a framework for who may or may not 
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95 Jaberi (1991, p. 182); Khomeini (2007, p. 70); Majmu’ Qavanin Owqafi (2004, p. 86) . Waqfs are 
generally  categorised into Aam  (public waqfs) and Khas (private waqfs). Public waqfs are those for 
which the public is the actual beneficiary, such as for mosques and libraries. A public waqf either 
has a very  specific mission or it  does not. For example, it could be a waqf that finances the activities 
of a specific mosque, or a waqf that is designated for the restoration of any mosque. Moreover, a 
public waqf could set as a beneficiary  the poor or orphans in general instead of being exclusive to 
the poor of a particular region or the orphans of a particular orphanage. A private waqf, on the other 
hand, has a very specific beneficiary or beneficiaries; for example, someone’s child or children. 
Both public and private waqfs could have very specific usage and beneficiaries. For example it 
could be the poor that are the beneficiaries of a public waqf; on the other hand, in a private waqf the 
beneficiaries might be restricted to the male children of a particular individual. Sometimes, all of 
the beneficiaries of either type of waqf benefit equally; on the other hand, sometimes one or more 
of the beneficiaries has greater shares than the rest. For instance, in a public waqf, the order in 
which the beneficiaries are presented is an indicator of their hierarchy in terms of shares being 
received. The same applies to private waqfs. With a public waqf, sometimes a particular guild has 
priority over another. For instance, certain Ulama could have priority  over other members of the 
Ulama as the designated beneficiaries of a waqf. In private waqfs, generally  one or a few of the 
founder’s children have greater shares than the rest  of the heirs. Furthermore, there is a third case in 
which the beneficiaries of a waqf could be the children of the founder along with certain designated 
Ulama (or “a certain number of Ulama”). Again, in this case, they might all have equal shares or 
not, depending on the wishes of the founder.
be appointed as a beneficiary, nor under what circumstances this may take place. What the civil law 
does, effectively, is elaborate on extant popular cases involving past jurists. Therefore, this section 
follows these popular cases, as well as those for which the civil law is relevant. These cases have 
also laid the ground for legal transactions among waqfs’ main players and the ownership of 
endowments. 
The beneficiary(ies), or Moqufon Elaih, can be divided between those pertaining to private waqfs 
(waqf-e Khas/ ahli), which are generally  established in favour of one’s relatives and/or descendants, 
and those pertaining to public waqfs (waqf-e-Aam/Kheyri), for which the beneficiaries are people 
selected from the public.
The first question involving many cases concerns whether or not the founder can appoint himself as 
the beneficiary of his waqf. This may  seem a rational thing to do from the founder’s point of view. 
He could potentially  set aside part of the endowment-generated revenue to finance himself 
following retirement (in event of an emergency), whereby the waqf constitutes a contingency plan. 
However, the popular verdict among the Imami jurists has been against such action. On the other 
hand, some have argued that if, for example, the founder appoints members of the Ulama and/or the 
poor to be beneficiaries of a waqf, and later in his life he is poor or becomes a member of the 
Ulama, he should be permitted to take recourse to the waqf.96  Based on Article 72 of the Iranian 
civil law, the founder may not appoint himself to be among the beneficiaries of an established waqf. 
Furthermore, the founder may not appoint himself to be among the beneficiaries either during his 
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96 Khomeini (2007, p. 67).
lifetime or following his death.97  Although the founder may not include himself as a direct 
beneficiary, there are nonetheless ways around this; for example, by appointing one of his minor 
children as the main beneficiary of a waqf, the founder will have the right to receive the proceeds of 
the waqf as the child’s guardian, thus effectively turning himself into a beneficiary. 
         
It should be noted that these are cases that compel a founder to specify  the beneficiaries and ensure 
that they are identifiable. In many cases, either deliberately or due to a variety of reasons—such as 
the passage of time or the loss of the Waqfnameh—the beneficiaries may no longer be identifiable. 
Furthermore, another trick whereby  a founder is able to show on paper that he or she has a waqf but 
in reality does lose any of the generated revenue is to appoint beneficiaries who are not easily 
identifiable. The second case is that in which the beneficiary  is identifiable but is unable to acquire 
the object that has been converted into a waqf.
Acquiring a waqf, as mentioned earlier, is a vital condition for the beneficiaries. In other words, 
beneficiaries must be capable of acquiring the property. There are, however, some exceptions to this 
rule. For example, with respect to the list  of beneficiary  conditions presented earlier, Allameh Helli 
adds that one cannot appoint angels, genies or the devil as beneficiaries. His argument is not based 
on condemning superstition but on the notion that they (angels, genies and the devil) do not have 
possessional power.98  Ayatollah Yazdi further adds that one cannot appoint someone with a bad 
reputation (i.e., someone who drinks alcohol or someone who, upon receiving the benefits from the 
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97 Qanun-e Madani, Majmu’e-ye Qavanin-e Owqafi (2005, p. 135). To set oneself among the 
beneficiaries after one’s death usually means that the founder is able to establish a waqf whereby, 
following his or her death, the proceeds go to someone who will pray for his or her soul. This is 
what Iranian law does not allow. However, the family members of the same person could establish 
the same waqf for the same purpose on his or her behalf.
98 Helli (1985, p. 447)
waqf, will waste them on drink, etc.).99   Based on Article 71 of civil law, one cannot appoint an 
unidentifiable person or persons as the beneficiaries of a waqf. However, with respect to a public 
waqf, as Katouzian argues, in order for the waqf to be properly ratified, although the beneficiary 
may not  be precisely identifiable, it is sufficient that  the public is able to identify the stated 
beneficiary(ies) on the Waqfnameh.100
Beneficiaries of a private waqf
The beneficiaries of a private waqf usually are members of a family. During the time of producing 
the Waqfnameh, the founder can be specific or non-specific about the members of his family who 
will effectively become beneficiaries. In other words, beneficiaries of the first type can constitute 
one or more individuals (“Fulan ibn Fulan”, “my children”, or “my male offspring”). He can favour 
one or a few of them over the rest of the family members. The founder can also discriminate 
between his male and female children. Usually, several subsequent classes of beneficiaries are 
mentioned. A very common clause is to designate first one’s sons and unmarried daughters, then 
one’s agnatic grandsons and unmarried agnatic granddaughters, then one’s agnatic great-grandsons 
and unmarried agnatic great-granddaughters, and so on. In such cases, no class becomes entitled 
until the previous one is entirely extinct. It is also quite common for the founder to stipulate that 
half of the proceeds go to the poor and the other half to his children.101
Before reviewing specific cases and conditions relating to beneficiaries, it  is necessary to discuss 
and bring to the fore the ever-present reasons behind establishing a waqf and to consider their 
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influence on the formation of waqf laws. As has been previously discussed, sheltering wealth and 
protecting private property  from confiscation or fragmentation have been among the key  reasons for 
setting up a waqf. Consequently, founders have often been disinterested in establishing a waqf for 
the purpose of providing a public good. In fact, in many cases founders have effectively looked for 
ways to bend the law in order to use waqfs to shield their property  from taxation, confiscation, 
fragmentation, etc., without having to give up anything in return.  The first general rules concerning 
beneficiaries tackle these issues. The first of two tricks that founders can use is to appoint a 
beneficiary who is not sufficiently  specific. In other words, although it seems that the waqf is 
providing certain services, in reality no one can claim the benefits because no one fits the 
description of the designated beneficiaries. The second case is when a founder appoints a 
beneficiary but there is no way for the designated beneficiary to take possession of the waqf. The 
third condition is that the beneficiaries must not be condemned or doomed by Sharia. The final 
condition is that the founder cannot appoint those who are going to be executed or who are infidels 
(in this case, those who do not have Muslim relatives).102  The reason for this condition is different 
from those pertaining to the previous conditions, which are aimed at preventing the waqf from 
becoming merely an institution for sheltering wealth without providing any services; rather, it 
relates to the desire to maintain the waqf principle of perpetuity intact.
 
The second set of cases is related largely to the need to settle disputes related to family waqfs.103  It 
is true that by converting a property into a waqf, the founder is able to circumvent the law of 
inheritance which otherwise would deny him the right to choose a particular path for and successor 
to his property. However, due to a variety of reasons—the main one being the non-corporate nature 
of waqfs—within a few generations after the founder’s death, disputes have often arisen among the 
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beneficiaries. More importantly, the biggest problem has been that, as it is likely that the number of 
beneficiaries will increase as time passes, each beneficiary’s designated shares of revenue from the 
waqf will drop. This could continue to the point that families eventually decide to abandon the 
family waqf, with the properties either becoming abandoned or, in most cases, subject to corruption.
Those cases dealing with the beneficiaries of a waqf can be divided into two categories: those that 
deal with private waqfs and those that deal with public waqfs. The first set of cases that we will 
review concern disputes among family  members or between family  members and a third party  who 
was also appointed by the founder as a beneficiary. The second set of cases includes those in which 
individuals are disqualified from becoming beneficiaries, and, as a result, the perpetuity of the waqf 
becomes endangered.
 
First are those cases that deal with family disputes related to the division of the proceeds, either 
among the founder’s children or when the proceeds are divided among the children of the founder 
and a third party. The majority  of such cases are caused by ambiguities in the Waqfnameh. There 
are many  cases in which the Waqfnameh goes missing after one or several generations following 
the foundation of a waqf, either accidentally or deliberately. Furthermore, there are many cases in 
which the Waqfnameh can no longer be read because it has deteriorated over time, or for a variety 
of other reasons. The verdicts of jurists in such cases have varied, both individually  and across 
schools of law.
 
The popular verdict among the Imami Ulama is that once the founder appoints his children, each of 
them will receive an equal share of the waqf’s revenues, unless otherwise stipulated by  the 
founder.104Article 73 of Iranian civil law empowers the founder to appoint his children and also 
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encourages the founder to avoid discrimination between the sexes when appointing beneficiaries.105 
In the end, and regardless of which school of law we are speaking of, the founder is empowered to a 
certain extent to make a decision as to who should be the beneficiaries and what their respective 
shares should be. However, there is no unified verdict for cases in which there is no Waqfnameh, 
when family disputes are thus likely.
 
Disputes can be more complicated when there is a third party (outside of immediate family 
members) who has also been designated a beneficiary. A very common method for establishing a 
family waqf is to include a religious institution among the beneficiaries. By doing so, the founder 
has a greater chance of protecting his or her endowment; not only  is it in the interest of the 
respective institution to protect the endowment, it also conveys a degree of sacredness to the waqf. 
In any event, the resulting cases and verdicts could not  be more varied. Traditionally, the jurists 
would refer to the style in which the Waqfnameh was written, based on which they would decide 
how the proceeds should be divided among the beneficiaries. The rule of thumb was that 
beneficiaries should receive more or fewer benefits based on the order in which they appear on the 
Waqfnameh.
 
 An example of this is when a founder appoints his children and the poor as beneficiaries of his 
waqf. Allameh Helli argues that when a founder selects more than one group of people as 
beneficiaries, he has created two classes (Tabaqeh) of beneficiaries—in this case the first being his 
children and the second being the poor.106 In other words, the children have priority over the poor in 
receiving their share. Nonetheless, he adds, “the grandchildren will be exempt from receiving the 
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benefits.”107 Over time, cases like this have been the subject  of much dispute, and we can find many 
fatwas issued on them. For example, Ayatollah Khomeini disagrees with Allameh Helli and argues 
that, in such cases, the revenues of the waqf must be divided equally between the children, 
grandchildren and the poor.108  According to his view, not only  is there no class distinction between 
the beneficiaries of the waqf, the grandchildren are treated as equal to the rest of the beneficiaries, 
even if they are not mentioned. Whether or not the grandchildren of the founder are to be treated as 
beneficiaries has been the subject of much discussion. The main views are split between those who 
argue against grandchildren’s right to automatically become beneficiaries after their parents, as 
Allameh Helli argues, and those who argue for them, such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah 
Yazdi, claiming that  once the founder appoints his children as beneficiaries, the grandchildren will 
automatically become beneficiaries following the death of their parents (i.e., the founder’s 
children).109
The case whereby grandchildren are included among the beneficiaries is of high importance. First, 
the grandchildren are, in most cases, minors over whom their parents have guardianship. Thus, their 
parents will receive their children’s shares, meaning that those parents with more children will earn 
more from the waqf. One can imagine that such cases can introduce complications among family 
members when a new child is born and tension escalates. Furthermore, as a family grows, so, too, 
does the number of beneficiaries; at the same time, the share that each beneficiary receives 
diminishes. Eventually, beneficiaries might no longer care about collecting their shares or fighting 
for their parts of the waqf, which could result  in a waqf becoming vulnerable to exploitation by 
external parties or even its administrator, the mutawalli. Furthermore, it shows that although 
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establishing a waqf could potentially shelter a family fortune, in the long run it will likely result in 
family disputes. 
The second set of cases are those wherein the beneficiary  may become extinct—and in so doing 
endanger the perpetuity of waqf. These cases are related to those wherein a minor child or a 
terminally ill patient is appointed as beneficiary. The problem with both of these cases is that if the 
beneficiary dies, the waqf remains without a beneficiary and the principle of the perpetuity of the 
waqf is violated. Those cases dealing with such scenarios attempt to find an alternative beneficiary 
or a method for leaving the waqf with an alternative beneficiary  in the event that the original 
beneficiary passes.
 
Appointing an unborn individual or a minor child as a beneficiary has been a popular method of 
circumventing the law of inheritance. Among the Imami Ulama, Ayatollah Yazdi has argued that 
one cannot appoint an unborn child as the beneficiary of a waqf. Iranian civil law, based on Article 
957, states that if said child is born alive then the waqf has been ratified correctly.110  This is one 
case in which the modern laws dealing with waqfs in Iran are contradictory. As we shall see, 
according to civil law a waqf can be established only once, and one cannot set a time in the future 
for ratification of the waqf. Furthermore, a waqf’s deed or Waqfnameh must not stipulate any 
conditions that might make the waqf invalid in the future. Hence, the case of an unborn child 
contradicts the rest of the rules regarding the establishment of a waqf.111
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Two other conditions for the beneficiaries are that their lines must not be in danger of extinction in 
the near future and they may  not be “ infidels” with no Muslim relatives. There has been much 
debate over whether infidels can become beneficiaries. Furthermore, among the Imami Ulama 
Ayatollah Yazdi has argued that the act  of appointing infidels as beneficiaries might inspire and 
encourage the rest of their family  members to convert to Islam.112 As in most modern considerations 
of this matter, Katouzian elaborates on the legal standing of waqf beneficiaries: based on clause 
seven of Article 961, one may not appoint a foreign national as the beneficiary  of a waqf. For 
example, a foreign national may not be appointed as a beneficiary of an Iranian farm that has been 
converted into a waqf. However, the same law permits the revenues of that farm to be rendered to a 
mosque outside of Iran.113 
Finally, according to Iranian civil law, as Katouzuian argues, someone who is terminally ill cannot 
become the beneficiary of a waqf. This is mainly  due to potential complications with regard to waqf 
ownership. Once a waqf is established, the founder loses the rights to his or her property. 
Additionally, the waqf does not necessarily have corporate status (even if Iranian civil law claims 
that the waqf has such status). The waqf cannot remain valid without a beneficiary, and should a 
sick beneficiary die that property becomes subject to ownership issues. Thus, the law has taken pre-
emptive measures to avoid such complexities.  However, based on Article 69 of the civil law, 
should the Waqfnameh indicate different classes of beneficiaries and one of these classes is 
terminated, if the second class can take over the benefits, then the waqf will remain valid. In other 
words, a terminally sick person can become the beneficiary of a waqf only  if the waqf anticipates 
different classes of beneficiaries, such that after the death of the first beneficiary, other beneficiaries 
will take over the proceeds. Essentially, and as a rule of thumb, there must not exist any moment 
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when the waqf is without a beneficiary.114   Moreover, in the case of a private waqf, Katouzian 
argues that because civil law has considered a waqf transaction to be in the nature of a contract, 
then several dates are crucial to the ratification of a waqf: the date when the Waqfnameh is 
produced, the date when the beneficiary  accepts his or her status as a beneficiary, and the date when 
possession of the waqf transfers from the founder to the beneficiary.115
Beneficiaries in public waqfs
The beneficiaries of a public waqf can be both individuals and public utilities, such as mosques, 
schools, bridges, graveyards and drinking fountains. Again, similar to those of a private waqf, the 
beneficiaries of a public waqf can be specific or non-specific: for example, the poor (non-specific) 
or the poor from a particular neighbourhood (specific). In the case of utilities, a mosque can be the 
beneficiary of a waqf, but the potential recipient could be a specific mosque but  does not need to be. 
Cases dealing with the beneficiaries of a waqf have two primary concerns: the first is to find a 
solution for how the proceeds should be spent on the waqf; the second is to define the correct 
beneficiaries for the waqf. In general, most problems arise a few years after the establishment of a 
waqf, particularly after the death of the founder, at which point confusion is often generated 
concerning how the waqf should operate. Theoretically, the Waqfnameh should be used as the 
reference point; likewise, the manual containing all of the directions and guidelines as stated at the 
time of the waqf’s establishment by the founder can be consulted. However, in reality, there is no 
way that one can anticipate all possible future outcomes. This tradition has had a detrimental impact 
both on waqfs and, ultimately, on the economy in general. The main cases are concerned with waqfs 
connected to mosques and public waqfs for which the beneficiaries have not been identified.
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Waqfs connected to mosques
Historically, mosques have enjoyed a great deal of attention with respect to waqfs. There are two 
ways in which a waqf can support a mosque. The first  is that the founder can convert his or her own 
property  into a mosque or, alternatively, build a mosque. Disputes occur when someone allows a 
congregation to pray on his property but does not wish to establish a mosque on his estate. In this 
case, there are two sets of contradictory opinions. Ayatollah Khomeini argues that if a founder 
intends to convert his property into a mosque, then he must explicitly state so. He may  establish that 
this waqf is for a particular purpose, or that “this piece of my property is going to become a 
mosque”. On the other hand, if someone has set aside a portion of his or her property and has 
allowed people to say their prayers there regularly, that place does not become a mosque unless the 
founder explicitly expressed such wishes.116  Such cases demonstrate that waqf properties have been 
subject to abuse. Having neither ownership nor the appropriate bureaucracy in place, both the waqf 
and the individual’s private property have been subject to violation. 
 
The second set  of problems arises with regard to the question of how to spend the proceeds 
rendered by  the activities of an already established mosque. There are many potential disputes that 
frequently arise among beneficiaries following a founder’s death. Ayatollah Yazdi issued a fatwa on 
how the proceeds should be spent with respect to mosques. He argues that if the revenues from a 
waqf have been earmarked to finance a mosque, then those revenues have been set aside to facilitate 
that mosque’s activities; thus, an order should be designated whereby  the revenues are to be spent. 
First, the revenues should be spent on the repair and restoration of the mosque. Second, the 
remaining revenues should be spent on lighting; third, if there is anything left, it should be paid to 
the Imam Jomeh (the Imam Jomeh is the man who recites and conducts the daily congregational 
prayers in a mosque). However, if the mosque is not in need of restoration, lighting, etc., then the 
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revenues should be diverted to another mosque that is in need of such services. Yazdi goes on to 
note that if the founder has designated a specific usage for his waqf, then that is the only way in 
which the waqf’s revenues may be spent.117  Jurists may be forced to grapple with certain specific 
cases; the complicated task of running a mosque, particularly in the future, cannot be narrowed 
down to the specific cases mentioned. Additionally, the administration of a waqf never has the 
necessary  freedom to make rational decisions as called for because of limitations imposed on it  by 
the Waqfnameh.
Fi Sabil Allah Waqf
The beneficiaries of a waqf might remain unknown because the waqf’s deed has been lost or simply 
because the founder did not include one and indicated that the waqf is a Fi Sabil Allah waqf (that is, 
a waqf dedicated to pleasing the Lord). A few arguments concerning cases in which the exact usage 
of the waqf remains unclear and the only indicated purpose of the waqf is fi Sabil Allah have been 
presented. Sheikh-e Tusi argues that if the founder has not been specific about the exact usage of his 
or her waqf, and only indicated that it was for “good deeds”, one third of the revenues should be 
spent on the soldiers of Islam, while the rest should be spent on the Hadj pilgrimage.118  However, 
the popular verdict among the majority of the Imami Ulama contradicts Tusi’s suggestion; here the 
argument is that  the waqf’s revenues are better spent on development projects aimed at delivering 
public goods, such as bridges, mosques, etc.119  Nowadays, the founder is obliged to be very exact 
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and must appoint specific beneficiaries. This is an attempt by modern waqf regulations to minimise 
potential confusion in the future.120
The waqf object
The last section of this chapter explores the third category of players pertaining to every waqf: the 
object (Moqufeh). The laws of waqf regarding the waqf object remain more or less the same as with 
old cases, some of which have been codified. The main development has been attempts to 
encourage cash waqfs, which are of great importance and could potentially rejuvenate many Iranian 
waqfs that have stagnated. In order to be converted into a waqf, an object must meet several 
conditions. The main rationale behind what can or cannot be converted into a waqf is based 
primarily  on the concept of the perpetuity of a waqf. In other words, any object that could 
depreciate cannot be converted into a waqf. Cases related to the object of a waqf can be divided into 
two categories. The first deals with issues pertaining to the ownership  of properties intended to be 
converted, or already converted, into waqfs. The second is related to those objects that can be 
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third Imam of the Imami Shi’it. These waqfs are called waqfs for Imam Hossein. Khomeini defines 
what can be qualified as such a waqf—a waqf for Imam Hossein is effectively one that renders the 
passion plays and other activities during the holy month of Muhharam. This type constitutes 13.4% 
of all waqf revenues in Iran, which makes it single-handedly the most popular and widespread waqf 
throughout the country.
converted into waqfs. Discussions about these objects are very important, as they reveal certain 
aspects of the Islamic economy; for example, when the lending of money was banned, waqfs 
potentially worked as vehicles for financing the economy.
The majority of the Imami Ulama agree with Mohaqeq Helli’s argument, which asserts three 
conditions regarding what can be converted into a waqf:
1) Only tangible goods that can be possessed (services, because they are not tangible, may not be 
converted into waqfs);
2) The tangible goods must not be depreciable; 
3) One must be able to actually acquire the tangible goods—for example, fish in the sea or a bird in 
the sky cannot be converted into waqfs.121
 As mentioned earlier, these are general guidelines as to what can and cannot be converted into a 
waqf. However, the haphazard nature of properties in Iran, many of which have no formal 
bureaucracy  to look after them, means that they are often subject to various types of disputes. The 
following question is first and foremost:
Can only one section of a property be converted into a waqf?
This question has been the subject of much debate among jurists. The common verdict among the 
Imami jurists is that one can convert only  one floor of a house, or just  a section of a piece of 
property, into a waqf; the Sunni schools of law, conversely, disagree.122   Article 55 of Iranian civil 
law states that the specific (exact) property  is needed in order for it  to be converted into a waqf. 
83
121 Helli (1989, p. 443)
122 Helli (1985, p. 451)
Furthermore, Article 67 of civil law states that  those things that cannot be acquired or exchanged 
may not be converted into a waqf unless the beneficiary is able to take possession of them.123
 
The reasoning behind this case is that  if there is no precise way of knowing the whereabouts of a 
property, or if the property changes, then the section converted into a waqf will change, which 
would violate the principle of perpetuity in a waqf. For example, land that has a river running 
through it will most likely change its shape over time; if the waqf portion of the land is affected by 
this change, then the waqf itself will be affected. Change may also be deliberate. In most cases, the 
heirs of the founder would like to maximise their shares of the inherited property; by altering the 
property’s landscape, they might achieve this goal. In order to manage such cases, Article 216 of 
civil law states that whatever remains unknown or ambiguous may not  be converted into a waqf. 
Hence, if in the waqf deed the exact details of the property are not provided (i.e., this part is left 
blank), that waqf cannot be ratified. Katouzian, however, argues that because the institution of a 
waqf is charitable in nature, sticking to the letter of the law is not mandatory. For example, if 
someone says that he has converted all of his land in a city into waqfs in order to support a certain 
hospital, this is sufficient as far as the law is concerned, although the founder may not know the 
exact extent of the properties about which he is speaking.124 
 
In this case, the rationale during pre-modern times can be understood when jurists, depending on 
the case, either allowed one to convert, or prevented one from converting, a fraction of a property to 
waqf. This act could create disputes among the beneficiaries, or between the mutawalli of the waqf 
and the heir to the property, with respect to neighbouring properties and so forth. It seems that 
modern legislation has aimed at bringing this under control. However, because the act of founding a 
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waqf needs to be promoted, it  also needs to be simplified. Therefore, based on what Katouzian says, 
not much has changed, and the haphazard nature of establishing a waqf, with its subsequent 
expenses to the economy, remains an on-going problem.
 
The second most common case is when a waqf is established through the conversion of something 
of which the individual is neither the owner nor the acting agent of the owner. It was noted 
previously  that modern legislation has made it mandatory that the founder be the actual owner of 
the property. However, in the past, ownership of property  did not carry as much weight as it does 
today.
Jointly held assets
The popular verdict among Imami scholars is in favour of the conversion of jointly  held properties 
and assets into waqfs. Allameh Halli issued a fatwa indicating that those properties that have joint 
ownership can also be converted into waqfs.125  The Sunni schools of law share a similar view, 
agreeing that a property that has joint  ownership can be converted into a waqf. Article 58 of Iranian 
civil law allows properties that have joint ownership to be converted into waqfs.126  There are two 
ways one can view these cases and their economic significance. On the one hand, founding a waqf 
can be done easily. On the other hand, such ease and the almost informal fashion of establishing a 
waqf can have a very  costly economic impact on the other owners of the property. It has been 
indicated that by converting a property, one effectively  takes that property out of the economic 
cycle. Therefore, the solitary action of one of the owners would end up affecting the entire property. 
In other words, one of the owners could use his right and convert his share of the property  into a 
waqf and in doing so affect the economic value of the entire property. In the process, the founder 
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may not need to secure the permission of the other owners, which effectively shows how weak their 
rights have been and still are regarding the security of their private property.
 
A departure from what has traditionally been stated with regard to the objects that can be converted 
into waqfs is that, in reality, there have been many objects that did not necessarily meet the initial 
conditions for a waqfed object. These objects came to play a role because there was a demand for 
them, which the vehicle of the waqf appeared to ratify. For example, there are cases of shoes being 
waqfed to the pilgrims of the Imam Reza in Mashhad who lost their own. There are cases in some 
cities of wedding gowns and suits being waqfed to those who cannot afford them, and so forth. 
Another reason for these objects being waqfed has been to provide the necessary goods, labour and/
or financing required of a particular enterprise.
Immovable goods
   
This section investigates immovable objects. Generally, it is agreed that goods converted into waqfs 
must be goods that are not excluded from legal traffic and that can be the object of a valid contract. 
In other words, individuals must be able to take possession of them; thus, the fish in the sea or the 
birds in the sky may  not be converted into waqfs. Additionally, the consumption or usage of these 
goods must be lawful; hence, no musical instruments, objects used for worship  in other religions 
(such as crucifixes), or “impure” goods such as wine and pork are permitted. Finally, these goods 
must not be otherwise excluded from legal traffic (hence, they  cannot be public domains or belong 
to waqf property). These are the general requirements that are applicable to all contracts involving 
the transfer of property. In addition, there are some other requirements that are specific regarding 
the founding of a waqf. Only physical goods (Ayn) that are clearly  defined and exist  at  the moment 
that the waqf is founded can be converted into a waqf. A “debt” or “one of the houses owned by 
me” (in the event that the founder owns more than one house) may not validly  constitute the object 
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of a waqf. Furthermore, the founder must be entitled to dispose of the intended object of the waqf. 
He cannot convert  into a waqf another person’s property or his own property  if it has been pledged 
to another. A waqf must be perpetual. However, if there is controversy regarding the implications as 
to the object of a waqf, then it can potentially be terminated.  One can categorise the criteria for 
those immovable goods that may be converted into a waqf as follows:
1. Movable goods related to an immovable property, such as slaves, animals and agricultural 
tools belonging to a rural estate127
2. Movable goods mentioned in certain hadith as constituting valid objects for conversion to 
waqfs, such as horses and weapons used for jihad 
3. Movable goods that people are accustomed to dedicating as waqf, such as shovels, pickaxes 
and biers to be used in graveyards, copies of the Quran to be read in mosques or schools, 
and cooking pots to be used in public kitchens for the poor
The next category of cases has to do to with whether gold and silver can be converted into waqfs. 
At first glance these cases do not seem to carry  much importance, at least  not economically. 
However, further investigation and comparative work is needed in order to understand the reasons 
behind such cases and their importance. As mentioned earlier, when the lending of money was 
banned by Sharia, given the absence of banks, waqfs came to play  a significant role as a financing 
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127  Katouzian (2005, p. 545); Helli (1989, p. 168). This brings us to another question—what is the 
verdict for the byproducts of a waqf? Are the byproducts of a waqf also waqfs, or should they be 
treated differently? For example, are the fruits of the trees in an orchard that has been converted into 
a waqf also considered to be waqf property? The majority of Ulama argue that the byproducts of 
waqfed items and properties are also waqf. However, Sani argues that such byproducts can only be 
considered part of a waqf if the common knowledge of the local people confirms this. Katouzian, 
referring to Article 68 of civil law, states that the byproducts of a waqf belong to the waqf, unless 
otherwise stated—i.e., if the founder expressed his wishes in this regard in the Waqfnameh.
mechanism in Islamic countries. The main question, however, remained: can gold and silver be 
converted into waqfs?
 
The practice of instituting cash waqfs dates to the 14th century and today is used especially in 
Turkey and the Balkans. This type of waqf has served two different yet very important  functions. 
First, as Cizakca notes, waqfs have traditionally been limited to immovable goods, and, as 
discussed earlier, one of the major motivations for establishing a waqf has been the ability to shelter 
wealth. Perhaps this method worked in favour of individuals who were rich not because of their 
assets but because of their liquid wealth—moneylenders, for example. This was one of the groups 
that advocated fatwas in favour of cash waqf. On the other hand, the general public also supported 
this type of waqf, because of the demands on the economy. As is the case in every society, in the 
Ottoman Empire—where the cash waqf started—there was demand for consumption loans yet no 
institution that provided financial services. This was because of the Islamic ban on charging 
interest. Hence, these waqfs served an instrumental role in the economy. In fact, it is reported that 
cash waqfs accounted for more than half of all new waqfs in the Ottoman Empire.128   Finally, a 
further impetus to the formation of cash waqfs came from cash-rich individuals seeking to establish 
a steady revenue stream to finance charitable services, the expenses of which were expected to 
remain roughly constant; for example, schools, whose primary  expense would be teachers’ 
salaries.129
 
Cash waqfs have played a crucial role in reshaping the waqf system. They have undoubtedly  limited 
one of the problems associated with the law of static perpetuity. They have enabled the transfer of 
waqf capital across economic sectors simply by redirecting loans from one set of borrowers to 
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another. Whereas a waqf of immovables might have its capital tied up in an increasingly 
unproductive farm, a cash waqf’s commitment to a particular sector is limited only by its loan 
period. That said, cash waqfs have by no means been free of operational constraints. Like the 
founder of an ordinary  waqf, that of a cash waqf could restrict its beneficiaries and limit its charges. 
The restrictions imposed on a cash waqf typically reflected, in addition to the founder's personal 
tastes and biases, the prevailing interest rates at  the time of its establishment. Over time, these could 
become increasingly serious barriers to a waqf’s exploitation of profit opportunities. As Kuran 
observes, precisely because cash waqfs have been required to keep their rates fixed, only one fifth 
of them survived longer than a century.130
Part of the problem is that whereas a bank pools the deposits of many individuals, a cash waqf has 
typically been formed through a single individual’s savings. Moreover, just as there have existed 
legal impediments to resource-pooling via waqfs of immovables, so it has been with cash waqfs. 
This has limited the size of the average loan, and probably also the size of the business enterprises 
that have been formed. It is true that there has been nothing to prevent borrowers from pooling 
capital themselves by taking loans from multiple cash waqfs. Nonetheless, borrowing is never 
costless, and the cost of obtaining many small loans undoubtedly exceeded that of taking an 
equivalent large one. There was, in fact, very little pooling on the demand side of this credit market. 
As Cizakca explains, insofar as cash waqfs lent to individual borrowers are concerned, they have 
generally  involved small-scale loans to consumers rather than to businesses.131 To evolve into a type 
of bank, the cash waqf would have had to overcome an additional restriction of Islamic law—its 
aversion to the concept of a juristic person. This did not happen. Created as a device to circumvent 
the Islamic law of inheritance and enhance the credibility of private property  rights, both major 
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legal restrictions, the cash waqf was unable to transcend the anti-corporatism of the law. This anti-
corporatism was rooted in early efforts to unite the nascent community of Muslims by denying all 
political boundaries except those separating areas inhabited by Muslims from those inhabited by 
unbelievers; these have been noted by both Lewis and Lambton.132
 
Few case studies deal directly with cash waqfs in Iran. That said, the outcome of the research 
previously  discussed does shed some light on cases involving cash waqfs as well as those regarding 
the conversion of gold and silver into waqfs.
Conversion of silver and gold into waqfs
Gold and silver, as immovables and as goods whose use is tied to their consumption such that they 
will wear out with use, are technically not permitted for conversion into waqfs. However, some 
jurists have argued for the conversion of such goods into waqfs based on the fact that gold and 
silver are considered to be immovable properties. There is a divide between the verdicts of jurists 
with regard to this matter; whereas Sheikh Tusi is against it,133  Allameh Helli has a more 
sympathetic opinion. He argues that if silver and gold are in the form of decorative objects or 
jewellery, then they can be converted into waqfs.134  More recently, Ayatollah Najafi has expressed 
an opinion on this subject based on Allameh Halli’s verdict;135  he argues that only  gold and silver 
that takes the form of jewellery or a decorative object—and thus does not  exist in solid form—can 
be turned into waqfs.
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Finally, based on Article 58 of Iranian civil law, because gold and silver retain their value and do 
not depreciate, they  might possibly be converted into waqfs. Although this is a common practice, 
particularly at shrines, civil law does not express any particular view here. Perhaps the reasoning 
behind the argument that gold and silver in the form of objects or jewellery (rather than in coin 
form) is valid is related to the fact that the mutawallis were, in fact, the money-lenders; by 
maintaining the waqf in a another form, such as jewellery  or a decorative object, it  was easier to 
keep track of waqf properties and retain a somewhat tighter control over the lending of money.
 
Debates regarding whether or not cash can be converted into waqfs are not new. This issue has, in 
fact, been a matter of dispute among Imami Ulama from the earliest days. have all issued fatwas 
against this conversion. They  based their arguments on a comparison between cash (in their time, 
gold and silver coins) and consumer goods (such as food or candles), which may not be converted 
into waqf. The reasoning behind this is that a waqf must be perpetual; consumption of something 
that had been converted into a waqf would effectively terminate the endowment.136
 
On the other hand, several fatwas have been issued by other Ulama in favour of such cash 
conversion waqfs. Both Shahid Avval and Allameh Helli argue that cash can be converted into a 
waqf under the condition that  the value of the cash does not depreciate.137  Advocating that the cash 
waqf become acceptable within modern legislation has been extremely important and could 
potentially act as a way to rejuvenate many old, abandoned and stagnated waqfs. In one very 
successful case, by referring to such fatwas a bill was passed by  the Iranian parliament in May 1986 
allowing a waqf institution the exclusive right to sell some of its assets and invest them in shares or 
other types of liquidities. Section 44 of Article 58 enables the waqf institution to reinvest the 
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funds138  generated from converting assets into other forms of liquidities, such as shares or bonds. 
Those shares of companies or bonds, however, were to be automatically converted into a waqf, and 
their generated revenues had to be spent in accordance with the initial wishes of the founder of the 
sold assets. Astan-e Qods-e Razavi, the world’s largest  waqf complex, supported this shift: in 2005 
it owned between fifty and 100 percent of at least fifteen major enterprises throughout Iran.139
Concluding remarks
 
This chapter explored the main players involved in waqfs. For each waqf, all of these players must 
be present in order for a waqf to be properly established. This is due to the concept of perpetuity, 
which is discussed in the next chapter. A variety of cases were shown relating to each of the players 
in a waqf. For example, the founder can establish a waqf not only  as a means of providing some sort 
of public good but also for a variety of other reasons, among them the prospect of circumventing 
the Islamic law of inheritance, or in order to shelter his wealth and escape taxation or creditors. The 
cases we considered illustrate the ways in which the socioeconomic rationale behind the 
development of such laws has functioned. Our research shows that jurists have had two initial 
concerns. First, they have sought to make waqfs inclusive of as many individuals as possible vis-à-
vis the fabric of society. However, the rapid method of establishing a waqf made the institution 
vulnerable to many potential abuses. Correspondingly, the second concern evident from the cases 
we examined demonstrates that jurists have sought to minimise potential abuse of the system by 
disqualifying certain individuals. Modern civil law of Iran has mainly  codified these old cases, with 
some scattered attempts to rationalise certain ambiguous cases in order to protect the institution. 
With respect to the founder, one can still exploit a waqf for reasons outside of charitable purposes. 
Moreover, and more importantly, it has been shown that there is a lack of cases wherein a waqf was 
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established by more than one individual or by an institution. This important discovery reveals the 
unincorporated nature of the waqf system, which is examined in greater detail in the next chapter, 
where civil law claims that a waqf has a corporate personality will be considered.
          
In the case of beneficiaries, the founder is able to select individuals across multiple generations to 
become the waqf’s beneficiaries in the future. Additionally, two other significant factors were 
addressed: first, the founder can potentially  appoint beneficiaries so that, in practice, no one comes 
forward to use the waqf. In other words, although it seems as if there does exist a valid beneficiary, 
hardly  anyone qualifies to use it; this constitutes another method for abusing the system. A second 
form of abuse occurs when, in reality, one of the primary  reasons behind establishing the waqf was 
to preserve the family fortune by circumventing the Islamic law of inheritance. In the long run, this 
has often resulted in disparities and disputes among family members. The modern legal system does 
not necessarily add anything to these traditional cases, which have primarily concerned issues 
regarding who qualifies as a beneficiary, particularly with regard to later generations and as 
divisions proceed. However, the law encourages the founder to divide the proceeds equally between 
male and female descendants.
             
The last player in a waqf is the object. Traditionally, the object of a waqf has had to be something 
that would not wear out over time, so as to not violate the waqf concept  of perpetuity. Furthermore, 
in reviewing a variety  of cases it has become clear that private property laws have become 
interlinked with the establishment of waqfs. Moreover, this chapter demonstrated that the institution 
of waqf has been used as a vehicle for financing the economy. In the absence of banks and financial 
institutions, waqf-related gold and silver have been used as a method of financing. Finally, a recent 
development in the laws of waqf, which could potentially  revive many stagnated waqfs, was 
examined. The right to sell its unwanted assets and invest the generated revenues into other 
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profitable businesses has been exclusively granted to Iran’s largest waqf institution and has proved 
to be financially successful.
              
 In short, this chapter introduced the primary players in waqf. The rationale behind the creation of 
the pre-modern laws that treat each of them and their eventual shift into modern civil law was also 
explored. The next chapter will look at the legal effects of waqf, where the legal relationship 
between these players will be demonstrated.
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Chapter IV: Legal Effects
This chapter chronicles the legal procedures that transpire during and after the establishment of a 
waqf. In the previous chapter, the main players of a waqf, such as the founder and beneficiaries, as 
well as the waqf’s object, were discussed. After establishing who can become a founder or 
beneficiary of a waqf, and what may  or may not be eligible to be converted into a waqf, the time 
comes to actually form one. There are two main components to the procedure, on which this chapter 
focuses. The first concerns how a waqf is legally formed; the second, the manner in which the 
process is legally recorded. Ultimately, it is this second component, concerning the recording 
process, that is the main focus of this thesis. The ownership of a waqf is a matter of dispute between 
different Islamic schools of law and among jurists. Because a waqf does not have a legal 
personality, if one cannot record its owner the waqf might not be protected by law. Given the scale 
of this institution, ambiguities over the ownership  of waqfs not  only  make the respective properties 
vulnerable to opportunists, they also hugely affect waqfs’ productivity and overall performance. 
Finally, after establishing the shortcomings of traditional laws related to waqf ownership, and 
documenting the process of establishing a waqf, the modern version of waqf laws, such as they 
appeared in 20th-century Iran and are still in practice, are examined so as to evaluate the level of 
progress.
The chapter is essentially  divided into two parts. The first part, which deals with the establishment 
of waqfs, is itself divided into two sections: the first section focuses on the importance of waqfs’ 
verbal declarations and the weight that jurists have given them; the second section considers factors 
related to the production of the waqf deed, the document detailing how the endowment is to be run 
and operated, indefinitely, based on the founder’s wishes. As the word suggests, this is a very 
serious document, into which much thought is invested so as to ensure that it  is produced correctly. 
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This thesis is specifically  concerned with the question of the extent to which these considerations, 
rules and regulations—which were set by traditional jurists over a lengthy period of time—remain 
relevant today. Are they compatible with Iran’s modern civil law, and what impact do they have on 
the productivity of waqfs?
The second part of this chapter focuses solely on the issues of waqf ownership. Most  Islamic 
schools of law argue that once a property is converted into a waqf, the owner (i.e., the founder) 
loses his property rights over it. However, what has become a source of dispute is the fact  that not 
only do the schools of law disagree as to who should take ownership of the property, jurists within 
the same schools of law also have not been able to arrive at a unified answer. The result is that the 
transfer of ownership, which clearly takes place with the establishment of a waqf, cannot be 
recorded. Consequently, the endowment cannot be protected by the law, as its ownership remains 
unclear. 
Focusing on the ownership of waqfs is the most important part  of this thesis, as the discussion not 
only sheds light on the most important, yet the weakest, aspect of Islamic law regarding the 
protection of private property but also reveals the impact of the absence of the concept of a 
corporation in Islamic law. Hence, during the 20th century, when such concepts were introduced to 
Iranian civil law and when traditional laws on waqfs were being codified, contradictions began to 
appear which have been vastly neglected. However, in order to elaborate clearly  on how the 
ownership of a waqf under traditional laws worked, and the process of its transition into civil law, a 
few underlying stages should be discussed. For example, whether the act of founding a waqf 
happens through a unilateral or bilateral contract  has been the subject of much debate among jurists 
for centuries. The answer to that question would largely clarify  the question of ownership of a waqf. 
However, neither of these questions has been clearly defined by jurists, which results in ownership 
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of waqf properties remaining unknown as well. Furthermore, in reviewing jurists’ arguments 
regarding the waqf as a contract, it becomes clear that the concept of a corporation has been 
completely alien to them, even as of the late 19th century. Finally, when the laws were codified in 
Iran into the modern body of civil law, on the one hand waqfs maintained their traditional identity, 
in this case as being unincorporated; on the other hand, civil law granted waqfs corporate status. 
This is one of the many issues concerning the modern laws of waqf in which there exists a huge 
contradiction, one that legal experts have been trying to explain for some time, generally  without 
much success.
Traditionally, jurists have advocated that a waqf needs a verbal declaration from its founder, 
through the pronunciation of a waqf formula, in order to correctly establish its endowment. 
Gradually, a written form of waqf deed was introduced. This advancement in the direction of 
centralising waqfs determined certain principles for both how a founder establishes a waqf and how 
a waqf’s deed is produced. Moreover, it  became very important that the deed made clear how the 
endowment was to be run, particularly following the founder’s death. In any  case, in order to secure 
the future of a waqf, the issue of ownership became vital. The main question for jurists has been: 
what happens to the ownership of a piece of property  that has been converted into a waqf? This 
important question has remained a subject of much dispute within both traditional Islamic law and 
modern civil law. The case has to be dissected from the very  beginning of the process of 
establishing a waqf. For example, the jurists must  decide whether they should treat a waqf as a legal 
procedure similar to a will, whereby the beneficiary would not need to accept  or sign a contract in 
order to become a beneficiary, or like a contract to which both parties must agree. Each theory has 
its own legal implications, which could potentially identify the rightful owner of the waqf property. 
Scholars have examined various elements of the process: the act of establishing a waqf; the 
procedures for producing the waqf’s deed; the transfer of the right of usage of an endowment from 
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founder to beneficiaries; whether or not a waqf is a contract, and, if so, what  type of contract it is; 
and who eventually becomes the owner of an endowment. The findings demonstrate that not only 
do traditional laws of waqf fail to identify  what happens to the ownership of a waqf, modern civil 
law also fails to do so. Civil law claims to give waqfs corporate status. However, as has been 
shown, these same laws do not allow a waqf to act as a corporation. Therefore, the hugely important 
issue of waqf ownership remains disputed, and, moreover, has gone completely unnoticed.
The second set of findings sheds light on aspects of traditional laws in which there is a clear lack of 
cohesion. More important is that these inconsistencies not only become cohesive in the process of 
the codification of laws, but also, in most cases, simply enter civil law, thereby  creating 
inconsistencies within civil law. On the one hand, for example, in considering the endowment as 
correctly  ratified, many  jurists place a great deal of weight on the verbal declaration of the waqf 
formula by  the founder. On the other hand, there is another type of waqf, known as a Mo’atati, 
which refers to cases in which the verbal declaration of the waqf formula by  the founder is deemed 
unnecessary. Similarly, there have been many arguments as to the importance of a waqf’s 
perpetuity, from the moment of the waqf’s establishment through the production of its deed, its 
administration, and so forth. There is even yet another type of waqf, known as a Monqateh, which 
allows the waqf not to be perpetual, at  least for limited periods of time. These traditional cases can 
seem irrational in terms of present-day  laws and the effectiveness of the contemporary economy. 
Nonetheless, all of these contradictory laws have been codified into civil law.
The third part of the chapter considers some cases that, on the surface, seem to be merely  practical 
matters of a day-to-day nature. However, an in-depth look at these cases reveals the forces behind 
the evolution of the legal system. For example, much has been said about the transfer of the right of 
usage in a waqf. In other words, what is the correct procedure for a founder to follow, from the 
98
moment of a waqf’s founding until the designated beneficiaries begin receiving the proceeds or are 
able to use the endowment. Many cases deal with many particulars of individual cases. However, 
the underlying theme reveals the necessity of a clear procedure with respect to the contract and the 
transfer of ownership within the waqf system. These cases, therefore, both directly and indirectly 
support the arguments presented in the first two parts of the chapter.
The chapter begins with the act of founding a waqf. The focus of this section is the particularities 
related to the initial stages of formally  establishing an endowment. The founder must be clear about 
his intention. More importantly, the founder must verbally  declare his intention and pronounce 
something known as a waqf formula. The waqf formula has gone through a lengthy process of 
rationalisation within the framework of traditional law. The most notable development in this 
process has been that the waqf formula can be pronounced in Persian rather than in Arabic, which 
has generally  been the only accepted language of Islamic law. Furthermore, even following the 
introduction of the waqf’s written deed, the importance of the verbal declaration did not decline. 
Unlike most cases, in which the verbal declaration merely has ceremonial value and it is the written 
version that carries legal weight, with waqfs the verbal declaration stands side-by-side with its 
written version. This leads to a situation in which, within the traditional sphere of law (with most 
traditional laws simply having been codified into civil law), some laws may have been rationalised 
on the basis of new methods of doing things and through fatwas. However, the old methods of 
doing things, along with the older fatwas, have not become obsolete in the process; they also remain 
in practice alongside the new laws. In other words, the old and the new laws coexist in a parallel 
way. Lastly, traditional laws are intrinsically  bound to lack cohesion. In the first section, we see that 
jurists have argued for the importance of waqfs having a verbal declaration. However, they  also 
advocate for those waqfs for which the founder never verbally declared the deed. These laws, with 
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their contradictions, have entered into Iranian civil law without full consideration of their economic 
impact on the country.
The second section of the chapter examines those conditions—and the related general principles—
that jurists have developed over time to act as a blueprint for founders in producing deeds for 
waqfs. These sets of principles and rules have had two important kinds of impacts. The first is that 
they  have set some form of standardisation for the production of waqf deeds. This centralisation 
makes producing, reading and following the directions for producing a waqf deed easy.  The style of 
writing of a waqf’s deed can change and become subjected to regional customs/laws in addition to 
those related to the era during which the waqf was established. The second set of findings is related 
to the practical and economic implications of those rules and regulations on Waqfnamehs. We 
discover that some of the principles that  were imposed by the jurists with respect to waqf deeds 
have had a stagnating effect on the performance of waqfs. Furthermore, these rules and directions 
have simply  been codified into the body of Iranian civil law. As a result, in Iran the modern laws of 
waqf have not only  failed to modernise the traditional laws but, more importantly, they also have 
resulted in contradictory  laws within civil law. The main principles that one has to follow in 
producing a Waqfnameh are related to the perpetuity, irrevocability  and immediacy of the waqf 
being established. For example, after a waqf is established its mission cannot change. This has 
come at a great cost, as new needs and immediate demands can no longer be added to already-
established waqfs.  On the one hand, civil law gives a waqf a legal personality; on the other hand, it 
does not allow the institution to alter its mission if it  should prove necessary. This is one very clear 
example of how poorly the process of codification of traditional waqf laws into civil law has been 
carried out.
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The third section of this chapter examines waqf ownership. There are two other aspects that the 
reader must understand before tackling the matter of ownership. First, jurists have had to consider 
many cases related to the transfer of the right of usage. The founder might refuse to allow, or 
express apprehension about allowing, beneficiaries to use an endowment, or about handing the waqf 
over to them at all. These cases have initiated debates as to what happens to the ownership of a 
waqf. In order to answer this question regarding waqf ownership, there is yet another aspect that 
must be considered, which is how a waqf works as a contract. Jurists accept that a waqf is a 
contract. However, the type of that contract, which results in identifying the rightful owner of the 
waqf, remains disputed. Iranian civil law has attempted to solve this long-term dispute by giving the 
waqf a legal personality. However, in practice a waqf can never exercise that legal personality. Too 
many laws prevent the waqf from exercising the latitude that modern institutions enjoy.
Finally, cases will be presented in which the transfer of the right of usage and the perpetuity  of the 
waqf have been discussed. The importance of these cases is that, first, they contribute to an 
understanding of the peculiar nature of waqfs. Second, they demonstrate that a waqf’s perpetuity, 
one of the most important  pillars of a waqf, can be broken through traditional law by applying the 
concept of momentary waqfs. This contradictory system, which in practice became inevitable, was 
not addressed and rationalised through the codification of relevant laws but was incorporated into 
civil law without significant  modification, resulting in laws that either do not make sense or 
contradict other legislation.
The act of establishing a waqf
Most Islamic schools of law mention the four main pillars of waqfs. These pillars are the founder, 
the beneficiary, the object and the act of founding a waqf. This section explores the final pillar: the 
act of founding a waqf. The general rule of thumb regarding the declaration of intent, according to 
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most schools of law, implies that if the wording of the declaration is obvious and unambiguous 
(Sarih), the declaration alone is constitutive; otherwise—i.e., if the declaration is indirect (kenayeh)
—circumstantial evidence that reflects the intent of the founder of the waqf is required. This might 
include, for example, additional phrases, such as “it shall not be sold, given away or inherited”. This 
declaration would normally  be recorded in a document known as the waqf deed (the Waqfnameh). It 
is important that  we do not confuse the verbal declaration (Siqeh waqf) with the waqf deed, a 
document that essentially  works as user’s guide. The waqf deed and its conditions will be covered 
later in this chapter.
Article 56 of Iranian civil law states that a waqf can be established by the founder with whatever 
terminology  or expressions provide an understanding of his desire in creating that waqf. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of the first generation of the waqf’s beneficiaries is needed for the 
establishment of a waqf.140  Evidently, civil law eliminates the need for using Arabic terminologies 
generally  associated with the waqf formula; all that is needed is verbal usage of the word “waqf”. 
This verdict  reflects a long process. One of the most recent and most influential fatwas is that of 
Ayatollah Khomeini, who argued that all that is needed for a founder to convert his property into a 
waqf is his verbal declaration that “this property is a waqf”.141  This is an over-simplified way of 
concluding a legal transaction in this day and age. For example, in the previous chapter cases in 
which someone mistakenly or deliberately converted someone else’s property  into a waqf were 
reviewed. One would anticipate that there should be some precautionary measures taken in order to 
prevent such mistakes and loopholes. However, the method that Ayatollah Khomeini advocates, 
though making it incredibly  easy to establish a waqf, opens the door to many potential problems 
and to exploitation of the system. We have already noted the many  reasons whereby one could 
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abuse the waqf system. Furthermore, as will be covered later, the act of founding a waqf must be 
immediate; in other words, the waqf is formed immediately after the founder’s verbal declaration. 
The problem is that once one establishes an institution intended to be perpetual, everything related 
to that institution becomes irrevocable and irreversible, as the waqf principle suggests. One would 
imagine that a more comprehensive method is needed in order to set things in order.
Regarding the establishment of a waqf, and in particular the importance of the verbal declaration 
(the Siqeh waqf), jurists’ records date as early as the 13th century. Sheikh-e Tusi argues that, first 
and foremost, the founder must have a genuine interest in founding a waqf. Furthermore, he only 
accepts those waqf formulas in which the word “waqf” has been stated. Finally, he considers that 
the only proper method of establishing a waqf is via verbal declaration, perhaps in opposition to the 
written form. In the traditional style, whereby jurists refer to fatwas from previous jurists that  are 
similar to theirs, Tusi argues that  the word waqf must be specifically  pronounced; otherwise, there 
is the possibility  of confusion as to whether the endowment is actually a Sadaqeh (alms) or a waqf. 
In order to avoid this, the founder should clearly  state that his intention is to establish a waqf, not to 
pay alms.142  Most important here is that although on the surface waqfs and Sadaqehs appear to be 
very similar, their legal parameters are quite different. Most notably, waqfs and Sadaqehs differ in 
terms of ownership. With a Sadaqeh, the beneficiary  becomes the owner of the endowed object, 
whereas with a waqf ownership is often a matter of dispute. As mentioned earlier, the institution of 
waqf has played a significant role in protecting private property, whether through sheltering wealth 
or circumventing the law of inheritance. Therefore, one can imagine how important it  must have 
been for the founders of waqfs to ensure that they did not mistakenly transfer ownership of their 
properties to others.
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The verbal declaration of a waqf traditionally had been stated in Arabic, like all other contracts in 
Iran that potentially involve religion—for example a marriage or the founding of a mosque. Making 
a founder first declare something verbally, perhaps not in his or her own language, has proven to 
cause much confusion and unfavourable outcomes. For example, Mohaqeq Helli, who also 
advocates for the importance of a verbal declaration by the founder, argues that the word “waqf” 
must be stated by the founder in the waqf formula. Moreover, he emphasises very  explicitly that 
only the word “waqf” must be used, and not any of its synonyms, such as Habs (meaning to lock or 
imprison). He bases his argument on the fact that many deeds, such as those related to the paying of 
alms (Sadaqeh) or Islamic tax (Zakat), share similar terminology with those related to waqfs. In 
order to avoid confusion, it is, therefore, vital to use the word “waqf” and nothing else.143
The apparent confusion and mistakes finally led jurists such as Ayatollah Tabatabai to issue fatwas 
eliminating the use of Arabic from the waqf formula. He argues that, whatever the method and 
terminology  indicating the founder’s wish to establish a waqf, it is valid. He continues by stating 
that the nature of the endowment itself and local knowledge of it are sufficient reasons for accepting 
the validity of a waqf. He does not see any  reason why a Persian-speaking Iranian pronouncing an 
Arabic word should play such a vital role in the establishment of an endowment. Furthermore, he 
argues that the potential confusions between waqf, Sadaqeh and Zakat would be eliminated if the 
Persian terminology was used instead of the Arabic terminology.144  That is, perhaps, the reason 
Ayatollah Khomeini tried to simplify the situation further by stating that all that is needed for a 
founder to convert his property into a waqf is the verbal declaration, “this property is a waqf”.145  It 
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the Ulamas suggested that perhaps a verbal declaration is not as important as some of their 
predecessors had indicated. For example, Sheikh Mohammad Hassan Najafi, unlike Helli and Tusi, 
is not as concerned about the true wishes of the founder with respect to formally ratifying a waqf.
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is evident that Iranian civil law has also been influenced by this development, as there is no mention 
of the need to use any  specific Arabic phrase. However, the word “waqf” must be explicitly stated 
in the formula. This may be the only example we find in which traditional laws, prior to their 
codification into civil law, had already been rationalised by jurists. 
Mo’atati waqf (a waqf without a formula)
The importance of this type of waqf is that it can be viewed as an attempt to centralise the 
establishment of waqfs. However, there are exceptions to this rule. In exceptional cases, a waqf can 
be founded through acts that imply intention. If, for instance, a person builds a mosque and allows 
other people to pray  there, or if he establishes a graveyard and lets other people bury their dead 
there, this is regarded as tantamount to founding a waqf. That is, certain acts are by custom 
regarded as an expression of the intent to perform a certain legal act. This type of waqf is known as 
a Mo’atati. Certain stipulations are regarded as contrary to the essential characteristics of a waqf, 
such that their inclusion would make a waqf null and void. Some such stipulations have already 
been discussed: waqfs dedicated to an unlawful aim, or for which the founder is designated as 
beneficiary. 
Mo’atatis have generally referred to already-established waqfs with which jurists have had to 
contend. In some cases, jurists noticed a need to centralise certain waqf laws; at the same time, they 
could not simply call for excising waqfs that did not necessarily comply with the new conditions.
The importance of the verbal declaration is obvious. However, the question remains: if someone 
initiated an act to have his property converted into a waqf, is doing so sufficient so as to 
legitimately consider that property a waqf? Or must the waqf formula be pronounced in order for a 
waqf to be formed? Allameh Helli argues that a waqf is only established with the pronunciation of 
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the word “waqf”. Therefore, a Mo’atati waqf is similar to a mosque that only becomes a mosque 
once the mosque formula is pronounced. The same argument applies to graveyards. The fact that 
someone is buried in a place does not mean that that place automatically becomes a graveyard; it 
only becomes a graveyard when the proper formula is read.  Historically, this was logical in order to 
protect private property  from potential abuses. However, jurists later declared that some forms of 
waqfs do not need a verbal declaration. For example, Ayatollah Yazdi, in addressing the verdict of 
earlier jurists, advocated for the importance of a verbal declaration by the founder himself. 
However, there are exceptions when it comes to mosques. Because most mosques are built without 
a formula being pronounced, he argued that they should be considered exceptions. He then argues 
that in some cases, such as the construction of mosques, bridges and orchards, when the resulting 
product is to shelter or feed the poor, pronouncing a waqf formula is not vital.146  Similarly, 
Ayatollah Khomeini argued that if a waqf is a public one and is providing a service to the public—
such as mosques, roads, bridges and trees (in public places)—then whether or not the waqf formula 
is pronounced is unimportant. He argues that the only crucial consideration is whether the founder 
wishes to build a building for the purpose of, say, constituting a mosque.147  Finally, Moqineh also 
makes an exception for mosques, which, he argues, can be built without a formula.
Iranian civil law (in Article 65) has made it very  clear that a waqf is only properly ratified through a 
verbal declaration by its founder. Much effort has been made to centralise the initial stages of the 
establishment of a waqf. However, there are still exceptions; for example, public goods from which 
the public might benefit can potentially be converted into waqfs without initial verbal declaration. 
The initial problem, which was to minimise potential violations of private property, decreases with 
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this step. However, the problem remains with such cases as mosques, as well as, potentially, with 
certain public goods, as was addressed by Ayatollah Khomeini.
Conditions for producing a waqf deed (a Waqfnameh)
This chapter explores waqf documentation. The issue of the waqf’s deed shall be addressed first. 
This is a crucial document, forming the basis upon which the waqf will operate indefinitely. The 
aim here is to illustrate how the manual for this institution is produced based on Islamic law, a 
process that subsequently has been codified into civil law. The flexibility  (or inflexibility) of this 
document is also a matter of importance.  This document allows a waqf to embark on new means of 
production, technology and demand as time moves on—or prevents it from doing so.
In the process of establishing a waqf, the first step is the verbal declaration, or Siqeh waqf, which 
the founder should pronounce. The second step is the waqf deed, or Waqfnameh. This document 
effectively constitutes a manual for the running of the waqf. The beneficiaries, administrator and 
manner of the endowment’s operation are documented, often in extreme detail. The instructions 
stated by the founder in the Waqfnameh are essentially  considered to be law in terms of the waqf’s 
operation, likewise with respect to any potential disputes. However, there are some principles to 
which the founder must abide in producing a waqf deed. This concept has been referred to as 
“perpetuity” on many  occasions throughout this thesis. Another set of conditions that must be taken 
into account is the subject of this section of the chapter. Thus, there are three main conditions that 
the founder must follow: the waqf’s irrevocability, perpetuity and compulsion. The importance of 
understanding these conditions is that they provide the background to the next  part of the chapter, 
concerning the ownership of a waqf.
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Two principles must be considered when a waqf is founded. The first is the immediate effect of the 
act of founding a waqf (Tanjiz); the second is a waqf’s perpetual character. The Imami Islamic 
schools of law agree that founding a waqf such that it only  becomes effective at a future point in 
time, or in such a way as to make it dependent on an uncertain condition (Moallaq), renders the act 
void. However, there is an exception to this rule: almost all jurists allow a person to found a waqf 
by testament, becoming effective upon his death. Such an act is governed by the rules of testament 
(Vassiat). In any event, any stipulation that the waqf was founded for a limited period of time—or 
with the condition that the founder may revoke, sell or give away the waqf property—is considered 
by all jurists to be contrary to the required principle of the waqf’s perpetuity, invalidating its 
founding. 
The first of these sets of conditions is the waqf’s irrevocability. The decision to establish a waqf is 
an irrevocable one. This is a statement with which almost  all Imami Ulama agree.148 Following such 
rules makes dealing with the affairs of a waqf very difficult. One can think of many small yet 
important details that may have been left out of the waqf’s deed and can no longer be implemented 
into the waqf after its founding. Moreover, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, there are 
waqfs that have been established by a founder who was not the actual owner of the converted 
property. According to this principle, such waqfs can no longer be terminated, particularly if time 
has passed and the waqf is already  fully established. Finally, this causes significant restrictions on 
the administration of a waqf. We look at this in greater depth in the next chapter. For now, it suffices 
to note that future generations may no longer be able to deploy new means of production, updated 
managerial skills, and so forth, in order to maximise a waqf’s utility. These limitations have had an 
impact on those involved with waqfs, who have subsequently  pressured the jurists to write fatwas 
allowing for greater flexibility with deeds. The jurists did not change or remove the principle of 
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irrevocability. However, they  did issue fatwas that, in some cases, allowed for the manipulation of 
waqfs. The result has been that these cases, which were intended as exceptions, provided the basis 
for loopholes in the waqf laws, paving the way for alterations and abuses.
The first of these cases comes from Sheikh-e Mofid, who contends that waqfs are part  of those 
types of alms that are irrevocable. However, he continues, there are exceptions to this rule. For 
example, a waqf could be damaged in cases for which Sharia forbids aid of a beneficiary, or in 
cases accepting certain beneficiaries.149  Mofid argues that when the founder converts his property 
into a waqf, his decision is irrevocable. He cannot change the mission of the waqf or anything 
related to it. (What comes next most likely comes from a particular case, with which he dealt in a 
very informal way). However, the founder might, at the time of the waqf’s establishment, insert 
certain clauses, stipulating, for example, that if the founder, during his lifetime, needed to have 
access to the revenue of the waqf or even to sell the endowment; following his death the beneficiary 
cannot sell the waqf or lease it. Moreover, the beneficiaries cannot change anything related to that 
waqf, unless it  is being destroyed and no one (i.e., neither the ruling king nor religious magistrate) 
is in charge of or has paid attention to its conditions so as to repair it; in this case, the beneficiary 
can sell the property and enjoy the revenue generated from that  sale.150  This fatwa was most likely 
derived from a rather small case handled by the jurists. One can see that the waqf property had been 
abandoned, and there was no hope that it would ever be resurrected. In this case, the jurists issued a 
fatwa that the heirs to the founder could sell the waqf property and divide the revenue between 
them, just as they  would their inheritance money. The fatwa begins with a very  clear statement 
indicating that the founder cannot change the mission of the waqf; neither can he sell or lease the 
property.  However, the next section contains a complete shift, defining a case whereby, if there is 
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no one to care for the property, that waqf can essentially be terminated and sold and the revenues 
divided between the founder’s heirs, just as with any inheritance money. Such fatwas have paved 
the way for families to consciously neglect waqf properties converted by their male heads, thus 
causing the property to become completely dilapidated; fatwas could then be issued, such as the one 
cited, in order to terminate the waqf and sell the property. The outcome is that, first, the waqf is 
unable to provide a sustainable service as was initially anticipated. Additionally, the fatwa opens the 
door for those heirs who were unhappy with their father’s decision to convert assets they would 
have inherited into a waqf; now they can simply neglect the property, allow it to become 
dilapidated, and then try to sell it. Both of these outcomes do not favour positive economic 
development.  The resources stagnate by virtue of letting the property go beyond the possibility of 
repair; additionally, the anticipated services from the waqf are not generated. These fatwas remain 
valid, and little has been added by civil law in order to add modern interpretations that align with 
Iran’s contemporary needs.151
Another fatwa not only confirms what has already been stated but also highlights the issue of waqf 
ownership. Ayatollah Yazdi claimed that once a waqf is established, the founder loses all of his 
rights to his property. However, if clauses have been inserted in the waqf’s deed with respect to 
beneficiaries, then the founder can interfere with the waqf’s affairs. For example, if the beneficiary 
of a waqf was to be poor in order to be eligible, and, at a later point in time, the individual is no 
longer qualified in this respect, the founder can interfere in the waqf’s affairs. Such exceptions do 
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not, however, represent a change to the waqf’s mission but rather to the beneficiary.152  There are 
also hadith confirming that after the establishment of a waqf, the founder loses his ownership rights 
over it. For example, a hadith from Jafar Ibn Mohammad, the sixth Shi’ite imam, states that, 
according to the Prophet Mohammad, anyone who donates alms and wants to have them returned is 
like someone who eats his own vomit.153  Another hadith, again from the sixth imam, states that 
anyone who donates alms in order to become closer to God should make his donation to the poor 
and that he or she cannot revoke this donation.154  This is probably the first instance in which the 
issue of transfer of ownership  of a waqf is mentioned. Based on this hadith, the founder, upon 
establishing a waqf, loses his rights, inclusive of his rights of ownership of the waqf property. 
Therefore, with the establishment of a waqf a transfer of ownership  takes place. Yazdi does not 
elaborate in this fatwa regarding what happens to the ownership of the waqf, but he has issued 
several other fatwas in this regard. If we consider a fatwa issued by  Mofid, we can recognise the 
important factor here, which is that the beneficiaries (i.e., the founder’s heirs) could ultimately 
claim ownership of the waqf through a loophole whereby the founder’s heirs are able to terminate 
the waqf. Therefore, one can conclude that, based on these two fatwas, ownership of waqfed 
properties effectively transfers from founders to beneficiaries. However, as we shall see, the issue of 
waqf ownership is much more complicated than this.
The three main principles
The three sets of principles that every waqf—and, therefore, every  waqf deed—must follow are 
Elzam, Tanjiz and Ta’bid. These three sets of rules may  be considered compulsory, irrevocable and 
perpetual. In other words, the Waqfnameh must be produced in a manner that does not allow for any 
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possibility that the waqf might be revoked or lose its perpetuity based on the manner of its 
production. We examine each of these principles here.  
The first is Elzam, which essentially  means that a waqf’s deed cannot include any clauses that 
violate the principle of perpetuity. With regard to this case, both Shahid Sani and Allameh Helli 
argue that the founder cannot insert any  new clauses into the Waqfnameh that would enable him to 
alter the waqf or to manipulate it in the future; converting something into a waqf means giving up 
respective property rights completely for the benefit of the designated beneficiaries and God.155  In 
other words, the waqf mission, according to their respective fatwas, cannot be changed, 
manipulated or altered. The most obvious problem with such a strict system is that the waqf cannot 
change according to evolving needs over time. For example, the Carvansaries, which are no longer 
used and are located on old trading and pilgrimage routes, cannot be converted into restaurants or 
hotels that would fit the needs of contemporary society.156  Similarly, an apple orchard converted 
into a waqf in the 18th century must  remain exactly the same apple orchard in the 21st century, even 
if that orchard now exists in the middle of an urban area where it may no longer be justifiable to 
grow apples or use the land in an agricultural manner.
Fatwas have also been issued that contradict the above fatwas to a degree. Although jurists began 
advocating for fatwas in which no changes to waqfs were allowed, in practice this proved to be 
impractical. Hence, there are fatwas in which the concept of Tanjiz has been challenged. For 
example, Tusi argues that if the founder includes clauses in the Waqfnameh indicating such, in case 
of need he may spend the waqf revenues on himself.  Moreover, if, prior to taking recourse to the 
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waqf he should die, then his heir will inherit his wealth.157 Other Ulama may not  go as far as Tusi, 
but the majority agree that, if the founder loses his prosperity, then he may terminate the waqf and 
use its resources. Perhaps it would make sense for the Ulama to allow the founder to include 
himself among the beneficiaries (which he may not) rather than to terminate the waqf. By enabling 
the founder to terminate the waqf in the event that he becomes poor, two sets of problems arise. One 
is that this stipulation contradicts the principles of waqf, particularly that of perpetuity, which paves 
the way for all sorts of tricks that the founder might employ if he no longer wishes to have a waqf—
for example, the founder can now terminate the waqf by simply  pretending that he is poor. 
Furthermore, the termination of a waqf includes no contingency plan for the beneficiaries, the 
recipients of the waqf’s services, who are now left empty-handed.
In the most contemporary  opinion on this matter, Ayatollah Khomeini argues that it  is better not to 
reclaim the waqf’s property under any circumstances. However, if the founder dies in poverty, then 
his heir will inherit the waqf.158  We will return to this fatwa again, as this is another case for which 
the fatwas are not coherent and create serious confusion concerning the waqf’s ownership. There 
are no particular discussions related to Elzam in Iranian civil law. Therefore, potentially, one can 
insert conditions in order to be able to revoke a waqf in the future.
The second principle is Tanjiz. This principle enforces the idea that the act of founding a waqf 
cannot become conditional with respect to the occurrence of another event. For example, the 
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founder cannot say, “if my son returns safely from his journey, then I will waqf my house” or “from 
the beginning of the next month, I will call my property a waqf”.159
The main question here is, can someone write in his will that he wants to convert a property into a 
waqf after his or her death? Previously, I mentioned testimonial waqfs. Here, I present jurists’ views 
from both the Imami and the Sunni schools of law. Mohaqeq Sani argues that one cannot convert 
something into a waqf in a will; he does argue, however, that this can happen if the founder dies. 
For example, the founder cannot set a condition such that “if I die (because he may not die), my 
property  will become a waqf”. However, he could write, “when I die, my property will become a 
waqf”.160  Ayatollah Khomeini’s view is that if the words of the founder are interpreted so as to 
indicate that he had desired to establish a waqf, then after his death his property will be converted 
into a waqf.161 Katouzian elaborates on this matter with his interpretation of Iranian civil law: in the 
event that one included in his will the intention to establish a waqf, the founder only  has a right to 
one-third of his property, what is effectively his testimonial power.  Should the founder wish to 
convert a larger share of his wealth into a waqf, he must do so during his lifetime.162  This is a 
situation in which civil law has attempted to rationalise the process.
Examining Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa more closely, it becomes apparent that it can be interpreted 
in a very  subjective manner. He states that “if it is interpreted from the words of the founder that he 
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had desired to establish a waqf, then after his death, his property  will be converted into a waqf”. 
This principle can be applied in a very  subjective manner; additionally, he provides no detail as to 
whether he means that the entire property can be converted into a waqf, or only a portion of it. 
Furthermore, both the Ulama and civil law have neglected here the issue of the verbal declaration of 
a waqf. All place great importance on pronouncing the verbal declaration in order to formally 
establish a waqf. Yet, once a prospective founder is dead, how is this possible? This is one of many 
issues pertaining to waqfs; despite the fact that civil law has somewhat rationalised the situation, 
with respect to the bigger picture, many shortcomings remain. Additionally, the fact that the 
founding of a waqf may not condition the establishment of the waqf to a potential event means that, 
in practice, the scope of services each institution can provide is limited. For example, one cannot 
establish provisional waqfs for natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and the like.  
The transfer of the right of usage (I)
Based on the concept of Tanjiz, a waqf must be established immediately. However, in reality  the 
process a founder must follow in order to allow his or her beneficiaries to use a waqf may take 
some time. The founder might create a series of excuses to prevent the use of premises by anyone; 
essentially, the entire waqf comes to act as a front. This situation has generated a number of fatwas 
and has also initiated a series of interesting legal debates.
There are a few points of view concerning this issue. The Imami Ulama hold that, in a manner 
analogous to gifts, a waqf is not binding or irrevocable until the property  has actually  been 
transferred to the beneficiaries or administrator. If, prior to that, the founder should die or lose his 
right of disposal over the property as a result of bankruptcy or serious illness, the waqf is rendered 
void. Regarding public utilities, the transfer of property is assumed to have taken place as soon as a 
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founder permits the public to use them. In this case, however, the requirement set by  the Imami 
jurists is that the property be handed over to an administrator. 
This process is the subject of some dispute (as will be discussed in the next chapter, the founder can 
take the position of administrator of the endowment). Those who do not require a transfer of the 
property  argue that the aforementioned hadith of Ammar does not state the transfer as a condition, 
and that the founding of a waqf is more like the freeing of a slave (an act  that does not require such 
a transfer) than the giving of a gift. In other words, it is a unilateral act on the part of the founder 
only, not a reciprocal act  involving a consensus between founder and beneficiaries. The second set 
of arguments maintains that a waqf is, in fact, a bilateral transaction, one that requires the 
agreement of the beneficiaries in addition to the wishes of founder. A difference of opinion also 
exists regarding the question of whether the irrevocability of a waqf requires that the immediate 
beneficiaries (if they are specified) accept their rights as such.  In an attempt to weave together the 
fragmented legal pieces related to waqfs and align them with Iran’s modern laws, civil law holds 
that, in a manner analogous to bequests, a waqf is only binding and irrevocable after the immediate 
beneficiaries have accepted it. The beneficiaries, in acquiring their right following the waqf’s 
founding, do not need to formally accept to become beneficiaries. They may reject it, meaning that 
they  consequently forfeit their rights. We will examine later in this chapter whether the act of 
founding a waqf constitutes a unilateral or bilateral decision, as this provides the basis for waqf 
ownership.
The final condition is the so-called Ta’bid, or condition of perpetuity. This means that the waqf deed 
produced by the founder cannot contain terms, conditions or any other language that would result in 
termination of the waqf. The majority of the Ulama tackle this issue from the point of view of the 
beneficiaries. Here, the Ulama are almost unanimous in their opinion. Tusi argues that  you cannot 
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appoint distinct beneficiaries.163  Mohaqeq Helli and Allameh Helli both argue that a waqf should 
have a beneficiary who reflects continuity. It is not right for beneficiaries to be designated on a 
momentary  basis.164  This means, for example, that one can appoint “the poor” as a beneficiary as, 
presumably, there will always be poor people. However, one cannot appoint the victims of an 
earthquake as the beneficiaries of a waqf. This is because said victims would only  temporarily 
qualify as beneficiaries. Furthermore, because earthquakes in general, are few and far between, the 
waqf could potentially become without a beneficiary, which would revoke its perpetuity. However, 
in practice there must have been waqfs established for these purposes. There is a fatwa issued by 
Mohaqeq Helli in which he argues that in such cases, the heir to the founder will inherit the waqf.165
 Based on Iranian civil law, Katouzian maintains that a waqf must be permanent. If someone 
establishes a waqf based on the revenues of a property for a designated purpose and places a time 
limit on that, from a legal perspective it  cannot be considered a waqf.166  We should not forget  that 
the perpetuity  of a waqf is bound to the existence of the object of the waqf and its beneficiaries. 
How can a waqf maintain its perpetuity if either the object or the beneficiaries are terminated? This 
is a significant question, the resolution of which I shall attempt in the following sections of this 
chapter.
 The practical conditions for producing a Waqfnameh
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The second part of our discussion is dedicated to those rules and conditions related to producing a 
Waqfnameh. In the first section, we covered the principles in a more theoretical way; in this part, 
we consider the more practical aspects.
A Waqfnameh should have certain characteristics that make it free from ambiguities and provide 
sufficient instructions to permit the smooth operation of the waqf. The first  important stipulation, 
agreed to by  all schools of law, is that the Waqfnameh must contain a statement describing the exact 
nature of the activities envisaged by the founder. In other words, a waqf, much like a modern 
establishment, needs to have a clear mission statement. Allameh Helli argues that the usage and the 
purpose of the waqf must be stated in the Waqfnameh, otherwise the waqf is not valid. He continues 
by stating that a waqf is similar to a transfer of ownership or the revenues generated by it  assets. His 
argument is that establishing a waqf is akin to selling a house, and one cannot sell a house without 
having a buyer and a set price (although it can be said that this represents more the case for having a 
beneficiary, not how the beneficiary should benefit from the waqf).167 Mohaqeq Sani argues that not 
specifying the waqf’s usage undermines one of the important pillars of a waqf, the beneficiaries. 
Thus, the usage of a waqf must be stated in advance.168
Ayatollah Khomeini highlights three cases according to which the waqf’s mission must be clearly 
indicated. He supports his argument by citing examples for each case. The first  is when the 
beneficiaries are Ulama or “the poor”. In this case, the Ulama, or “the poor”, who share similarities 
(i.e., many Ulama are poor), would become the beneficiaries. The second is when the beneficiaries 
are not specified (they  could be the poor from a particular city or from a mosque in another town). 
In this case, the benefits will go to one of the two on the basis of drawing lots. The third is when 
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there is no way of knowing the waqf’s usage or of having any knowledge about the beneficiaries. In 
this case, the magistrate must spend the respective waqf revenues as alms.169 These are likely cases 
that had been presented to him and which he found difficult to judge, primarily because the 
Waqfnamehs were not sufficiently specific.
Based on Iranian civil law, Katouzian maintains that a waqf must be permanent. If someone 
establishes a waqf based on the revenues of a property for a designated purpose and places a time 
limit on that, from a legal perspective, it cannot be considered a waqf.170  We should not forget that 
the perpetuity  of a waqf is bound to the existence of the object of the waqf and its beneficiaries. 
How can a waqf maintain its perpetuity if either the object or the beneficiaries are terminated? This 
is a significant question, the resolution of which we shall attempt in the following sections of this 
chapter.
Finally, according to article 71 of Iran’s civil law, a waqf must have a clear beneficiary. A public 
waqf with an unclear beneficiary can cause confusion as to whom should ultimately  benefit from it. 
However, in cases where the understanding is that the waqf’s revenues should render charitable 
functions, the law states that if the beneficiaries of a waqf are unclear, and the waqf’s revenues 
could support and promote Islamic instruction and the restoration of old waqfs, then said revenues 
will render such activities under the supervision of the waqf organisation. Katouzian argues that 
although the law has not specified whether this will be the case for both types of waqf, the argument 
most definitely stands with respect to public waqfs. After a waqf’s usage is determined, selecting 
the beneficiaries is easy.171  In this case, civil law primarily targets older waqfs that might not have 
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been established in alignment with contemporary standards. Moreover, for those waqfs currently 
being established, the law provides clear instructions concerning how to produce Waqfnamehs. The 
rules for producing Waqfnamehs are as follows:
A Waqfnameh must be produced in keeping with certain standards. In other words, there are certain 
clauses and conditions that can and cannot be placed in a Waqfnameh. These clauses and conditions 
can be divided into two types:
First are the clauses that can be contradictory  to a waqf’s mission. Needless to say, these clauses 
should be avoided. Nevertheless, in practice, such conditions, whether deliberately or not, 
sometimes are placed in Waqfnamehs. Second are those clauses in which the explicit directions for 
running the waqf and spending its revenue, or concerning the conditions pertaining to beneficiaries 
and so forth, are stated.
Most jurists have issued fatwas dealing with such matters. Among the Imami jurists, Shahid Sani 
argues that the founder can put  a clause in the Waqfnameh allowing him to sell the waqf’s property 
at a later date.172  The sale of a waqfed property is something we will explore in the next chapter. 
However, jurists have failed to agree on a united verdict regarding what can and cannot be put 
included in a waqf deed. Some of these statements clearly violate the concept of perpetuity, which 
they themselves have advocated.
The main arguments and discussions involve the following question: what is the verdict if the 
mission of a waqf is incompatible with holy Sharia law? Ayatollah Khomeini argues that clauses in 
a Waqfnameh must not contradict the waqf’s mission, even if the mission is not fully compatible 
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with Sharia.173  What happens, for instance, if someone converts his house into a waqf for drug 
addicts, but at the same time allows the addicts residing there to consume alcohol or drugs? More 
broadly  speaking, must the waqf be terminated, or must the clause in the Waqfnameh allowing the 
consumption of alcohol and drugs be removed from the Waqfnameh? Mohaqeq Helli argues that 
any clauses in a Waqfnameh that do not contradict the mission of a waqf and are also compatible 
with Sharia law can be inserted into a Waqfnameh.174 
Allameh Helli states that any conditions compatible with Sharia and which do not contradict the 
waqf’s mission must be met. However, these conditions must  have been stated in the Waqfnameh. 
Therefore, the founder may not add a condition to the Waqfnameh after it has been ratified. 
Likewise, the founder cannot exclude any of the already-stated beneficiaries from his waqf. 
However, he does have the power to add beneficiaries, even after the Waqfnameh has been 
ratified.175  Additionally, if the founder adds a condition concerning a school that belongs to a 
religious sect, this condition must be met as well.
Ayatollah Khomeini argues that the founder cannot include himself directly  among the beneficiaries 
of a waqf (i.e., a private waqf) that he has established. For example, he cannot say: “I waqf this 
farm in order that its revenues should pay my debts”. However, he can appoint his family members 
to receive the same revenues. He continues that the family  of the founder can be the beneficiary, but 
the founder cannot expect  to transfer all of his financial responsibilities to his family  in connection 
with the private waqf that he has established for them.176  Yet again, all of these examples reflect 
specific cases in which jurists have issued fatwas in order to resolve the related situation.
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Another common question is, can the founder insert a clause in the Waqfnameh whereby, if he 
becomes poor later in life, he could then take recourse to the waqfed property? The majority of 
Ulama argue that, in this case, the founder can terminate the waqf and take recourse to the property. 
Another issue that arises is, if the founder dies, depending on whether his heirs are rich or poor, 
should the waqf be kept or terminated?177  We have discussed similar cases: potentially, a founder 
can terminate his or her waqf by claiming (or pretending) that he is very poor.
What all of these jurists fail to address is how a waqf should function when contradictory aspects 
exist in the mission statement?  The biggest issue is perhaps exactly this. Failure to create a 
framework for correcting waqf deeds has exacted a huge toll on the efficiency of waqfs in Iran. We 
will consider this in greater detail in the next chapter, in which we will address the administration of 
waqfs.
Article 66 of Iranian civil law indicates that one cannot establish a waqf mission that is 
incompatible with the Sharia. Furthermore, Article 87 of Iranian civil law states that the founder can 
insert clauses whereby a waqf’s revenues are divided between the beneficiaries either evenly or 
unevenly. Alternatively, this matter can be delegated to the waqf’s mutawalli.178  The law here does 
not give sufficient guidance by which we might conclude that  the challenges with the traditional 
laws have somehow been overcome. One would expect that, based on the test  of time and the 
economic feedback from waqf administrators, the law should allow changes to be made to the 
initial missions of waqfs. For a number of reasons, these changes would be of crucial importance. 
First, there is always the possibility that  in the waqf deed’s initial version, some minor or even 
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major points were omitted. Furthermore, as is evident in the rulings of many  jurists, there have been 
many cases where the waqf deed has contained several contradictions. The jurists failed to find 
remedial solutions in such cases, as did civil law. Finally, given the perpetual nature of waqfs, one 
can imagine the possibility that a waqf founded centuries ago in order to meet the demands of that 
time is no longer relevant today. One would expect the law to contain some provisional clauses 
enabling the periodic review of waqf missions in order that they might be updated to suit changing 
circumstances. Ultimately, often the Waqfnameh contains very  specific instructions as to the 
operation and running of an endowment. Yet again, with the passage of time, newer and more 
productive and effective ways are discovered for maximising the full potential of waqfs. 
Historically, jurists have not allowed Waqfnamehs to be updated; in the preindustrial world, when 
the pace of change was fairly  slow, the inability  to adapt  Waqfnamehs may  not have had such a 
strong impact  on waqfs. In contemporary times, however, it  is of high importance that an institution 
is able to embrace the latest scientific and technological achievements in order to maximise its 
output. This consideration has been heavily neglected by Iranian civil law, which has completely 
ignored the problem and has merely sought to codify traditional laws.
The waqf as a contract
Discussions concerning the transfer of right of usage have led to two theories, both of which have 
been discussed. The transaction entailed in converting a property into a waqf and appointing certain 
individuals to be beneficiaries must be treated as a contract if issues such as the transfer of 
ownership—and, more importantly, that of property ownership—are to be addressed.  One can say 
that a waqf may  be considered a contract in legal terms, meaning an exchange of promises with a 
specific remedy for their breach. All Islamic schools of law agree that a waqf is a contract. 
However, the type of contract has been the subject of much dispute. 
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Contracts may be bilateral or unilateral. A waqf can somehow easily fit into each of these categories 
depending on how one looks at it. A bilateral contract is what most  people think of when they  think 
of “contract”. It is an agreement in which each of the contractual parties makes a promise or 
promises to the other party(ies). For example, in a contract involving the sale of a house, the buyer 
promises to pay the seller an agreed-upon sum in exchange for the seller's promise to deliver the 
deed to the property. In Islamic law, this type of contract is known as Aqd.
In a unilateral contract, only  one party makes a promise. A typical example is a reward contract—A 
promises to pay B a reward if B finds A's missing property. B is not obliged to find A's property, but 
A is obliged to pay the reward to B if B does so.  The primary consideration here is B's reliance on 
A's promise, that B relinquishes his or her legal right to do whatever he or she wants to do at the 
point that he or she becomes engaged in finding A’s property. The offer of a unilateral contract is 
often made to multiple individuals (i.e., “the world”) by  means of advertisement. In this situation, 
acceptance only  occurs when the condition of the contract is satisfied (in this example, with the 
finding of A’s property). If the condition is something that only one party can perform, both parties 
are protected: the offerer is protected because he will only ever be contractually obliged to one of 
the many offerees; the offeree is protected in that, if he or she does meet the condition of the 
contract, the offerer is contractually obliged to pay him or her. In Islamic law, this type of contract 
is known as igha. The same concept also applies to wills, in which the beneficiaries do not  play a 
role. The contract is unilateral in the sense that fulfilment of the deceased’s wishes regarding his 
wealth occurs after his death. The acceptance of the wealth by  the recipient during the production of 
the will is not necessary for the will to be ratified.
The technical difference between these contracts relates to whether or not the beneficiary accepts 
his or her role. In unilateral contracts, the requirement that acceptance be communicated to the 
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offerer is waived. The offeree accepts simply  by meeting the condition of the contract; the offeree's 
performance is also treated as the price, or consideration, of the offerer's promise. The offerer is 
master of the offer; it is he or she who decides whether the contract will be unilateral or bilateral. In 
a unilateral contract, the offer usually is made to the public at large. In a bilateral contract, there are 
obligations on both sides, rights on both sides and considerations on both sides. If an offerer makes 
an offer such as, “If you promise to paint my house, I will give you £100”, it becomes a bilateral 
contract once the offeree accepts the offer. Each party has promised to do something, and each will 
receive something in return.
The future of the ownership of a waqf property  depends on whether or not  jurists agree as to which 
type of contract the act of establishing a waqf is—that is, what type of contract is a waqf, unilateral 
or bilateral?
The jurists disagree. Among Shi’ite jurists, there are three opinions concerning the nature of a waqf 
as a contract. First  are those who consider a waqf to be a bilateral contract, regardless of its type. 
The second group argues that a waqf is a unilateral contract, regardless of its type. The third group 
believes that a family waqf is a bilateral contract and a public waqf is a unilateral contract.
Ayatollah Najafi Esfehani is among those who contend that  a waqf is a bilateral contract. He argues 
that the transfer of wealth from one party to another requires the second party’s consent. Therefore, 
a waqf is a bilateral contract. Moreover, if a waqf were a unilateral contract, and the beneficiary 
rejected the donor’s offer, the waqf would be invalid; this is an opinion shared by many other 
members of the Ulama. He then adds that the endowment itself remains part of the wealth of the 
founder; in other words, the ownership of the endowed property does not change hands—it remains 
with the founder. Thus, a waqf is a bilateral contract.
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Tabatabai , based on the opinion of many of his predecessors, argues that a waqf is a unilateral 
contract. He mentions that earlier jurists did not posit the beneficiaries’ acceptance as a condition of 
either a waqf Khas (private waqf) or a waqf am (public waqf). Hence, a waqf is a unilateral contract 
and is only ratified by the founder. Sheikh Yusof Behbahani argues that most of the Shi’ite Ulama 
consider acceptance of a waqf unnecessary. What research into this matter has shown is that, 
regardless of whether a waqf is public or private, acceptance by  the beneficiaries is not a vital 
condition of the contract. Therefore, a waqf is a bilateral contract.
Third, there are those who argue that the type of contract depends on the type of waqf. From this 
group, Allameh Helli argues that because in a public waqf the number of beneficiaries can be very 
large, it  is not practical to have the consensus of each and every  one of them. However, in such 
cases as when a mosque is converted into a waqf, or when the beneficiary is an infant, then the 
consent of the mosque’s manager or the infant’s guardian is required for the waqf to be properly 
ratified.179 Finally, Shahid Sani, in Lomeh, states:
 “If the beneficiaries of a public waqf are the poor or akin to them, then their consensus is not 
necessary  for the establishment of a waqf. However, it  is better to have the approval of the ruler or 
whoever speaks on behalf of the public in these matters. We should bear in mind that once a waqf is 
established, it is forever, and there is no way  to get the approval of all of the next generation of 
beneficiaries.”180
Unlike the first generation, with respect to whom the waqf represents a bilateral contract in which 
they  are mentioned in connection with the waqf’s ownership—which in his opinion, remains with 
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the founder—with respect to the second and third generations we cannot speak about the transfer of 
ownership at all. 
Article 199 of Iran’s civil law maintains—based on an idea held by some Shi’it jurists (probably 
based on fatwas issued by Ayatollah Khomeini)—that, regardless of whether a waqf is public or 
private, given that it is a bilateral contract, acceptance by  the beneficiary  is vital for the 
establishment of a waqf. Article 56 explains that, with a private waqf, acceptance by  the first 
generation of beneficiaries is necessary.181  Based on the law’s verdict—which has tried to put an 
end to all of the disputes concerning the contractual nature of waqfs—a waqf effectively  becomes a 
bilateral contract. Again, based on Iranian civil law, if a property is concerned the bilateral contract 
is always a transaction of wealth between two parties. This is where contradictions in civil law are 
evident, as well, as ownership  of the waqf cannot be identified. In a desperate attempt to make the 
law appear rational, Katouzian elaborates that a waqf is unlike any other transaction in wealth 
represented by a contract. The legal structure of the waqf institution is different—there is no 
agreement between the founder and the beneficiary. The founder designs and establishes the waqf, 
and the beneficiary  has no say. It is only  after a waqf is established that one can become a 
beneficiary of it.182  Moreover, the beneficiary has no say in the management and future of a waqf. 
The founder appoints a manager (mutawalli) and possibly a supervisor (Qazi), but both are 
unrelated to the beneficiary.183
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Katouzian fails to elaborate as to why the waqf institution is different and, if it is so, to describe the 
legal attempts that have been made to make this exception work. According to Katouzian, a “waqf 
does not  necessarily  satisfy  the definition of a bilateral contract”. He goes on to note that a waqf is 
possibly similar to a social contract, for example like those pertaining to social rights, which are 
also bilateral contracts. However, social contracts do not always satisfy the precise definition of a 
bilateral contract. Katouzian argues that, when it comes to social contracts, inasmuch as gaining the 
acceptance of each and every individual is not a viable option, the public effectively delegates their 
rights to representatives, who accept or reject offers on their behalf.184  Based on Katouzian’s 
explanation, in the case of a public waqf it is the religious magistrate who accepts the contract on 
behalf of the public. In the case of a private waqf, the question arises as to whether the first 
generation of beneficiaries has the right to make a decision that impacts future generations. 
Katuzian points out that the legislators have deliberately codified waqf laws in order to produce 
cohesion between the different types of waqfs.
Katouzian admits that, within the framework of modern Iranian law, a waqf cannot always be 
considered a bilateral contract. The ambiguities that occur with waqfs and related types of contracts 
are of extreme importance. The type of contract that is selected will determine future ownership of 
the waqf property. Given the scale of waqf properties in Iran, ambiguities and disputes over 
ownership are very costly to the economy.
Ownership of a waqf
It is evident from the majority of accounts found in traditional law, as well as in civil law, that the 
establishment of a waqf is considered a kind of contract. However, both systems have failed to 
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situate the institution of waqf under any known form of contract. Consequently, the future 
ownership of endowments often becomes a matter of controversy. This section began by  asking, 
what happens to the ownership of a waqf once the founder converts his property into a waqf? Does 
ownership remain with the founder, or does it transfer to someone else?
There are four major positions in this regard. The first is that the founder remains the owner of the 
waqf.  The second is that ownership of the waqf transfers from the founder to the beneficiaries. The 
third is that ownership depends on whether the waqf is private or public; with a private waqf, 
ownership transfers to the beneficiary, whereas with a public waqf, ownership transfers to God. The 
fourth is that ownership, regardless of the type of waqf, belongs to God.
Among the Imami Shi’ites, the jurists Ayatollah Yazdi and Shahid Avval both argue that the founder 
remains the rightful owner of the waqf.185  Many Imami jurists, on the other hand, argue otherwise 
and consider the beneficiary(ies) to be the new owner(s) of the waqf. Helli and Sheikh Hassan 
Najafi are among those who advocate this position.186 Shahid Avval is one of the few who advocates 
the third position. He also makes exceptions in the case of mosques.187  The most contemporary 
fatwa, which has had a huge impact on the formation of contemporary waqf laws in Iranian civil 
law, comes from Ayatollah Khomeini, who rejects the idea that ownership  of a waqf remains with 
the founder. He argues that the founder cannot alter or manipulate the waqf in any  way or under any 
circumstances. He has, therefore, already lost his ownership  rights over the waqfed property. 
Khomeini also rejects the argument that the beneficiaries become the new owners of the waqf. 
Interestingly, he also rejects the view that God becomes the new owner. Ultimately, Khomeini 
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views ownership of the waqf as being unknown or unidentifiable.188  Therefore, he not only rejects 
all previous views on this matter, he also does not offer any alternative solution. Not knowing who 
is the owner of a property  makes that property  and its related endowment vulnerable to 
expropriation by opportunists.
We must remember that waqf properties were generally productive establishments that  the founders, 
in order to protect them, converted into waqfs. It is easy to imagine that when there was no defined 
owner of a given property, soon after the founder died the property was without protection. We shall 
look at the limitations that ambiguities over waqf ownership have caused with respect to the 
administration of waqfs in the next chapter.
In Iranian civil law, ownership  of waqfs is still a grey area. Article 3 of waqf and charity  law states 
that every waqf has a corporate status.189 This can be viewed as a large step  forward, one that could 
potentially elevate the status of this medieval institution into the 21st century. However, this law 
fails to weave together different elements of waqfs. It  was mentioned in Chapter 2 that, according to 
civil law, corporations still may not become founders of waqfs, and it remains the task of a single 
individual to establish a waqf. Moreover, a waqf must remain perpetual and its mission irrevocable, 
both of which are incompatible with the concept of a corporation. Finally, while a corporation may 
have assets like a waqf, unlike a waqf, it can sell its assets, expand or become smaller over time 
without affecting its corporate nature. Conversely, a waqf remains perpetually  bound to its initial 
assets. In other words, a waqf may  not sell its assets, nor expand in any way or form. Moreover, if, 
for example, a waqf building collapses, the waqf itself also comes to an end. As a result, a waqf 
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does not function as corporation according to the definition of corporation given by Iranian civil 
law.
Given the level of importance of the matter of waqf ownership, the debates and disputes around this 
issue are also significant. Most contemporary  discussion on this topic has attempted to compare 
waqfs with their foreign equivalents (such as trusts in England) and to find a remedial solution for 
waqfs, an inspiration to solve this domestic challenge and to modernise the old waqf system. What 
is commonly agreed upon is that the initial aim of founders was to keep  their properties intact, in 
order that the actual properties should remain the same and the generated revenues remain constant. 
The current debates regarding the modernisation of waqfs, and whether or not its role should be 
updated to suit  more contemporary needs, can be divided into five categories. The first possibility is 
that the founder should donate the designated capital or portion of his wealth to a corporation 
(organisation) with a mission and wishes that are similar to those of the founder. This would seem a 
rational suggestion. However, in practice it has not worked, as this idea does not necessarily  comply 
with the primary  reasons for establishing a waqf. Using this method, the founder becomes merely a 
donor, a different  scenario from that of the founder of a waqf. The founder usually leaves his name 
on the endowment, which will survive long after he is gone; this is not the case with a donor. 
Additionally, the founder profits from economic benefits (at  least temporarily), such as preventing 
his property  from being fragmented, having his wealth sheltered, avoiding paying taxes, and so 
forth.
The second is that the founder should produce a will donating the same portion of his wealth to the 
same organisation (this method is known as a testimonial waqf). The third is that the founder should 
establish a foundation and donate money to it. The fourth is that the founder should provide for the 
establishment of such an organisation in his will. Finally, the founder could set aside some capital 
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during his lifetime and begin financing the activities of such an organisation (very much like a waqf 
in its traditional form). The impact of these suggestions has not been significant; interestingly, all of 
these remedial suggestions point toward foundations as substitutes for the old waqf system.
One may venture to suggest that those in charge of Iran’s waqf laws had the testimonial waqf in 
mind, whereby the founder can set aside up to one third of his wealth for a designated activity, such 
as might correspond to a waqf, or establish a foundation and continue supporting it. This could well 
be another reason why civil law has given corporate status to waqfs. Furthermore, a waqf can be 
established without any official permission or even registration and still have a legal identity.190 
Many lawyers argue that the corporate status that  the law has given waqfs is primarily  for the 
purpose of attracting founders to more modern philanthropic institutions, e.g., individuals who 
intend to establish a foundation or institution based on a testimonial. Indeed, in Iran one finds both 
waqfs and foundations operating. The foundations that benefit from modern laws and certain 
approaches to charity work have proven to be much more successful than waqfs, which have 
remained the same. The primary problem remaining with contemporary Iranian civil law is that, on 
the one hand, it gives waqfs corporate status and, on the other, tries desperately  to preserve all of 
their non-corporate aspects.
The transfer of right of usage
As discussed in the Chapter 1, one of the characteristics of the legal rules in their traditional form is 
that they are not necessarily  coherent and are often contradictory. In this section, we consider 
exceptions to the principle of perpetuity, which have resulted in the formation of a completely 
different type of waqf, known as a Monqateh waqf or abrupt waqf. We examine the reasons and 
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rationale behind such waqfs and their incorporation into modern laws related to waqfs, which came 
about as a result of the codification of traditional laws into Iran’s civil law in the 20th century.
As with every  aspect of waqf laws, there are exceptions to the rule. As discussed above, a founder 
loses all property  rights with respect to the asset being converted into a waqf immediately after the 
waqf’s establishment. Moreover, his or her decision remains an irrevocable one. In practice, jurists 
have had to consider some exceptional cases related to waqfs that were long established, or 
concerning the manner in which Waqfnamehs were produced. They often have taken a pragmatic 
approach when dealing with these waqfs.
There are two sets of opinions within the Imami school of law: those who argue for setting a time 
limit on waqfs and those who are opposed. Those in favour of a limit refer to a hadith from Imam 
Baghir (Mohammad ibn Ali, Baqir al-Ulum), which states: “The founder may tell his adult children 
or the beneficiaries of a waqf that after his death, the waqf will be terminated and become part of 
his children’s inheritance”.191  On the other hand, some jurists, such as Ayatollah Yazdi, have argued 
that no time constraints can be placed on a waqf. He refers to another hadith, from the same Imam, 
who was asked about a man who had converted his land into a waqf and now wanted to construct a 
building on that piece of land. Yazdi responded that if the waqf’s beneficiary is the founder’s infant 
child and a guardian was appointed to him, then he cannot construct the building; on the other hand, 
if the child has not yet reached adulthood, and the founder has appointed himself as mutawalli, then 
he can interfere in the waqf’s affairs—that is, he can construct the building on the child’s behalf. 
Moreover, if, when the child grows up—if the founder has not transferred the affairs of the waqf to 
him, and the child has not disputed the waqf deed—the founder could interfere. This is because the 
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beneficiary, who is now an adult, has not yet seized the waqf.192   These hadiths support specific 
cases, making it very difficult, if not impossible, to use them as a reference for the law. However, 
the main point in citing this hadith is that it  indicates that the actual beneficiary of a waqf must be 
able to use and receive the proceeds directly.
An old argument involving the Imami jurists concerns the question of whether a waqf is ratified 
once the waqf formula has been pronounced. In other words, when a waqf becomes the possession 
of its beneficiaries, is it formally ratified? Sani argues that the beneficiary having control of a waqf 
is an indication that the waqf has been rightfully  established.193  Moqnieh, on the other hand, argues 
that having possession of a waqf is not a vital condition for the waqf being properly ratified.194
Mohaqeq Helli argues that a waqf has been properly established once it comes into the possession 
of the beneficiary. However, he does make a few exceptions. He argues that, in some cases—if 
someone decides on his deathbed to establish a waqf, for example—the founder must have the 
consensus of all of his heirs, or he may establish only  one third of his wealth as a waqf, which is his 
given testimonial power based on Sharia.195 Ayatollah Yazdi essentially agrees with all of the other 
jurists, who argue that transfer of the possession to the beneficiary is the action that validates a 
waqf. Furthermore, he adds that if the founder of a waqf dies prior to the completion of this 
transaction, then the waqf is no longer valid. Additionally, the heir of the founder would then inherit 
those assets automatically. Moreover, he argues that the only  correct way for the beneficiary to 
obtain a waqf is by  first securing the founder’s permission.196  In Yazdi’s opinion, most jurists argue 
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that it is necessary for the beneficiary  to have possession of a waqf, but this process does not need 
to occur immediately.197 Finally, if the founder wishes to convert a piece of his property into a waqf 
at a time when that particular property is rented or leased to the beneficiary, the process of handing 
over possession of it has already taken place and there is no need for it  to be repeated.198  In this 
respect, a public waqf shares a great deal in common with a private waqf, in terms of rules and 
regulations. A representative of the ruler or the religious magistrate may take possession of a waqf. 
Likewise, much as with a private waqf, if the founder dies prior to completion of the transaction the 
waqf shall no longer be valid.199
There are many cases related to the transmission of rights of usage on which jurists have issued 
fatwas. We review some of the most well-known cases here. The importance of these cases is that in 
Iran they are still relevant for proving a case in court. These cases will be examined to see how civil 
law has managed to codify them.
First there is the case of the infant child as beneficiary. It was noted in previous chapters that 
appointing a minor child as a beneficiary  has long been in practice as a way of sheltering wealth. 
The founder, who is also the child’s guardian, maintains control of the waqf and enjoys the 
generated revenue while avoiding his creditors and paying taxes. The question is, what happens 
when that child grows up? In the most likely  scenario, the child, upon growing up, will ask for the 
proceeds to be directed toward him rather than his guardian. The verdicts are as follows: In the 
event that a father appoints his infant child as the beneficiary, there is no need for possession to 
change hands.200   However, as previously mentioned, once the child reaches adulthood, this 
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transaction must be completed; otherwise, it  will become subject to dispute between the 
beneficiaries (in this case, the children who are now adults) and the founder (we consider this case 
at a later stage). The second case concerns mosques and graveyards. As was noted earlier, many 
fatwas only accept a waqf as valid if the founder pronounced a verbal declaration. In one of the 
examples that was discussed, if a founder allowed some members of a community to be buried on 
his property, or allowed people to pray there, his action was taken as converting his property  into a 
mosque or a graveyard. It was noted that if the founder has a genuine interest in doing so, he should 
go through the process of establishing a waqf, which begins with a verbal declaration of his 
intention.  If he does so, the final stage of the transaction concludes with the waqf becoming 
completely ratified when a prayer is said on the grounds or a dead person is buried there—the 
possession process is completed and the waqf has been successfully  ratified.201  These cases 
emerged during times when there were shortages of certain public goods, such as those provided by 
mosques and graveyards. In the absence of state intervention to provide such services, both the 
public and the state encouraged wealthy individuals to convert their properties into waqfs in order 
to meet public demand. Such fatwas are, in a sense, issued in order to control the related procedure. 
On the one hand, jurists maintain that the founder should have the intention of converting his 
property  into a waqf; on the other hand, they want to ensure that if he does convert  his property into 
a waqf the beneficiaries are also able to use it and that the waqf does not  end up  being a mere 
formality. When there is hierarchy (Tabaqeh) among the beneficiaries,202  then, initially, possession 
by the ruler or the religious magistrate is a condition for the waqf to be ratified. Moreover, in cases 
in which the beneficiary is not specific (like “the poor”), there are two types of popular arguments. 
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The first is that  the waqf is ratified the instant a dependent begins receiving benefits from the waqf. 
The second argues that until “the poor” formally take complete possession of the waqf, it has not 
yet been ratified.203 Finally, there are cases in which the beneficiaries of a waqf are composed of the 
Ulama and “the poor.” In other words, the beneficiaries are mutually exclusive. In this case, it is 
enough for the mutawalli (the administrator) of the waqf to take hold of the waqfed property. There 
are some disagreements regarding this view: those who oppose it argue that if someone other than 
the owner is appointed as the guardian of the waqf, he does not become its owner; rather his task is 
simply  to ensure that the mosque or the tomb is vacant of other peoples’ belongings.204   (This issue 
clearly  demonstrates that unresolved issues related to waqf ownership impact other waqf issues, as 
well). Article 59 of Iranian civil law stresses that if the founder does not hand over the waqf to the 
beneficiary, then the waqf will not be ratified. The instant the waqf has been handed over, it has 
been formally ratified. Moreover, if the founder dies prior to the transfer process, the waqf is no 
longer valid (Article 802). Article 60 of Iranian civil law indicates that  the handover should take 
place with the founder’s free will.205  If the founder is unable to complete the transfer process with 
respect to the property to be converted into a waqf, then the waqf is not valid. For example, birds 
that are not caged and are thus free to fly cannot be waqf, unless the beneficiary  is able to 
demonstrate that  he can somehow get hold of them.206 Article 62 of Iran’s civil law states that if the 
beneficiary is specific, transfer of ownership to the first generation is sufficient. On the other hand, 
if the beneficiary is non-specific, then transfer of possession must have taken place with either the 
mutawalli or the ruler (which in this case is the waqfs organisation).207
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The laws mentioned above unite everything that has been discussed in this chapter. They  attempt to 
define one final verdict concerning the transfer of the right of usage from founder to beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, they ensure that the first generation of beneficiaries or the religious magistrate accepts 
the offer of becoming beneficiaries so as to comply with the contractual nature of waqfs. Finally, 
the law prohibits founders from exploiting the waqf system by converting objects into waqfs that 
provide no service to the public and which are attempted entirely on pretentious and false 
grounds.208
 Momentary waqf (waqf e Monqateh)
  
As has been discussed, perpetuity is one of the pillars of every waqf. However, over time so many 
waqfs have been established that their deeds do not necessarily  follow the requisite uniformity in 
meeting the condition of perpetuity. This is due to many factors, the most common of which 
concerns the manner in which the Waqfnameh is produced. The beneficiaries identified in a 
Waqfnameh could become extinct, and the Waqfnameh provides for no provisional substitute. 
Jurists have had two options, one of which is to call such waqfs void; alternatively, they have 
created a way to justify such waqfs. Finally, there are cases in which it seems that the jurists were 
aware that the founder was converting his assets into a waqf in order to exploit the institution. In 
this case, it can be seen that, at least on certain occasions, jurists actually  facilitated such actions. 
The problem is that such exceptions ended up becoming as important as the mainstream verdicts, 
resulting in confusing and contradictory waqf laws. In any event, the Monqateh waqf was created to 
facilitate such demands.
A Monqateh waqf is one for which the beneficiary  is impermanent. In other words, the beneficiary 
is only  going to need the support of the waqf for a certain period of time. The problem with this 
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type of waqf is that  if at some point the waqf is without a beneficiary it will become void, violating 
the principle of perpetuity. In this section, the three different situations in which this can occur and 
the verdicts that were made in connection with them will be considered.
A Monqateh waqf is a type of waqf that exists for a defined period of time. There are mixed views 
among the Shi’ite Ulama regarding this type of waqf. Some consider such waqfs to be valid; for 
example, Sheikh Mofid argues that one can appoint an unborn child to be the beneficiary  of a waqf. 
In such cases, upon being born the child will assume the waqf’s benefits from existing beneficiaries 
of the property.209  Those who argue for this type of waqf, such as Allameh Helli, base their 
arguments on the fact that following the waqf’s termination, it will return to the founder. 
Alternatively, in the event that  the founder is dead by that time, the property returns to the founder’s 
heir.210
Iranian civil law does not give a distinct opinion on this matter. Katouzian elaborates on this issue 
and notes that some believe—in reference to Article 90 of Iranian civil law—that the waqf’s 
revenues must be spent on good deeds. However, we must first make sure that this is the founder’s 
true wish, as his decision to establish a waqf cost him his rights toward his property.211 As a result, 
Monqateh waqfs have survived as a practice whose parameters are based entirely on Sharia, and 
there is no sign that civil law has attempted any rationalisation. One can argue that Iranian civil law 
could not consider such waqfs because they exist in stark contrast to the principle of perpetuity, 
which the law has advocated previously. 
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 The types of Monqateh waqfs:
  
Monqateh waqfs can be divided into three types, depending on whether the first, middle or final 
generation or class of beneficiaries failed to exist during any given period of time. These three types 
are called Monqateh al-Avval, Monqateh al-Vasat and Monqateh al-Akhar (meaning “cut at  the 
beginning”, “cut at the middle”, and “cut at the end”, respectively).
Monqateh al-Avval
The first type, Monqateh al-Avval, exists when the very first  class, or first generation, of 
beneficiaries no longer exists. Allameh Helli and Tusi are among those who argue in favour of this 
type of waqf.212  Ayatollah Khomeini also advocated this type of waqf and provided an example: if 
someone appoints a dead person as the beneficiary, this does not constitute a valid waqf.213 
However, someone may  appoint his children and grandchildren as the beneficiaries of a waqf. 
Moreover, in the event that any  of the beneficiaries dies, and in the event that the same beneficiary 
has an unborn child, that child will become a beneficiary of the waqf, as well. Khomeini argues that 
it is best that the waqf is renewed following the death of the first generation of beneficiaries.214
Finally, Katouzian explains that, based on Article 69 of Iranian civil law, one cannot appoint a dead 
person to be the beneficiary of a waqf. Moreover, he continues, with this type of waqf, only the 
beneficiary must be alive, even if he or she is unknown.215 This is a situation in which civil law not 
only rationalises something from the traditional laws of waqf but also begins to contradict itself. 
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Based on many articles in civil law, the beneficiary of a waqf must be identifiable. Therefore, the 
perspective that the beneficiary can be an unidentifiable person is completely contradictory  to 
previous determinations.
Monqateh al-Vasat
The second waqf of this type occurs when the second class or second generation of beneficiaries no 
longer exists. This type of waqf is referred to as a Monqateh al-Vasat. Shahid Sani argues that, in 
the event that the first and final classes of beneficiaries are known, the waqf is valid, even if the 
beneficiaries in between remain unknown.216  Katouzian suggests that if the final class of 
beneficiaries is identifiable, and the middle class of beneficiaries also can be identified, then the 
waqf should be designated as a Monqateh al-Avval.217
Monqateh al-Akhar
Finally, the most common type of waqf is that in which the beneficiaries are distinct and no 
substitute for them was appointed by the founder. This type of waqf is referred to as a Monqateh al-
Akhar. In this case, many factors are at play and the waqf deed plays a pivotal role. In order for the 
waqf to be established, an alternate beneficiary to those who are no longer available must be found. 
The Waqfnameh might include instructions pertaining to this.
Concluding remarks
This chapter explored three major processes of documentation in the establishment of a waqf. The 
primary aim of the chapter was to address the issue of waqf ownership. However, it  was first 
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necessary  to review the entire process of establishing a waqf and its long and peculiar legal 
character. The stages that must take place for a waqf to be established are, first, the act of founding 
a waqf, second, the writing of the waqf deed, and, finally, the transfer of ownership of the converted 
property. Traditionally, the founder must be clear about his intention and select identifiable 
beneficiaries for the waqf. The founder’s intention must be formally ratified by  his verbally 
pronouncing a waqf formula. This verbal declaration has been much encouraged by jurists and has 
also entered into Iranian civil law; it carries the same legal importance as those made before the 
codification of the laws. However, it has gone through an almost unique evolutionary process. 
Unlike other popular formulas related to Sharia law, such as marriage and the establishment of 
mosques, all of which are said in Arabic, jurists agree that the waqf formula can be said in Persian. 
This is due to the fact that, for the average Iranian, the Arabic language is unfamiliar; moreover, 
inasmuch as the waqf formula shares a similar terminology with other types of institutions, it  was 
decided that the formula can be pronounced in Persian. On the other hand, as in most cases 
regarding waqfs—and contrary to the strong advocating of jurists regarding the pivotal importance 
of the verbal declaration of the waqf—an endowment can be correctly established and recognised 
by both Sharia and civil law without a verbal declaration by  its founder. This type of waqf, known 
as Mo’atati, is as valid as any other type of waqf. The arguments for the enforcement of a verbal 
declaration from the founder combined with a written deed for the waqf would seem to be the next 
logical step in order to ensure that  everything is set up  correctly  and runs smoothly. However, some 
of the most recent fatwas, such as those issued by  Ayatollah Khomeini, rely on only the most simple 
and basic form of declaration by the founder, which can bypass any written document or 
background check. Iran’s modern laws attempt to tackle loopholes that opportunists might exploit, 
but traditional law remains ill prepared to tackle modern legal demands.
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The second part of the chapter looked at the conditions under which a waqf deed must be produced. 
As far as written waqf deeds are concerned, the jurists traditionally have provided a unique set of 
rules that the founder must follow. This has acted as a method to minimise certain common 
mistakes in producing waqf deeds. There are three main principles that a waqf deed must follow: 
perpetuity, inalienability and irrevocability. These conditions make waqfs incredibly rigid 
institutions and can work against their own good. As will be shown in the next chapter, with the 
passage of time marginal or radical changes to the way things have operated or have been managed, 
and even to the nature of the waqf’s mission, have been proven to be unavoidable. As will be 
discussed, over the long run such rigidities here paved the way  for corruption, pragmatic 
management and/or a decline in the waqf. The inflexibilities in traditional laws regarding a waqf’s 
mission and its principles were due to a lack of understanding of the concept of a corporation. 
Iranian civil law has simply  codified almost all traditional principles related to producing a waqf 
deed and granted waqfs corporate status. This act  resulted in many contradictions within Iran’s civil 
law. The primary  problem is that a waqf cannot operate like any other corporation in which the law 
is recognised. The traditional laws related to waqfs were created without the slightest idea of 
corporations and with the objective of maintaining them essentially as they  were, while weaving 
them into a modern legal system that does, in fact, recognise corporations; this does not necessarily 
work. 
The final part  of the chapter looked at waqf ownership and a few related issues. The classic Islamic 
doctrine is that the founder loses all of his rights with respect to the property, inclusive of 
ownership, once he converts it into a waqf. The question on which the jurists fail to agree is what 
happens after the founder loses ownership. In order to address this vital question, the jurists have 
had to consider the waqf as a type of contract. They  have all agreed that a waqf is a contract; 
however, they continue to disagree about the specific type. In most cases, jurists go to enormous 
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lengths to explain what type of contract a waqf is, but, in the end, they give up. As a result, no set 
verdict has been decided regarding waqf ownership. Some verdicts advocate that waqfed properties 
remain under the ownership  of their founders, while others maintain that ownership transfers to the 
beneficiaries or even to God. There are two main issues resulting from the fact that no unified 
conclusion exists. First and foremost, not knowing what happens in terms of the transfer of 
ownership of a property means that  it cannot be documented correctly; therefore, any violation to 
that property cannot be properly safeguarded. The problem in the past has been extrapolated to the 
present; waqfs did not have corporate status. Thus, the administrators of waqfs had no real legal 
right to represent their endowments in court.
Iran’s modern civil law does not, as yet, provide clarity as to what  happens to the transfer of 
ownership of a waqf. However, by granting a waqf a legal personality, it does give the waqf’s 
administrator (the mutawalli) a bit more power when representing the waqf in court. Nevertheless, 
the lack of cohesion within traditional laws concerning waqf, and the absence of a clear verdict in 
Iran’s modern civil law, has clearly taken a toll on both the performance of waqfs and the economy 
of the country as a whole.
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Chapter V: Administration
In principle, the manager of a waqf must obey the stipulations of its founder to the letter. 
Additionally, ambiguities concerning the ownership of the waqf, and all of the details that might not 
have been foreseen by the founder in the Waqfnameh, present huge obstacles both in decision-
making and in protecting the endowment from external violation. However, in practice the founder's 
directives often were circumvented, which contributed to corruption and the weakness of civil 
society. This chapter examines whether modern legislation concerning the waqf in Iran has 
overcome these traditional administrative problems.
 
In the previous two chapters, the main players with respect  to waqfs and the laws regarding the 
establishment of waqfs were introduced. Thus far, there remain some shortcomings within both the 
collective work of the Islamic jurists who generated the traditional laws and the modern versions of 
the laws, which result from the codification of traditional laws and the addition of modern legal 
concepts, creating the current civil law of Iran. With respect to each case and section, some of the 
shortcomings of both the traditional and modern versions of the laws were highlighted. The two 
main shortcomings concerned the rigid structure under which waqf deeds must be produced—so as 
to impose perpetuity, inalienability and irrevocability—and the unresolved issue of the ownership  of 
waqf properties, under both traditional law and the civil law of Iran. The latter problem has even 
lead to contradictions in Iran’s modern legal system, mainly  due to cases whereby a waqf was 
transplanted with a legal personality as a result  of modern laws, something not possible under 
traditional law. Correspondingly, the concepts of perpetuity, irrevocability  and inalienability, which 
frame a waqf’s protocol, deed and mission, cannot comply with the modern concept of a 
corporation with a legal personality, whereby these things can change. This chapter is divided into 
two sections, the first of which deals with a waqf’s administration. 
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The administrator of a waqf, the mutawalli, must  grapple with numerous restrictions as a result of 
the law, restrictions from which the manager of a modern enterprise is free. Specifically, there are 
two main issues that have a major impact on the performance and behaviour of a mutawalli. First, 
he must follow to the letter the instructions of the waqf’s founder; if the ownership  of a waqf is 
disputed, how does this affect  his duties? Second, the legal formation of a waqf creates a secondary 
problem with the waqf’s administration. Many discussions consider waqfs without a mutawalli— 
the ways in which one can be appointed to take that post, how his duties are assigned, what his 
salary  should be, and the problem of redundancy. The second part of the chapter considers a 
collection of issues concerning waqfs and specific economic environments and related issues. The 
waqf is considered a piece of property, which can be sold, rented, divided or terminated. Finally, 
this section will consider one of the most current developments in waqf law: the resurrection of 
ancient, or even terminated, waqfs.
To begin, the intrinsic problems that frame the activities and decisions of a waqf’s mutawalli will be 
highlighted. Recent studies of waqfs reveal that, on one hand, the administrators of waqfs tend to be 
very tight-handed because of the rigidities in waqf law; on the other hand, in practice they  often 
enjoy  a great deal of latitude. Such stark contrasts can be explained as a combination of pragmatic 
management and the relaxed litigation it fuels. However, such actions have had a long-term impact 
both on endowments and on the economy as a whole.
The second section of this chapter discusses the various topics that  populate the majority  of the 
legal texts. The main point here is to challenge the perception that the mutawalli is the “manager” 
of a waqf. It will be argued, instead, that  the mutawalli shares only certain responsibilities with 
those of a modern-day manager. His decision-making powers are severely limited compared to 
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those of a contemporary manager. Consequently, a mutawalli, although constituting an economic 
agent, should not be mistaken for a manger in the modern sense. Furthermore, there are many 
aspects specific to a mutawalli, such as the nature of his appointment, his salary and his duties, that 
make him redundant. The majority of the issues that jurists have had to deal with have resulted from 
the concept of perpetuity  and the great importance given to a waqf’s deed. For example, many 
things can go wrong as a result of mistakes in a waqf’s deed, or simply  due to the passage of time, 
so that a waqf is left without a mutawalli. Without the waqf having a corporate status or constituting 
a legal personality—which would make appointing a new mutawalli an easy task—these issues can 
result in complicated challenges. 
The waqf’s lack of a legal personality, which is one of its hallmarks, results in issues regarding the 
mutawalli’s salary and duties—which may not be adjusted according to the rate of inflation over 
time, and so forth. In the case of the mutawalli, such issues have become challenging. This study 
considers both the traditional verdicts from jurists tackling these problems and the adjustments that 
have been made by Iran’s modern civil law. The main goal is to demonstrate how tiring and 
cumbersome the duty  of administrating a waqf is, which is, arguably, one of the contributing factors 
to the decline of the institution and its performance.
The final part of the chapter is divided into two parts. The first  looks at the most common problems 
that a piece of property encounters. Renting a waqf, dividing a waqf, selling a waqf and even 
terminating a waqf are topics that not only have been challenging for the endowment itself but  also 
have had a significant impact on neighbouring properties, as this study shows. For those not already 
convinced that the waqf is not the most efficient institution, not only for delivering public goods but 
also for protecting its own goods, a remarkable event happened in Iran during the 1980s. Based on a 
fatwa issued by and in the personal interest of Ayatollah Khomeini, the country’s parliament passed 
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a law allowing old and terminated waqf properties to be reconverted into waqfs. This created 
unprecedented problems for properties throughout the country and is the subject of the latter part of 
the final section of this chapter.
The administration of a waqf
Based on traditional waqf laws, and, to a great degree, their modern versions, the administrator of a 
waqf (the mutawalli) must obey the founder’s demands to the letter. As a result, the system lacks 
flexibility for keeping up with the fast pace of present-day economic conditions. In other words, the 
majority  of the laws which were generated in the pre-industrial world specifically suited the slow 
pace of change in that era, during which people would experience little to no change in the 
advancement of technology  or new modes of production and demand. However, the laws of waqf 
are ill suited to the post-industrial era, in which new modes of production are constantly being 
introduced, more efficient managerial methods are available, and changes in the production of 
public goods must be evaluated constantly.
It has been mentioned that one should not mix the role of a mutawalli with that of the modern-day 
manager, primarily because of the mutawalli’s fewer and much more restrictive decision-making 
powers compared to those of a manger. The second point  that  needs to be elaborated is the 
difference between operational flexibility  and foundational flexibility. The founder enjoys a great 
degree of freedom because of the loose structure in establishing a waqf. On the other hand, the 
principle of static perpetuity limits the flexibility  of those agents involved with the operating side of 
the endowment. The literal meaning of the term waqf suggests that its purpose is to stop something 
or to make it dependent and conditional. Perhaps what the system was meant to stop  was the 
expropriation of waqf assets and deviations from the founder’s directives. The goals of a waqf and 
its method for reaching them are both conditional. As has been shown, modern laws have continued 
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the same approach. The law still insists that the wishes of the founder constitute the most important 
goal of a waqf, and that they must be carried out regardless of expense. 
Both the mission and the management of a waqf are subject to endorsement by  the religious 
magistrate and are based on their operational rigidity. First, the mission of a waqf, as has been 
discussed, is irrevocable. The popular verdict is that even the founder of a waqf cannot implement 
any changes once the waqf is ratified. Furthermore, the objectives of a waqf such as are specified in 
the waqf deed (Waqfnameh) must be followed precisely. However, in practice, obeying those 
instructions to the letter would have caused the institution of the waqf to become dysfunctional. For 
example, numerous waqfs throughout Iran were built to support caravansaries in medieval times. 
Centuries later, shifts in trade routes and changes to the structure of travelling in general have made 
these endowments dysfunctional. In most cases, the long-dead founder neglected to allow future 
mutawallis to use their own judgment in order to transfer the assets from now-dysfunctional 
caravansaries to other enterprises.218  As a result, the resources of the waqf have stagnated and lost 
their economic value. One would assume that modern laws would overcome such obstacles and that 
they  would be more rational, in order to fit  modern needs. However, Iranian civil law is similar to 
traditional law. Aside from a few cases, such as the waqf objects for the Astan-e-Qods-e Razavi, 
which could be liquidated, there has not been much development.
The level of flexibility  that  administrators of waqfs enjoy can be determined from a careful study of 
the fatwas related to waqf administration in general and of specific waqfs in particular. Every 
Waqfnameh can be subject to various ambiguities, which can produce creative interpretations for 
subsequent exploitation. In practice, the waqf system is far from being as rigid as waqf laws and 
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regulations would suggest. However, such circumventions come at a cost, particularly when they 
occur frequently. In the long run, economic efficiency will be affected as a result of these 
circumventions and adjustments. Had the waqfs been allowed to be restructured and their missions 
updated according to the economic needs of their time, they might have avoided economic 
stagnation. Furthermore, the pragmatic management of these waqfs, which could lead to law 
breaking, could be controlled under the law. These are among several potential reasons why one 
might have expected waqf laws to be modernised during the process of codification. It  has been 
shown, in fact, that very little has changed from the traditional laws to the modern ones.
The initial reason for such managerial rigidity  can be traced to the rights of the founder of the waqf, 
who has the ultimate right to dictate the terms of the waqf’s operation. The mutawalli is effectively 
not a manager but merely an executor of the founder’s decision. The mutawalli’s preferences thus 
are irrelevant in deciding legal cases. Borrowing certain economic terminology, in this case the 
mutawali can be designated as an agent219  and the founder as the principal. In this case, the 
mutawalli is an agent hired to carry  out the founder’s directives. Problems arise when the directives 
are ambiguous, incomplete or even non-existent. In such cases, the mutawalli is confronted with the 
challenge of figuring out how and for what the founder would have aimed. Furthermore, the 
mutawalli does not have the right to make any operational changes, even when such actions would 
be beneficial to the waqf. In other words, the mutawalli’s understanding of the founder’s directives 
must determine his decision-making process, which may or may not reflect what constitutes the best 
solution at any particular time.
This process may become further complicated if the founder had also appointed a Qazi  (judge) and 
the Qazi does not allow the mutawalli to carry out the founder’s intentions. The Qazi is an agent 
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country’s economy; for example, by buying, selling or investing.
similar to the mutawalli; he is appointed by the founder to enforce his wishes.220  As one can 
imagine, the mutawalli and the Qazi might have different interpretations of the true wishes of the 
founder. The Qazi has the power to block the decisions of the mutawalli. Differences of opinion 
could happen under the pretext of, say, repairs, the ingredients in food (even in the smallest matter, 
e.g., lamb versus veal in a stew), or staff replacement. The ultimate effect is that the waqf is 
empowered with a parallel level of ritual continuity. However, continuity can come at the expense 
of the waqf’s efficiency. This brings us to accounting for the vastness of the resources that  waqfs 
control in Iran and the corresponding sub-optimal usage of resources, which suggests static 
perpetuity. Perhaps this system suited the slow pace of medieval times, when changes to the 
economy came relatively  slowly. However, in modern times, the rigidities of the waqf have proven 
unsuitable for the fast  pace of economic change. The case was equally  true with traditional laws as 
it is today, with the codified version of the same laws. The main question here is, why have all of 
these restrictions been imposed on waqfs? Additionally, who wanted to make waqfs less flexible? 
Finally, if the social losses have been noticed, why have waqfs never been abandoned?
To begin with the public waqf, because the ownership of a waqf is subject to dispute and even today 
constitutes a grey area, the mutawalli of the waqf, particularly after the death of the founder, can 
easily be tempted to embezzle. Alternatively, the mismanagement of a waqf can potentially be 
costly  to the establishment’s economic performance. In such cases, it  was believed that tight rules of 
management would enforce honesty. One must not forget that waqf laws were established at a time 
when technological and economic advancements developed slowly. Therefore, the general 
understanding has been that enforcing honesty and morality  would improve economic efficiency 
and the consequences of “tying an administrator’s hands” were widely ignored. For those waqfs that 
151
220 The role of the Qazi with respect to an Iranian waqf is unclear, and, in many cases, the founder, 
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provided public goods, it was in the interest of both ruler and founder to adhere to the perpetuity 
concept, thus ensuring a steady  flow of related services. Moreover, for those founders who were 
genuinely interested in providing social services, the cost of immobilising a property and “tying its 
administration’s hands” was negligible compared to the benefits accrued by preventing potential 
abuses in the future.
In the case of family  waqfs, one can say that it  was mainly in the interest of the founder to enforce 
rigid rules concerning the waqf’s administration. In order to maintain a balance in the family, as 
well as to ensure that the family and the descendants were served based on the priorities he 
established, the founder would have wanted to limit the mutawalli’s operational activities. The 
founders of such waqfs (not necessarily the beneficiaries) would support imposing restrictions on 
the administration of a waqf—and hence its perpetuity. In either case, a substantial revision to the 
waqf laws, as might have been expected, has largely  been neglected with respect to Iran’s modern 
laws.
 
Pragmatic management
As mentioned earlier, many studies have shown that, in practice, mutawallis enjoy a great deal of 
freedom in running endowments. This, of course, generally runs contrary to what has been imposed 
on them technically  and legally. All of the limitations imposed on a waqf’s administration by 
Islamic law encourage a pragmatic approach to management. In many contemporary waqf studies, 
close adherence reflects a very different image of reality concerning the administration of a waqf. 
Although the mutawallis are limited by  many rules and regulations, in practice pragmatic 
management is usually  evident. In many cases, mutawallis have deployed various methods in order 
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to maximise the output of waqfs.221  In the absence of strong litigation enforcement, mutawalli and 
waqf employees have often enjoyed great latitude. Moreover, one can find occasional examples of 
waqf assets being sold or exchanged. These examples suggest that the entire argument concerning 
static perpetuity  is, in fact, irrelevant. However, in the long term, it is evident that a significant 
number of waqfs have suffered from mismanagement and ultimately have disappeared for a variety 
of reasons. In most cases, the waqfs in question became dilapidated beyond the point of repair and 
were finally completely abandoned.222  Such approaches and adjustments may sound not only wise 
but also inevitable; however, they come at a cost.
Economic analysis
 Pragmatic management, which is only natural due to the inflexibility  of waqf laws, may seem to be 
a natural way of handling things. On one hand, the rules and regulations are stringent; on the other, 
people find ways around them in order to accomplish the waqf’s mission. However, such 
adjustments come at a cost. In this section we complete an economic analysis in order to examine 
the ways in which the economy has been affected by these tight rules and the costs involved in 
adjusting to them. In theory, the founder’s directions must be followed to the letter. Therefore, 
mutawallis have been left short-handed, particularly  with respect to decision-making. Even if a 
mutawalli has the best of intentions, he may  not be allowed to carry out decisions such as changing 
the type of crop  produced, creating a new position on his staff, or even changing the waqf’s 
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222  There are many small towns throughout Iran in which the old part of the town has been almost 
evacuated and its population has had to move further out and essentially build a new town. The 
reason for this has been that the old town had a great number of waqf properties, the majority of 
which were beyond repair, causing risk to those living near them; unfortunately, the waqf laws were 
inflexible in regards to this issue.
menu.223  The most striking feature of waqfs, from which this institution continues to suffer, is the 
fact that resources cannot be pooled. In other words, joint economic ventures cannot be formed 
under waqf laws. Thus, waqf A and waqf B cannot share their resources in order to achieve synergy 
as waqf C. Consequently, as Kuran argues, “a waqf on its own cannot deliver large scale projects, 
such as road maintenance or piped water”.224  If waqf laws were sufficiently flexible so as to allow 
smaller waqfs to pull together their resources, such complex tasks would be achievable.225
The second section of this chapter examines various situations related to the role, duties and 
challenges of the mutawallis. There are two important points here. First and foremost, the study 
demonstrates that the lack of the concept of a corporation can cause many problems for this 
institution and explores the ways in which modern waqfs have responded to this situation. Second, I 
illustrate how comprehensive, and often complicated, the laws relating to mutawallis have become, 
making the operation of a waqf a tedious task.
The Mutawalli
The founder of a waqf usually makes arrangements for the waqf’s administration by  appointing an 
administrator. The most popular type of administrator is the mutawalli.226 Briefly summarised, the 
most common situation is that a founder identifies an agent and establishes rules for the 
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223  The majority of the modern waqfs in Iran are related to the month of Moharram. Most of these 
waqfs exist, in part, to provide sustenance for congregations. The founders of these waqfs may have 
explicitly ordered certain foods and/or recipes.
224 Kuran (2001, pp. 841–98)
225 In contemporary Iran such tasks are carried out by foundations, such as Jahad-e Sazandegi and 
Many Bonyads.
226 Qayyim, Naziir and Naqib are other names that have been used for this agent. The word 
mutawalli, as a description of a waqf’s administrator, first appeared at the time of the Safavids. 
Prior to that, in most cases, the word Naghib was used.
appointment of his successors. Most schools of law allow the founder to take up this position. The 
duties of the mutawalli are primarily the maintenance and exploitation of the waqf property. For 
example, he decides which repairs must be made as well as how to make the establishment more 
profitable. Ultimately, he is in charge of distributing the proceeds among the waqf’s beneficiaries. 
Additionally, he is entitled to be paid for his activities. His position is similar to that of a guardian 
(the literal translation of mutawalli is, in fact, “guardian”) over a minor or an insane person.227  In 
some Islamic schools of law, the mutawalli’s administration may become subject to the supervision 
of a Qazi (judge).
The above description is very similar to that of the tasks and duties of a manager of a modern 
enterprise. Hence, in most cases the role of the mutawalli can easily be taken as equivalent to the 
manager of the waqf. It is true that—on the surface, at least, and in abstract form—the mutawalli 
does share certain similarities with a modern-day manager. However, as will be demonstrated, in 
practice a mutawalli’s functions are very different from those of a modern-day  manager. This study 
evaluates the efficiency of a mutawalli in a traditional establishment. Moreover, it will be 
determined how and to what degree the role of the mutawalli was adjusted once its legal parameters 
were codified into civil law.
There are many situations whereby there is a waqf but no mutawalli for it. This could be due to a 
number of reasons. The waqf’s deed might  have been lost or may  not be legible, those who were 
appointed to the position may have passed on or no longer be interested in the job, and so on. 
Therefore, many fatwas have been issued to address such cases.
How to appoint a mutawalli when there is none
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227 This is the literal meaning of “mutawalli”.
The most well-known fatwas related to mutawallis not only teach us about traditional laws but  also 
highlight actual cases and problems with which jurists had to grapple. The Imami jurists have 
issued various fatwas on issues concerning mutawallis. In most cases, the fatwas dealt  with the 
absence of, or ambiguities surrounding, someone entitled to take over administrative 
responsibilities. Furthermore, it appears that disputes over the ownership of waqfs generally  have 
concerned the administration of the endowment. Among the Imami shi’ites, Sheikh Tusi argues that 
the founder of a waqf can appoint either himself or someone else to administer the waqf’s affairs. 
However, if he fails to appoint someone to carry out this duty, there are two possible answers to the 
question of its administration. In the first instance, the task of mutawalli becomes the responsibility 
of the ruler (i.e., the king). This is because the ruler is the representative of God on earth (Tusi bases 
his argument on the idea that the transfer of ownership of the waqf is from the founder to God, and 
because the king is the shadow or representative of God on earth, the king is in charge). In the 
second instance, the beneficiaries become responsible for the waqf’s management. However, if we 
apply  the same logic as that related to the transfer of ownership, the implication in this case is that 
ownership of the waqf has been transferred from the founder to the beneficiaries.228  This is 
something with which Tusi does not agree, as mentioned in the previous chapter. In other words, 
Tusi fails to come up with a system that is coherent; based on his verdict, transfer of ownership 
interferes with the finding and appointment of a new mutawalli.
The second fatwa was issued by Mohaqeq Helli, who argues that, in the absence of an appointed 
mutawalli, it is the duty of the beneficiaries to take responsibility for the administration of the waqf, 
inasmuch as now they have ownership of it.229  (It  is clear that he views the waqf as having 
undergone a transfer of ownership from the founder to the beneficiaries). Unlike Tusi, Helli does 
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not contradict himself, and his views on both the appointment of a mutawalli and the transfer of 
ownership are consistent.
The third set of arguments comes from Allameh Helli, who suggests that a founder can appoint 
himself or someone else to be mutawalli of the waqf. In the absence of such an appointment, the 
founder has priority to become mutawalli. However, there are alternate views on this: some jurists 
believe that either the ruler or the beneficiary  may take the position of mutawalli. Both of these 
views are valid and are based on which method of determining who has ownership of the waqf is 
used.230  In short, identifying the administrator of a waqf is closely  linked to the ownership of the 
endowment. Because the ownership of waqf has been a matter of dispute, hence the administration 
of it cannot be identified easily either . It is clear that  the unresolved case of the waqf’s ownership 
exacts a toll on its administration and, consequently, its efficiency.
Ayatollah Najafi argues that  the founder can appoint more than one mutawalli to the waqf.231  He 
states that in the event that  the founder fails to appoint a mutawalli, regardless of whether the waqf 
is public or private, it is the ruler’s responsibility to take charge of its administration. However, for 
those types of waqfs that provide public goods, such as trees that provide shade under which people 
can take refuge, the ruler’s permission is not necessary.232 (The view of the jurists is that the waqf 
becomes the property  of God; hence, the representative of God on earth, the king, becomes in 
charge of it). Although Najafi formally declares that there is no owner of the waqf other than God, 
one can see that, based on his argument, the ruler or king effectively becomes the owner of the 
waqf.
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tradition of having multiple mutawallis in order to manage particularly large-scale endowments.
232 Yazdi (2002, pp. 227–28)
Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini argues that  in the absence of an appointed mutawalli it is the ruler’s 
responsibility to take over guardianship of a waqf. However, in cases involving silt  removal from 
canals (i.e., dredging), the harvesting of crops, and so forth, it is the duty and responsibility of the 
beneficiaries. Moreover, after the king, it becomes the duty of any  pious man to take over the 
administration of the waqf.233  Khomeini’s verdict can be perceived as somewhat pragmatic. 
However, as is the case with most of his verdicts, it lacks objectivity. His verdict is a very good 
example of how waqf laws were made during the second half of the 20th century. In the first half of 
the verdict, he emphasises the duty  of the beneficiary to be proactive and assist with the waqf’s 
affairs, from which they  themselves benefit (i.e., silt removal and harvesting). Furthermore, when it 
comes to appointing a mutawalli to the waqf, his view is yet again very much based on a few 
specific cases, regarding which he takes a very  pragmatic approach. However, one could link his 
views on ownership  of a waqf (which, in this case, remains unknown) to the transfer of the 
administration of the waqf to the ruler.
Article 61 of Iranian civil law states that the founder can express in the Waqfnameh whom he 
intends to appoint as mutawalli. Furthermore, Article 61 states that a mutawalli may be appointed 
either directly by the founder or through the court in charge of running the daily  affairs of the 
respective waqf.234  Moreover, the law states that every  waqf has a legal personality, and the 
mutawalli is the legal representative of that waqf.235  Furthermore, in the absence of a mutawalli, 
regardless of whether the waqf is private or public, it  is the responsibility of the Valie-e Faqih, or 
Supreme Leader of Iran, to take charge of the designated waqf (which can be delegated to a waqfs 
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organisation).236 Considering the vast amount of land in Iran that has been locked for centuries into 
waqfs without valid waqf deeds or mutawallis, this law gives a huge amount of responsibility and 
power to the Vali-e Faqih. However, our main focus is on the law’s statement that gives waqfs legal 
personalities and makes mutawallis legal representatives of these institutions. We will return to this 
point later in this chapter. First, a few additional verdicts on the cases related to mutawallis will be 
explored.
There is no prerequisite or condition for someone to take the position of mutawalli as defined in 
civil law. However, in Articles 79 and 80 the law indicates that  if a mutawalli fails to fulfil his 
duties, he may become redundant.237  Clause 2 of the regulation concerning waqfs without a 
mutawalli states that if the waqf does not have a religious function, three to five people can assume 
the position of mutawalli. These individuals must have a minimum age of twenty-five years, be 
literate and be of local origin; their eligibility must be approved by the waqfs organisation. 
Furthermore, they may not be appointed for a period of more than three years at one time, although 
the position can be extended.238  As will be explored later, the law tries to centralise the 
administration of waqfs by  requiring that  mutawallis be approved by the waqfs organisation. This is 
contrary to the traditional setting, where there are few, if any, restrictions placed on who is 
appointed mutawalli.
It has been noted that the mutawalli must obey the founder’s wishes to the letter and that this 
stipulation takes much away from his decision-making powers in terms of running the endowment 
in an optimal way. Moreover, it was noted that, in practice, many of those restrictions were ignored 
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by mutawallis; often, they  had no choice but to adopt a pragmatic approach. In many cases, this 
approach might have solved the temporary problem; in the long run, however, it  advocated law 
breaking and led to corruption. It is important to consider what the jurists have determined about a 
mutawalli’s duties, as well as the ways in which they  have adjusted the laws in order to both 
decrease corruption and make the mutawalli’s role more efficient, given the fact that modern 
legislators have been fully aware of corruption within the waqf system,.
The responsibilities of the mutawalli
The responsibilities of a mutawalli can vary, largely depending on whether or not the founder 
provided explicit directions for running the waqf. If the founder provided such directions, the 
popular verdict of the Imami jurists has been that the mutawalli has the responsibility to develop the 
waqf and run its day-to-day  business precisely as indicated by the founder.239  It was previously 
discussed that the role of a mutawalli could be confused with that of a present-day manager. This is 
where differences begin to appear. While the mutawalli shares some of the responsibilities of a 
manager with respect to particular tasks, his decision-making powers, relatively speaking, are fairly 
limited. This is primarily due to the fact that he is obligated to follow the founder’s directions to the 
letter. As we will see, this generally  tends to become an issue with older waqfs. For example, a waqf 
that was established in the 18th century, and for which the founder provided the mutawalli specific 
directions, may  prove impossible or nonviable to be run as stipulated. In any case, if the mutawalli 
wishes to obey the founder’s directions completely, he effectively becomes little more than an 
executor of the founder’s decisions regarding the waqf—in other words, at least theoretically, the 
mutawalli’s role is more akin to that of an executor than a manager.
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When there is more than one mutawalli
The complexities of a waqf’s administration become complicated further when a waqf has more 
than one appointed mutawalli. There are disagreements among jurists regarding the decision-
making process when more than one mutawalli has been appointed to a waqf. The mutawallis might 
divide the tasks and related decisions among themselves, which is the arrangement Helli suggests, 
or, as Shahid Sani argues, the mutawallis might not be permitted to operate independently of each 
other.240 These two fatwas reveal the unincorporated nature of a waqf. If waqfs had corporate status, 
there would be no need for such arguments. Ultimately, Yazdi gives some direction as to how a 
waqf can be operated under multiple mutawallis. He argues that in the event that the founder of a 
waqf has not divided the tasks among the mutawallis, the mutawallis likewise may not  divide the 
tasks among themselves. However, they can divide the revenue generated by the waqf among them. 
He continues that if one of the mutawallis has a claim over a portion of the waqf’s revenue, the 
other mutawallis lose their claims over the same revenue. If the mutawallis mistakenly award the 
same revenue to two different people, the revenue should be reclaimed and redistributed correctly. 
In the event of a dispute between the mutawallis regarding how to run the waqf, it  is the 
responsibility of the ruler to resolve the dispute. Furthermore, whenever multiple options exist  with 
respect to running the waqf, the method closest to God’s blessings is always the most correct one. 
The mutawalli does not have the right to delegate his duties to someone else without first  obtaining 
the founder’s permission. However, the mutawalli can seek assistance from the religious 
magistrate.241
It is evident that verdicts such as those issued by Ayatollah Yazdi are based on particular cases, and 
it might be impossible to expand this fatwa into a blueprint for the administration of a waqf. 
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Furthermore, it is again evident that the concept of corporation was entirely alien to Ayatollah Yazdi 
in 19th-century Iran. As a result, the waqfs in Iran were unable to achieve a smooth operation and to 
exploit their full economic capacity. 
Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini argues that the founder can, during his lifetime, give the mutawalli the 
right to appoint other mutawallis or help  him with his duties, or appoint in his will a mutawalli 
following his death. Moreover, should the founder have failed to expressly mention anything 
regarding the appointment of other mutawallis, or if he, in fact, forbade the mutawalli from 
appointing a deputy in fulfilling his duties, the mutawalli may  not do so.242  It  is apparent that such 
fatwas clearly  do not facilitate the economic development of a waqf—and perhaps make it entirely 
impossible. A good mutawalli, then, is confronted with the challenge of trying to increase the 
productivity  of a waqf and grow its endowment without having the power to select an assistant. 
Furthermore, if a mutawalli cannot appoint someone to help him fulfil his duties, in his absence 
practically nothing can be done.
Now that the traditional perspective on the legal parameters of a waqf’s administration have been 
reviewed, let us shift the focus to Iran’s modern civil law and see how waqfs have been handled. 
Article 75 of Iranian civil law states that the founder can appoint himself or another person to 
manage a waqf independently  or (in the event that another person is appointed) in cooperation with 
another. The founder has the right to implement conditions as he wishes.243  Article 77 states that if 
the guardianship (Towliat) of a waqf has been delegated to more than one person, in the case of the 
death of one of the mutawallis, his responsibilities transfer to the surviving one(s). A waqf’s 
revenues must be collected by the mutawallis collectively, and the ruler must thus appoint a new 
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mutawalli to fill the gap.244  This law sheds light on one of the shortcomings in the modern 
legislation on waqf. If the waqf functioned like any corporation—and the law allegedly  grants it 
such status—the waqf’s board of directors (in this case, the mutawallis) might have been 
established such that, in the event of the death of one of the directors, they would be able to find a 
resolution regarding the future of the management of the foundation. Therefore, Article 77 is 
contradictory with respect to the concept of a corporation, as it takes decision-making power away 
from the mutawalli and gives it to another unincorporated body. 
Based on Article 86 of civil law, the conditions determined by  the founder dictating how the waqf 
should be run must be carried out by the mutawalli. The mutawalli may exercise his powers merely 
within the limits of what the founder has specified in the Waqfnameh; for example, reparation and 
restoration, renting out and dividing revenues, etc. In the event that the founder failed to establish 
such conditions, the mutawalli’s responsibility  is to run the waqf in the manner that is the norm for 
similar waqfs.245  This law encourages the management standard of waqfs to be equal. However, it 
discourages any kind of managerial innovation or creativity that might lead to greater efficiency, 
productivity  and/or development of the endowment. Based on Article 86 of civil law, if the founder 
did not place any conditions on how the mutawalli should operate a waqf, then the waqf’s revenues 
should be spent on its running costs, its repair and restorations; any remainder might go to the 
beneficiaries. Such a law creates a huge incentive for the mutawalli to inflate operational and 
similar costs and avoid providing any services.246  Furthermore, what is evidently  absent from the 
law is a provisional article that might encourage the mutawalli to use his judgment in order to come 
up with the most appropriate plan of action. Modern law fails to allow the mutawalli to enjoy the 
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level of decision-making freedom that a manager would have in an enterprise. However, this is by 
no means an indication that mutawallis have adopted a passive role. Many recent studies on waqfs 
have demonstrated that the very  rigid regulations that  theoretically restrict mutawallis are often 
ignored. The pragmatic management of waqfs will be addressed later in this chapter.
Appointing a judge (Qazi) to a waqf
There may also be another player connected with a waqf: the Qazi (judge), who essentially 
supervises the work of the mutawalli. The founder can appoint a supervisor to oversee the 
mutawalli’s work, or a board of supervisors to ratify the decisions of the mutawalli. Article 87 of 
civil law states this, stipulating that the founder can appoint supervisors either to oversee the work 
of the mutawalli or to ratify  his decisions.247  As previously mentioned, the practice of appointing a 
judge to supervise the duties of a mutawalli has not been consistent in Iran. For example, during the 
Safavid era the founder would normally  appoint himself as mutawalli and his eldest son to be the 
judge. The son, then, effectively assumes a paid apprenticeship under his father, whereby he learns 
how to operate the endowment. The son would ultimately succeed the father as the next mutawalli 
of the waqf. Moreover, it  is also very  unlikely that  the son would ever formally disapprove of his 
father’s decisions, which makes the role of a judge more a symbolic than a practical one.  However, 
such practice seems to have become less popular during the Qajar era and is not common in modern 
Iran.248 
The role of the judge is not very  clear in Iran’s modern legislation. The Awqaf Organisation has 
duties that generally can be associated with the supervision of waqfs, which can be considered a 
step toward the centralisation of the administration of waqfs.
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The salary of the mutawalli
The founder can set a salary for the mutawalli. However, if for any reason he has not done so, it 
constitutes a matter of dispute among Imami jurists. There are two cases that are most common 
here. In the first, some detail may have been left out of the Waqfnameh. As discussed earlier, the 
Waqfnameh may not be altered in any form or way.  Therefore, if the founder forgets to register a 
salary  for the mutawalli, he may not easily be able to do so later. Additionally, as is quite often the 
case, a mutawalli’s salary set decades, or even centuries, ago may not be increased in accordance 
with modern salaries. For example, consider a waqf established 100 years ago, whose founder 
allocated a salary  of £5 a year to its mutawalli. Although the need to adjust the salary may seem 
obvious, it is actually quite a complicated matter.
Helli argues that the mutawalli should be paid, whereas Sani argues that the mutawalli should have 
requested from the founder that a salary be established at the time that the waqf was established. If 
he did not do so, his actions suggest that he was happy to perform his duties without 
compensation.249 This fatwa suggests that once a waqf is established, one cannot make any changes. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates how difficult it can be to address subsequent complications created 
during the waqf’s founding. The same arguments and disputes exist among Sunni schools of law. In 
an attempt to overcome such problems, Article 84 of Iranian civil law states that  the founder should 
set a salary for the mutawalli. In the absence of this, the mutawalli should be paid the same payment 
as if he were performing an equivalent  job in the market.250  Emami argues further that the founder 
165
249 Helli (1985, p. 461); Shirvani (2006, p. 178)
250 Qanun Madani, Majmu’e qavanin va moghararet owqafi (2004) 
may not appoint himself as the waqf’s beneficiary, but he can appoint himself as the waqf’s 
mutawalli, while also setting a salary for himself.251
Making the mutawalli redundant
The popular verdict among Imami jurists is that  after ratification of the Waqfnameh, the founder 
cannot implement any changes, inclusive of laying off the mutawalli, unless otherwise stated in the 
Waqfnameh.252  On the other hand, including such clauses may not be possible, based on the fact 
that the founder loses his ownership rights over the endowment. Ayatollah Yazdi argues that the 
ruler can make the mutawalli redundant if it appears that he has betrayed his position or neglected 
his duties.253 The Sunni schools of law share very  similar views regarding how to make a mutawalli 
redundant. According to the Shi’ite verdict, it  is very  difficult, if not impossible, to make a 
mutawalli redundant.254
In another attempt to rationalise such a process, Article 79 of Iranian civil law states that neither the 
founder nor the ruler can make the mutawalli redundant. If it turns out that  the mutawalli has been 
betraying his duties, it is up  to the civil courts to render a decision and issue a redundancy  verdict. 
Moreover, if the court makes a mutawalli redundant, the court shall then appoint a trustee to take 
over the responsibilities of the waqf until the mutawalli reforms his behaviour.255  The law is 
somewhat contradictory  vis-à-vis the fatwas issued by  Ulama and seems to be more in tune with the 
corporate status given waqfs by civil law. Finally, Article 80 of civil law states that if the mutawalli 
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fails to fulfil the initial requirements explicitly requested by the founder, he should be suspended 
from his position. For example, if the founder had expressed that the mutawalli should be a Muslim 
and Iranian and the mutawalli converts to another religion or adopts a different nationality, he shall 
be considered redundant with respect  to his duties. Moreover, making a mutawalli redundant is an 
irrevocable action.256 
Case study: The Haj Baqeri waqf
The Haji Baqeri waqf is a large property, approximately 10,000 square meters, located north of 
Tehran. This waqf is considered a family waqf as well as a waqf of the Imam Hossein.
Haj Baqeri Sr. was a landowner in the Shemiran district of Tehran. During the reign of Reza Shah, 
at the peak of the government’s confiscation of properties, he decided to convert his property into a 
waqf. During the very first year, he circulated a rumour that his property  was a waqf without 
officially  ratifying it. However, a few years later, he had to finish the job officially. The property 
compromises an orchard and a few buildings. The beneficiaries were set as the founder’s children 
and the Imam Hossein. He appointed himself as mutawalli and his eldest  son to succeed him 
following his death. He also assigned a salary of 500 Tomans (currently around 30 pennies) a year 
for his activities. The buildings on the property are flats, a few of which have been occupied by Haj 
Baeghri’s children while the rest have been rented out. Every year, part of the waqf’s income goes 
to a mosque in east Tehran for the purpose of producing food during the month of Muhharam, in 
connection with the passion plays performed then. The founder specified the type of food to be 
served, Khhoresh-e-Qeymeh (a Persian stew which is served at funerals). This stew, which is served 
with rice, can be made with lamb, beef or veal, although the founder was specific about using lamb 
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in this particular case. In an interview, the current mutawalli of the waqf, Haj Bagheri Jr., discussed 
some of the issues and challenges he has had to face in recent years. The first  concerns the salary of 
the mutawalli, which was a substantial amount at  the time of the waqf’s establishment; since then, 
however, the salary  has become meaningless. Because the waqf is perpetual and the terms of the 
Waqfnameh cannot be changed, altering the mutawalli’s salary has proven to be very difficult. 
Ultimately, the waqfs organisation raised his salary from 500 Tomans (30 pennies) a year to 40,000 
Tomans (25 pounds) a year.257 
The second challenge is that the waqf had been approached by a housing development project, with 
the permission of the waqfs organisation. At first, the mutawalli objected to this. However, he later 
learned that he had no choice other than to cooperate; otherwise, he might be temporarily or even 
permanently made redundant. The housing development project took place in the end, and there are 
now more than 30 new flats being built as part of three apartment complexes. These apartment 
houses have been sold to private individuals. The owners of these flats, however, were required to 
pay a sum of money as rent to the Awqaf Organisation; these funds have been collected by the 
mutawalli. Finally, there has been a shortage of lamb for stews in recent years. Therefore, the 
mutawalli had to coordinate with the imam of the mosque (who acts in the capacity of Qazi) in 
order that he should be allowed to use veal instead of lamb. However, the biggest secret that Mr. 
Baqeri shared with me is that, although the income from his waqf has recently increased 
significantly (which, theoretically, must be invested according to the wishes of the founder), he still 
spends the same amount as he did previously. He elaborated that the Qazi accepts a small bribe and 
tells the waqfs organisation that  they  have fed a much larger crowd, which would be the appropriate 
amount for the income of the waqf.
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257 The salaries of the mutawallis constitute one of the major issues surrounding many waqfs. Today 
it is advised that, instead of having it constitute a fixed rate, it should be indicated in the 
Waqfnameh as a set percentage of the revenues. This would both motivate the mutawalli to be more 
productive and allow his salary to grow over time and in keeping with the inflation rate.
In order to shed more light on the challenges confronting waqfs whose purposes are no longer 
relevant, it  is helpful to look at a particular example. Mr. Khosravi, the editor of the journal Waqf, 
Mirath e Javidan, discussed the high number of Ab Anbars (traditional water conduits) in the city of 
Yazd, the majority of which are waqfed properties. Because piped water has been introduced to 
every  residence in this city, these Ab Anbars have been abandoned and most  are now dilapidated, 
well beyond repair. However, because these establishments occupy  strategic locations within the 
town they are perceived as having high economic potential for development. The remedial solution 
proposed by the waqfs organisation of Yazd is a scheme whereby the Ab Anbars are leased long-
term to private individuals for development. The Awaqf Organisation used the money generated 
from these leases to purchase and place water fountains throughout the town. The justification for 
such an act remains a legally grey area and is subject to dispute, according to both civil and Sharia 
law. The interesting way  in which the waqfs organisation was able to overcome this obstacle shows 
us how little things have changed. It was mentioned previously that, under traditional laws, jurists 
issued fatwas based on individual cases. Moreover, many  of the hadith cited were fabricated in 
order to support the jurists’ claims. Likewise, in this example, the waqfs organisation, in order to 
sort out the issue of the Ab Anbars, took refuge in a concept known as Aqrab fi Aqhrab. This 
concept allows for the identification of a substitute that reflects, as much as possible, the original 
wishes of a waqf’s founder when the initial proscribed usage is no longer needed. Interestingly, in 
this case there were not any fatwas or concepts existing in the traditional setting. This means that 
the members of the waqfs organisation were unable to rely on civil law alone in order to make the 
waqfs productive; they needed traditional laws to support  their claims. Finally, in the absence of 
either, they found it necessary to adopt a pragmatic route and even to establish new concepts.
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Having said that, civil law has a few provisional cases and stipulations for considering cases in 
which the waqf’s mission is unclear or has become somewhat redundant.
According to Article 61 of Iranian civil law, the revenues of each waqf must  be spent exactly as 
stated in the Waqfnameh. However, there is a clause in the law that, in the event that the 
Waqfnameh no longer exists or is no longer legible, constitutes a set of directions concerning how 
the waqf should proceed. The law refers to three provisional cases dealing with such situations. The 
first is when there is no knowledge available as to whether the waqf was originally private or 
public. If this is the case, based on Article 91, the revenues generated by the waqf should be spent 
on charitable deeds. The problem with modern civil law is that it not only complicates the process 
but also fails to address whether the purpose that the initial founder had in mind is still of concern. 
Hence, the related resources may end up being invested in things that are no longer necessarily  of 
any great importance.
The second case concerns public waqfs. One example concerns a farm, the revenues of which were 
meant to support students, yet there are no details regarding eligibility; nonetheless, the revenues 
must be spent only  on students. If no beneficiary  is found in the Waqfnameh, then the revenues of 
the farm should finance charitable deeds (the waqfs organisation should take over in this case).
Finally, there is the case in which, for example, the founder converted several shops to support the 
maintenance of a bridge and the bridge no longer exists; here, the revenues should be spent on 
charitable deeds. The main point is that civil law has adopted a position based on the scattered 
nature of traditional law. In other words, modern law has not elucidated the logic and framework 
underlying traditional approaches; the reverse has been true. Even with all of the changes in the law, 
the nature of waqf laws has remained the same; the outcome is that this institution is economically 
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inefficient. The traditional laws related to waqfs made it  very easy  for a founder to establish one. 
However, they  are incredibly rigid once the endowment is established. All of the potential methods 
for revision that jurists have suggested are incredibly costly, both in terms of the economic value of 
the endowment and also with respect to the mission that the waqf allegedly is designated to support. 
For example, consider a shop that has been converted into a waqf in order to provide scholarships 
for the students of a designated school. At some point, the founder or his heir realises that their 
decision to convert their property into a waqf was perhaps not the best one. They may  desire to 
support the school in question, but no longer via the income generated by  the waqf shop. Traditional 
laws do not allow them to terminate their waqf, nor to change it into any  other form. Furthermore, 
they  gradually  realise that the shop is falling behind in terms of its economic performance relative 
to similar establishments. This is due to the rigidities imposed on the waqf’s mission (for example, 
if the shop were a green-grocer, it would be very  difficult to change it to something which might 
now be more profitable). Furthermore, inefficiencies may be the result of problems with the 
administration of the shop. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the waqf’s mutawalli may not be 
able to increase his workforce, or to deploy new methods of management or technologies that might 
help  him improve the endowment’s productivity. The pragmatic management and the potential 
methods whereby a mutawalli might effectively break the law have previously  been discussed; the 
only method that the law leaves him is to terminate the waqf. Regarding the conditions related to 
the termination of a waqf, it appears that, in the end, the founder or his heir receives the property. In 
the meantime, however, the waqf experienced an enormously lengthy period of decay without 
productivity. The piece of property  was stagnating and the beneficiary  was not receiving whatever 
had constituted the main purpose of the waqf. It is only after many years of deliberate neglect  that 
the waqf officially  becomes void; the process of rebuilding must begin “from scratch,” which 
means that many resources were wasted in the meantime. It  is apparent that modern laws do not 
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offer a practical alternative to the rigid traditional laws. In fact, in the case just  noted, the modern 
institution of the waqfs organisation eventually becomes exasperated with modern legislation and 
seeks an alternative to traditional laws.
The final section of this chapter explores some of the activities that those operating a waqf property 
can consider.
Renting out a waqf
Rented waqf properties have been encountered by most of the public in Iran. However, whether a 
waqf can be rented out or not has been the subject of much debate. Yet again, we have a situation in 
which, lacking a framework with some guidelines, the jurists consider an issue based on previous 
cases that often are incredibly  particular. For example, Allameh Helli argues that one of the duties 
of the mutawalli of a waqf is to rent out the waqf property. If the founder had already rented out the 
property, or set the terms and conditions for doing so, then said terms and conditions are set. 
Alternatively, should the founder not have set the terms and conditions, doing so becomes the duty 
of the mutawalli; in his absence, the beneficiaries must rent out the property.258 Shahid Sani argues 
that this is acceptable if, by renting out a waqf, the beneficiary actually receives the rent. Thus, if 
the beneficiary  dies, the rent contract is terminated. On the other hand, if the main purpose for 
renting a waqf is to finance another waqf, then that rent contract remains valid.259  Both Allameh 
Helli and Mohaqeq Helli argue that once the rent contract is signed, the mutawalli and the waqf’s 
beneficiary cannot alter or implement any changes to it.260  Such a restriction has resulted in many 
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waqf properties generating almost no income because they were unable to adjust their rents vis-à-
vis the rate of inflation over time.
Taking a rather more pragmatic approach, Ayatollah Khomeini argues that if a waqf is set in such a 
way that it generates revenue for rendering an activity, then, regardless of whether it is private or 
public, the waqf can be rented out. On the other hand, those waqfs that provide public goods, such 
as mosque buildings, or even a house, and which could be a private waqf for the founder’s children, 
may not be rented out.261 Khomeini continues that a founder can convert his already-rented property 
into a waqf. However, the rent (i.e., the revenues from the waqf) should go to the beneficiaries.262 
What becomes clear here is that jurists, in general, do not disagree in principle with the idea of 
renting out the waqf. The main problem concerns how the generated revenues are spent. Iran’s civil 
law does not provide any specific direction in this respect. However, the accepted method, 
according to the Awqaf Organisation, is that the rent generated by a waqf property  must be 
reinvested as much as possible into whatever purpose the founder had in mind. This has proven to 
be a fairly effective method and one that has enabled many properties to escape stagnation. 
However, it has also created space for opportunism and corruption.
Selling a waqf
The object of a waqf and its conditions have been discussed. Moreover, the specific case of the 
Astan-e Qods-e-Razavi, according to which the assets could be sold and reinvested into other 
enterprises, was highlighted. This section will explore the issue further, as well as consider whether 
a waqf can be sold and why this question is important.
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The common verdict among Imami Shi’ite jurists rules against the sale of a waqf. However, 
depending on the view as to whether or not a waqf is a perpetual establishment, different opinions 
have been offered. Those Ulama who argue for the perpetuity of a waqf, such as Sheikh Mofid, 
oppose the sale of a waqf under any circumstances (even if, as a consequence, the waqfed property 
should lose its economic value).263  On the other hand, some jurists argue that the sale of a waqf is 
legitimate, though only partially. For example, if the window shades in a waqfed property need to 
be replaced, the relevant parts can be sold and replaced by new ones. In other words, some 
components of a waqf can be sold, but not the establishment as a whole. 
This fatwa not only  illustrates how a waqf or one of its parts may be sold, it also reveals the degree 
to which the mutawalli is restricted. According to this fatwa, the mutawalli may not arrange 
anything unless the waqf remains exactly as it was initially represented. Some may argue that this 
fatwa preserves the tradition of the institution. Arguably, this is true, yet neither can any 
improvements of any form be introduced. Furthermore, if we place ourselves in the shoes of the 
mutawalli, who needs to see to the repair of the window shades in his waqf, we realise how difficult 
the process of making the necessary repairs is. He must either take recourse to a pragmatic approach 
and break some of the rules or simply ignore the needed repairs. In Iran, both outcomes can often be 
witnessed today with respect to waqfs.
Sheikh Tusi, among others, argues that a waqf may not be sold under any circumstance. Then, in a 
completely contradictory statement, he argues that, in the event that the founder becomes 
financially desperate, or the waqf property becomes unusable, the waqf’s beneficiaries can sell it.264 
Quite possibly, this fatwa has influenced generations of Ulama following Tusi, many of whom 
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argue that if a waqf property becomes unusable in a manner whereby the continued use of the 
property  renders it hazardous to its residents, it can be sold. Additionally, as Sani argues, should 
there be on-going disputes and disagreements between the mutawalli and the waqf’s beneficiaries, 
then the waqfed property can be sold.265
Allameh Helli disagrees strongly  with the sale of waqfs under any circumstance. However, he 
contradicts himself: on the one hand (in a very  similar case to that cited by Tusi), he argues that 
even if a wooden column in a mosque breaks, one may not sell the column in order to finance a new 
one. Moreover, according to Helli, the broken column should be relocated to somewhere else in the 
mosque. On the other hand, he argues that if the founder included in the Waqfnameh a clause stating 
that, in the event that he becomes poor he can sell the waqf, the waqf can be terminated and the 
property sold.266 
Ayatollah Najafi argues that should a waqfed property be destroyed in a manner whereby it can no 
longer carry out its mission, the property can be sold.267  Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini rules against 
any sale of waqf.268
It is evident that the issue of the selling of waqf properties is filled with disagreements and 
complexities related to traditional law. Iranian civil law does not allow a waqf to be mortgaged 
because of the fear that, if the borrower is unable to pay his dues the waqf property will be sold. 
This act at  once supports the perpetuity of the waqf and prevents the waqf property  from achieving 
its full potential economic value. According to civil law, a waqf may be sold if it meets a few 
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conditions. First, based on Article 88 of civil law, it may be sold if the waqf becomes unusable (i.e., 
due to broken furniture, broken walls, etc., that cannot be repaired). Alternatively, the damaged 
waqf may  prevent the greater endowment from generating adequate revenue. Moreover, in such 
cases, if there is no one to be found who is able to take responsibility  for repairing the waqf, then 
the property  can be sold (meaning also that there is an incentive not to repair the property). Finally, 
based on Article 89, if by selling a portion of a waqf one is able to repair or restore the damaged 
parts, those parts can be sold.269  The second condition is stated in Article 349 of civil law, which 
stipulates another condition whereby, if there is an on-going disagreement between the mutawalli 
and the beneficiary that is causing the waqf’s destruction, the waqf can be sold.270  Modern laws 
provide a bit of structure, and they  rationalise, to a degree, traditional laws regarding the sale of a 
waqf. However, given the scale of waqf properties in Iran, and their economic importance, the 
extent of change has been very modest.
The extinction of a waqf
The first of this set concerns how (if at all) a waqf can be terminated. As has been mentioned on 
multiple occasions, a waqf is intended as a perpetual endowment. Nevertheless, jurists have 
imagined several situations that might result in a waqf’s termination. There are five major reasons 
why a waqf may come to an end. The first occurs when the goods of the waqf perish; that  is, the 
goods have been destroyed or damaged to the extent that they can no longer be used or exploited in 
the way envisioned by the founder. The general verdict  among the Ulama is that the waqf becomes 
extinct and the remains of the goods revert to the founder or his heirs. Some jurists assert, however, 
that no possibility of alternative use or exploitation must be left unexplored prior to a waqf’s 
termination, and they explore this possibility  to great lengths. In principle, waqfs consisting of land 
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cannot be extinguished. It is also evident that this has proved to be a very effective way for the 
founder or his heir to try  to terminate a waqf property—in other words, to release their property 
from the institution of waqf. There are a few major problems with this. The first is that either the 
waqf does not provide the service for which it was intended, or the delivery  of those services is 
hugely  compromised. The second problem is that, generally speaking, it takes a very long time for a 
property  to degrade to a state that is considered beyond repair. In the process, not  only will the 
beneficiaries not receive any benefits, the property will also stagnate. Finally, a street on which 
there are a few waqf stores could be considered. They may all at one point  become vacant and be 
abandoned. The resultant neglect, as well as the complexities involved in dealing with the 
properties, may cause the entire neighbourhood to suffer both commercially  and in terms of real 
estate values. Who wants to open a nice store or go shopping where there are ruins in the middle of 
the street?271
The second possibility is that a waqf might be declared null and void by the religious magistrate or 
the ruler if the conditions of validity are satisfied, or if the founder has introduced stipulations 
contrary to the essence of the notion of waqf. The third reason, which is merely theoretical, occurs 
when the founder apostatises from Islam, as a consequence of which his established waqf becomes 
null and void. The fourth reason applies to a waqf established in favour of a limited number of 
beneficiaries for the duration of their lifetimes or for a specified period; it  becomes extinct when the 
last of the beneficiaries dies or when the specified period expires. The waqf property  then returns to 
the founder or his heirs. As was discussed earlier, a waqf’s deed cannot include conditions that 
could subsequently void the waqf. 
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271  For example, the downtown area of the town Lasht-e Nesha in northern Iran contains several 
waqf properties. The majority of these properties were neglected. The problem became so severe 
that, ultimately, the town had to be relocated to what used to be considered its suburbs. New high 
streets and a town centre were built. The old town is now effectively a semi-ghost town.
The five cases presented above are more or less hypothetical. In reality, cases are presented to the 
jurists for their verdict. For example, a very common case is that  which determines the fates of 
waqfs responsible for the activities of a mosque that no longer exists. The common verdict among 
the Imami Ulama is that it  is best that the revenues of those waqfs are directed to the poor.272 
Ayatollah Khomeini, on the other hand, disagrees with this verdict and argues that, in this case, the 
waqfs’ revenues should fund similar activities as per the initial waqf.273
Dividing a waqf
Whether a waqf can be divided has been a matter of dispute among jurists. Allameh Helli argues 
against dividing a waqf.274  On the other hand, Ayatollah Khomeini argues that if the waqf property 
is shared among a few people, the waqf can be divided. For example, if a house belongs to two 
brothers, and each brother has converted his share independently into a private waqf, and one of 
them appointed his children to be the beneficiaries and the other establishes that the revenues from 
the rent of his share should support  a mosque’s activities, then the waqf can be divided in order to 
avoid confusion.275 In one case for which modern laws rationalised things, Article 559 of civil law 
was cited; it states that a waqf can be divided if the property is shared between a waqf and a private 
property.276  Article 597 of civil law states that the beneficiaries may not divide a waqf between 
them, regardless of whether the waqf is private or public. It seems that, in Iran, it is only the waqfs 
organisation that has the power to divide a waqf.
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Resurrection of old and ancient waqfs
The most striking development in waqf laws in recent years was inspired by a fatwa by Ayatollah 
Khomeini. On 14 September 1984, the Council of Guardians passed a bill whereby waqf properties 
that had been sold without the exceptions mentioned in previous sections (or without the permission 
of a religious magistrate) must be converted back into waqfs, and their ownership documents were 
deemed no longer valid.277  This law is important  because it potentially violates property ownership 
rights. As discussed earlier, one of the major reasons that people have converted their properties 
into waqfs throughout history was due to a lack of security regarding their private property. What is 
evident is that the lack of security  over private property is still one of the most important issues 
confronting the Iranian economy. Based on this law, one’s property rights can be made void if it  is 
discovered that  a property  had been converted into a waqf at some point in the past. The most 
striking aspect of this law is that it does not have a time limit. In other words, the law does not 
define how far back one must  go in order to prove whether a piece of property had once been 
designated as a waqf.
Case study: Rab-i-Rashidi
According to this example, an ancient waqf that was completely terminated more than 700 years 
ago can be resurrected according to the modern laws of waqf.
Rab-i-Rashidi was an academic centre in waqf form, established by Rashid-al-Din Fazlolah-e 
Hamadani, the minister of Ghazan Khan, during the Ilkhanid dynasty in 13th-century Iran, in the 
city of Tabriz. The compound comprised 30,000 houses, which were divided into residential 
facilities for teachers, staff and the students, educational centres, libraries, labs, factories and the 
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like. The activities of this massive centre were supported through numerous waqfs that were spread 
throughout Iran and beyond, some even in modern-day  Lebanon and Egypt. The founder of the 
waqf, Rashid-al-Din Fazlolah, was killed not long after he established the centre, and the compound 
was plundered several times and neglected—today, few remains of the buildings are intact. 
However, the waqf deed for this monumental compound has survived the test of the time, and the 
original copy is kept in a museum; around 1000 copies of it have been produced.278
The manuscript of this waqf is very accurate and well written, which makes identifying the exact 
whereabouts of the compound itself, as well as the waqfs rendering its activities, easy. 
Consequently, the Awqaf Organisation has thus far identified around 5000 pieces of property 
throughout Iran that formerly belonged to Rabi-i-Rashidi. Furthermore, the actual location of the 
compound, which has been identified as being around the city  of Tabriz, is to be resurrected as a 
university according to the wishes of Rashid al-Din Fazlollah. As a result of the new legislations, 
those identified properties that once were part of the Rashidi’s waqf must  revert  back to the waqf 
form. This process has created a number of problems. On the one hand, many individuals have had 
their property rights violated. Those properties that have been identified as being either part of the 
compound—or, alternatively, converted into waqf form in order to render the original activities of 
the compound—will now, according to modern legislation, revert back to their original form, and 
their owners will lose their ownership rights. Alternatively (as is most often the case), in some cases 
a property  is identified as a waqf and the Awqaf Organisation allows the owner to retain his or her 
possession on the condition that he or she pay rent to the Awqafs Organisation. Because of the risks 
of dealing with waqfed properties in Iran, this arrangement will affect future sales of the property 
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by reducing its market  value. On the other hand, some may argue that the “resurrection” of Rab-i-
Rashidi after seven centuries was a great contribution to Iranian culture, encouraging philanthropic 
activities, which in turn helps one’s name live on long after him.
Case study: Saheb Divani Waqf in Varamin
The Saheb Divani Waqf, one of the largest waqf complexes in Iran, has been used a case study in 
this thesis. Those important details that support  the arguments in this thesis have been extracted and 
translated from Persian to English. Many of the arguments that have been brought forward from the 
legal point of view throughout this thesis can be proven by studying these waqfs:  the primary 
reasons for converting large-scale assets into waqf; the minuscule mission of waqf versus the 
enormous scale of the assets which have been designated for this task; and the administration and 
development of the waqf in modern times.
This waqf was established in 1840 by Haj Alireza, the father of Ebrahim Khan Kalantar.279  The 
waqf comprises properties, villages, and five Qanats (traditional Iranian networks of wells for 
irrigation purposes) located south of Tehran. The main purpose of the endowment is to provide 
candles for a few religious ceremonies; the founder provided detailed instructions in the 
Waqfnameh. What is striking about this waqf is its sheer size—about 8000 square miles—and its 
prime location in the south of Tehran. What is interesting is that the output is only  about twenty 
candles per year! 
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279 Hajji Ebrahim Khan had been chancellor for Zand and Qajar rulers for some fifteen years. He 
played a very instrumental role in positioning three consecutive kings to achieve power: Lotf Ali 
khan Zand, Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar and, finally, Fath Ali Shah. His legs and hands were 
amputated and he was boiled alive. His sons were either killed or castrated in order to ensure that 
his lineage did not survive him.
Mr. Sahib Divani, the current mutawalli of the waqf and a direct descendant of the founder, told us 
that, officially, he is still the administrator of the waqf. However, due to the fact that he is in charge 
of two other major waqfs (one of which will be considered next), he has not had the manpower or 
the time to look after this endowment. There is no mention in the Waqfnameh that the mutawalli 
can hire help and pay from the proceeds of the waqf; he cannot afford to do so from his own pocket. 
Moreover, because those areas south of Tehran are no longer used as agricultural land and are much 
more suited for development plans, their endowments have been stagnating for decades. The 
farmers have migrated to the cities and have established new careers, and the farms have been 
abandoned completely. The land, on the other hand, has huge potential for development. However, 
based on the current laws of waqf, converting such land into something different—for example, an 
industrial tow, which would be economically a wise thing to do—proves to be very  difficult. The 
primary reason is that the current law only allows a waqf to change or update its mission—say, 
from using land for agriculture to an industrial estate—if the mutawalli can produce a complete 
economic analysis including planning permissions, business plans, etc. Such tasks are very capital-
intensive and there is no guarantee that they  will be approved. Therefore, in the majority  of cases, 
the mutawallis do not take on this task.
Case study: Saheb Divani Waqf in Fars Province
One of the largest in Iran, this waqf was established in the late 17th century; additional properties 
were added to the endowment in the 19th century. It comprises more than 50 villages, numerous 
farms, orchards, Qanats, wells, mills, etc. The waqf is still administered by  a direct descendant of 
the founder and has an incredibly  long and detailed Waqfnameh. What is striking about this waqf is 
its sheer scale: at 168,000 hectares, it is larger than the Kingdom of Fife in Scotland and home to 
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nearly 150,000 people, mainly in farming communities. The purpose of this massive endowment is 
feeding the congregations at certain times of the year—during the month of Moharram, for example
—a few other religious activities, and also to pay for the maintenance of several Hoseinieh. The 
problem here is that, from the perspective of economic performance, there are too many  assets 
invested for such little return. The mutawalli of the waqf informed me that the entire endowment 
has been creating losses as far as he could remember, such that even those activities that were 
designated in the Waqfnameh never had been supported fully. He stated that the situation was due to 
the very tight waqf laws. As was the case for the first  waqf, he cannot hire employees and pay them 
from the proceeds of the endowment because this possibility  was not mentioned in the Waqfnameh; 
therefore, his days are filled with small tasks, leaving him no time to focus on the development of 
the endowment. He also informed us that he has had many offers and much interest from property 
developers for many different projects, but that once they learn that the property is a waqf they 
consider it too risky an investment.
Concluding remarks
This chapter looked at the administration of a waqf and a series of economic activities in which 
waqfed properties might engage, such as renting, selling, the termination of the waqf, and so forth. 
The first half of the chapter considered the role of the mutawalli, his duties, and the challenges with 
which he might grapple. Most texts refer to the mutawalli as the manager or trustee280  of a waqf. 
The initial finding was that although on the surface a mutawalli has many of the same duties and 
responsibilities as a manager or trustee, because of the severe lack of decision-making power 
imposed on him by  the waqf laws he might better be considered simply an economic agent who 
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280 Appendix III of this thesis contains a historical study comparing the roles and duties of the 
mutawalli with those of the trustee of an English Trust.
happens to administer the affairs of the waqf. However, in practice these restrictions have not 
prevented mutawallis from carrying out their duties but have forced them to adopt a very pragmatic 
approach in running the waqf’s day-to-day affairs. While related actions may work as a short-term 
remedy, however, in the long run they contribute to the corruption of the system and the weakening 
of civil society with respect to the broader economy.
The second part  of the chapter looked at the long-term impact of maintaining the concepts of the 
perpetuity, inalienability and irrevocability  of a waqf. These concepts, derived from the traditional 
laws set by  various Islamic jurists, and which have entered into civil law, were generated during the 
pre-industrial age and have remained more or less unchanged over time; eventually, they were 
codified into the civil law of Iran. The goal was to demonstrate how much trouble waqfs’ lack of 
corporate status, along with their ambiguous ownership status, has been for administering 
endowments. Practices such as a appointing a new mutawalli, increasing his salary to match the rate 
of inflation, or making him redundant are all incredibly challenging and difficult. These are issues 
that a corporation deals with on a day-to-day basis but  which become huge legal challenges for a 
waqf. More importantly, jurists, for a variety  of reasons, enforced a very rigid structure on the 
manner of a waqf’s rules, instructing each mutawalli to follow the directions of the waqf’s founder 
to the letter or to uphold the waqf’s exact mission, which may have become completely  irrelevant 
through the passage of time. These factors, which have contributed to the inefficiency and 
inadequacy  (in some aspects) of the running of waqfs, and which also have locked up vast 
resources, have caused economic stagnation.
The third and final section of the chapter looked at several economic activities in which a waqf may 
engage. These activities ranged from renting out the waqf, its sale, its termination and even its 
resurrection (in the case of an abolished waqf). As might be expected, nothing is straightforward 
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and easy when it comes to a waqf. In principle, everything is very difficult and may even look 
impossible to achieve; however, in practice, there is almost always a way (a jurist’s verdict, or an 
alternative view or understanding) to achieve the desired end. In other words, aside from renting out 
a waqf, selling it, dividing it or terminating it, almost anything can be done, although it usually  ends 
up being a very difficult and complicated task. Perhaps the most revenue generated by all of the 
waqfs in Iran is derived from renting out their properties. Essentially, the mutawalli of a waqf rents 
out the property  and uses the rent as a means to fulfil the founder’s wishes, whether it be feeding 
the poor or contributing to the repair of a mosque, etc. However, problems with this process remain, 
the main one being the question of whether the amount of rent is stated in the waqf’s deed; if so, it 
becomes very difficult to increase the rent with the passing of time. Hence, the tenants of these 
properties enjoy a lower rate of rent that they would if they were renting property that was not 
waqfed. 
Furthermore, as a result of new legislation, properties may be built on waqfed land and leased over 
the long term. Nonetheless, again, such properties have lower sales values because of the 
complications potentially caused by the waqf laws. Finally, one of the most  recent developments 
related to waqf laws in Iran was discussed: if it  becomes clear that if at any point in time a property 
had been a waqf, and for whatever reason it  was converted back into a normal property, that 
conversion has been deemed unlawful and the property is reverted back to a waqf. There is no cut-
off date for this law. Therefore, as was shown, waqfs like Rab-i-Rashidi, established nearly 800 
years ago and terminated soon after, have been resurrected. The problem does not so much concern 
the few terminated waqfs that  carry significant cultural or historical importance but rather the 
degree of uncertainty that such a law imposes on private properties in Iran. Anyone could 
potentially lose (at least partially) his or her property  rights if it is discovered that there had once 
been a waqf on the property. This law greatly enhances the power of the Awqaf Organisation in a 
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very practical way throughout Iran. Waqf properties allegedly constitute the largest share of land in 
the country, and this new legislation increases the scale of waqf significantly. The Awqaf 
Organisation is directly under the auspices of the Supreme Leader, and none of the waqfs’ accounts 
are transparent or open to the public. It thus can be concluded that Iran’s Supreme Leader is, in 
effect, the largest landowner in the country, which naturally enhances his political power.
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Conclusion
There have been few studies of Iran’s waqfs in general, let alone concerning the institution’s legal 
and socioeconomic importance in particular, which has been the main focus of this thesis. As such, 
this study  contributes to the socioeconomic history of Iran. First, it  sheds light on the 
inconsistencies and shortcomings of the modern laws of waqf and on the importance of the 
institution as one of the main and key holders of important assets, from early medieval to modern 
times. The waqf system may  have lost its appeal and position as the sole provider of public goods in 
the country and as a philanthropic institution, but it still enjoys a greater share of wealth and assets 
than any other corporation in Iran—and continues to grow. The hypothesis of this study is that the 
modernisation of the laws of waqf that has taken place in the 20th century has been insufficient and 
remains incomplete. The result often has been stagnation in the development of the waqf system.
Contrary  to most other Islamic countries, where waqf laws were thoroughly modernised and 
updated to meet modern legal standards during the early 20th century, in Iran the waqf laws merely 
have been codified from their traditional versions into Iran’s civil law. This has resulted in a legal 
system that  is fragmented, confusing and subjective; the vast majority of the country’s assets being 
unable to be exploited to their full potential; and scarce resources. In order to prove this point, a 
substantial amount of material has been utilised, mainly  from primary sources. This is the second 
most important contribution of this thesis. Most of the documents used in this study were identified, 
selected and brought back from Iran and were then translated into English and categorised into 
sections in order to support the thesis’ arguments. These materials could also be used as sources for 
research conducted in other fields of study that involve Iran’s waqfs or the Imami school of law.
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This thesis aimed to examine issues related to the institution of waqf in modern Iran from a legal 
and socioeconomic point of view. Most Iranians have heard of the term waqf, have possibly passed 
by places designated as waqfs, or have purchased or rented properties that later turned out to have 
been designated as waqfs. However, very  few people can claim that they  receive benefits from 
waqfs, or that  they  realise that this institution potentially  encompasses the greatest share of Iran’s 
land and properties. Moreover, it is not simply that the majority of the public does not know what 
exactly  the purpose of this institution is; very few official statistics are available in this respect, 
also. Finally, the head of the Awqaf Organisation in Iran is appointed directly  by the Supreme 
Leader; likewise, the mutawallis of Iran’s largest waqf complexes, such as Astan-e Qods Razavi, 
Haram-e Hazrat-e-Masoumeh and Shah Abdol Azim, are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader 
and are unaccountable to any organisation (meaning also that they are exempt from tax audits, 
among other things).
The institution of waqf in modern Iran can be described as simultaneously present and invisible. It 
is present in that it  exists and encompasses a vast amount of properties. At the same time, it is 
invisible because, except with respect to certain occasional religious functions, it  is rare that public 
goods are delivered through waqfs, which was initially the very purpose of the institution. 
Additionally, the majority  of waqfed institutions for which financial records are available have 
produced a loss or, in the best-case scenarios, broken even. One example, used in this study, is the 
waqfs of Sahibdivani, which collectively  are even larger than the county of Fife in Scotland (where 
the town of St. Andrews is located) and the aim of which was, at the time of its establishment in the 
19th century, to feed certain people during particular religious ceremonies and to pay the 
maintenance fees of a small mosque. Essentially, the main obvious issue with respect to existing 
waqfs is that there is no meaningful correlation between the input they require and the output they 
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produce. Furthermore, the laws have made it incredibly difficult and costly  for the massive 
endowment to be economically efficient and developed.
Throughout this thesis—and through an examination of most, if not all, legal aspects of waqf laws 
in Iran—it became clear that  Iranian waqfs are not productive, and that the laws are one of the main 
reasons for this; in effect, they are causing an incredible trove of assets to stagnate economically, 
something that has both economic and social consequences for the country. This leads us to the 
second question: if the laws of waqf are preventing this large-scale institution from flourishing, 
what has been done to address this problem?
As was mentioned earlier, in modern Iran the institution of the waqf is not very transparent, nor do 
many people associate it with the supply  of public goods. These two factors have contributed to 
waqfs receiving little public recognition. Hence, there has not been much discussion of the 
institution, or many  (if any) studies undertaken concerning the socioeconomic impact of waqfs in 
Iran. Furthermore, as far as the legal structure of the institution is concerned, the general 
assumption and belief is that although it is mainly perceived as a religious institution, it should have 
been modernised during the 20th century in much the same way as other traditional institutions 
were.
This thesis argues that waqfs still have huge socioeconomic importance. The fact that they do not 
provide much in the way  of public goods, as was initially  intended, and still hold significant assets 
means that these otherwise valuable assets are now effectively  useless and stagnating. By  locking 
resources into dysfunctional waqfs, the country effectively becomes resource-poor; this affects its 
ability to establish enterprises and promote meaningful economic growth. 
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After establishing the importance of waqfs, what has been done to the institution from a legal point 
of view was determined. After all, as far as the law is concerned the general perception is that it has 
been modernised. In line with that, the laws of waqf should be rational, coherent, follow a logical 
structure, and should not operate on an entirely case-by-case basis. The chapters of this thesis have 
been organised so as to tackle the above question. They  begin by giving a background as to why, 
historically, waqfs were established and what the main socioeconomic and political reasons behind 
them were. 
The task of analysing the laws of waqf and investigating whether or not  they have been sufficiently 
modernised or rationalised requires that we first understand the function of the law. This may seem 
obvious, but in the case of waqfs, given that it is an ancient institution, many  of the related laws and 
legal parameters may appear odd or strange. Therefore, it is necessary first to explain how and why 
these laws and the institution as a whole came about. Consideration of some of the characteristics of 
Islamic law, along with a consideration of the history of waqfs, should provide a few ideas 
regarding the establishment of waqfs and support for the institution in general, which is heavily 
anchored in Sharia law. In other words, Sharia law helped create this institution as a response to 
some of its own shortcomings, particularly those related to the economy.
Some of the main characteristics of Islamic law that have contributed to finding a remedial solution 
are as follows: first, traditional Islamic law, even as represented by its most modern and liberal 
interpretations, does not honour private property and has never recognised it  as a natural right. 
Islamic law (or its interpretations) prohibit the lending of money—and thus, effectively, financing. 
Furthermore, the Islamic law of inheritance does not allow one to have testimonial rights beyond 
one third of one’s wealth; likewise, it does not recognise corporations.
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The peculiar nature of Islamic law, combined with Iran’s turbulent political history  (as with many 
Islamic countries in the region), paved the way  for Islamic jurists to stand by the institution of waqf, 
which may not even exist now in its original form, from the time of Prophet. The jurists essentially 
created a system within a system. In other words, the institution of waqf came about and grew as a 
legitimate escape route from traditional Islamic laws. By converting assets into a waqf, one could 
gain a fair degree of protection over one’s private property and testimonial powers beyond one third 
of one’s assets, while gaining social status and even the ability to influence politics.
These same reasons, which legitimised waqfs, also contributed to its pervasiveness, something still 
evident today. After Iran’s disputed presidential elections of 2009, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and 
his allies came under significant political and economic pressure. The Islamic Azad University, 
which is directly  run by and associated with him, and which has an estimated 1.5 million students 
and generates over $20 billion in revenue annually, now faces an uncertain future and even possible 
confiscation. As a result, it  was proposed that its assets be converted into a waqf, something that 
became headline news and generated many highly political and even legal debates in Iran.281 
Additionally, there have been sporadic events involving waqfs being used to support political 
causes. The most notorious example concerns a very modest elderly  woman who converted into a 
waqf her only possessional wealth, a tiny  flat in the city  of Qom, and designated the generated 
revenues to support the research and development of Iran’s nuclear programme.282
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281 www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2010/10/101011_103_azad_khamenei.shtml; ww.bbc.co.uk/persian/
iran/2010/09/100929_107_iran89_larijani_azad_university.shtml; www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/
2010/06/100601_139_azaduniversity_background.shtml; www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/
2010/09/100923_138_iran_azad_uni_hashemi_rafsanjani.shtml.
282  Waqf-Mirath e-Javidan, vol. 15, no. 4, Tehran: The Awqaf and Charity  Organisation of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 2009.
The aim of the second chapter was to introduce the main players of a waqf and to evaluate their 
strengths and weaknesses from a legal point of view. One of the difficulties of explaining the laws 
of waqf is that there are concepts and principles that influence the endowment in the long run; in the 
interest of keeping these concepts intact, they  end up influencing everything, including the main 
players. Every waqf needs to have a founder, a beneficiary  or beneficiaries, and a waqf object. 
There is also the overall concept of the endowment’s perpetuity, which needs to remain consistent. 
In other words, the main players of a waqf should be identified in such a way that none of them are 
ever terminated, go missing, etc., such that the waqf would become void. Furthermore, because 
waqfs have been used frequently as tools for sheltering wealth, traditional jurists have set many 
conditions in an effort to prevent this situation. However, because sheltering wealth (possibly  from 
outright confiscation by  invaders) was frequently practiced, jurists also tried to make the regulations 
as loose and inclusive as possible.
The major finding in this chapter, which carries over into the rest  of the thesis, is that legislators, 
when codifying the traditional laws of waqf, began with the details and worked their way up  from 
there. The problem with this is that, with respect to individual cases, the laws ended up being more 
or less identical to their traditional versions; at the same time, when the institution as a whole came 
under consideration, the legislators tried to make waqfs more or less like corporations, which 
resulted in a great deal of inconsistency  in the laws. For example, in Iran’s modern civil law it is 
never stipulated that  the founder of a waqf can be more than one person, or, more importantly, a 
corporation. With respect to individual cases, the law resembles its traditional form, whereby  the 
founder must be one specific individual. On the other hand, when it comes to the institution of waqf 
as a whole, the laws give waqf (traditionally an incorporated institution) corporate status. Now, this 
is the only kind of a corporation that can be established by only  one specific person as opposed to a 
group of investors, organisations, multi-nationals, etc. The same is true concerning the object of a 
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waqf: the waqf is bound to its object. For example, if someone converts a building into a school, the 
school is what constitutes the waqf. Therefore, if for any reason the object ceases to exist—say, the 
building in question collapses—then the waqf is terminated. In the case of the school, this limits its 
operational flexibility; a waqfed school may not expand in size or change its location, because this 
would violate the principle of the waqf’s perpetuity. The law provides all of the details and specifics 
as to what traditionally  can be converted into a waqf, without taking into account the fact that  a 
modern-day corporation should have absolute control over its assets. I hope that this aspect of the 
thesis will inspire future research on other laws in Iran, laws that are generally presented as being 
coherent and modern, with the objective of establishing to what degree these claims are true.
The first part of the thesis looked at the main reasons and contributing factors which have 
historically resulted in the establishment of waqfs. These ranged from socioeconomic reasons to 
demonstrations of piety and political motives. It  was also noted that, based on official reports, the 
majority  of waqfs in Iran provide next to nothing. Therefore, they are unable to produce the public 
goods for which they were established, as the waqf only is productive if one breaks even; the profits 
render its mission.. It  is also common knowledge in Iran that waqfed properties are easily exploited. 
In other words, waqfed properties have found themselves defenceless against violations. 
Theoretically speaking, a property can best be protected once ownership is clearly established, as it 
can thus be formally registered; in the event of disputes or violations, the state can then interfere 
and sort out whatever problems exist.
The case of ownership of a waqf is perhaps the most challenging topic that jurists have had to 
address. Jurists have long grappled with the issue of waqf ownership. They  disagree as to whether 
or not a waqf should be considered a contract, and, if so, what kind of contract; based on the 
response to these questions, a whole new set of arguments follows. The main issue with traditional 
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laws is that there is no concept of corporation. In other words, for jurists, the concept that a waqf 
should own its own properties and govern itself is completely alien. Jurists have continued 
attempting to identify  the person who owns the waqf, in spite of the fact  that, inevitably, this 
becomes impossible. Unfortunately, Iran’s civil law does not provide a clear verdict on this matter. 
The fact that  there are so many properties in the country  that are locked into this institution, as the 
matter of ownership remains unclear—thus leaving the respective properties vulnerable to 
opportunists—is alarming.
The laws of waqf in their traditional form lack the fundamental concept of a corporation. Hence, 
principles such as perpetuity, inalienability  and irrevocability were assigned to waqfs, mainly so as 
to prevent the mutawalli of a waqf from embezzling money or committing other kinds of 
wrongdoing. Much has been written regarding the immediate and broader impact of such concepts 
on the productivity  and efficiency of waqfs. In a sense, by  virtue of observing such restrictions the 
mutawalli is reduced to the role of executer of the founder’s wishes, rather than manager of the 
endowment, in spite of the fact that his assigned duties are generally  to contribute to the 
development of the endowment and the exploitation of its potential.
It can be argued that traditional laws put the mutawalli in a position whereby he does not have a 
binding contract  vis-à-vis the endowment (inasmuch as a waqf is not a corporation) and thus he 
must follow the wishes of the founder to the letter, so long as it is his responsibility  to develop the 
waqf. Moreover, the less concrete a waqf’s status is regarding its ownership, the easier it is for an 
opportunist to exploit it. This has resulted in mutawallis being easily corrupted; for instance, they 
may become tempted to embezzle money from the endowment. Mutawallis may also become 
corrupt simply because they have no alternative but to adopt a pragmatic approach to dealing with 
problems, such that they  are forced to ignore the rules in order to accomplish their work. Given the 
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pervasiveness of waqfs and the number of mutawallis involved, it is not difficult to understand why 
respect for the law has never been significantly important over the course of Iranian history.283
Ultimately, the main question is this: how have Iran’s modern laws responded to the shortcomings 
of traditional laws related to the position of the mutawalli? It has thus far been established that 
modern laws did not, in fact, manage to fix the problem of ownership with respect to waqfs and, 
indeed, have also produced many  contradictions by giving waqfs corporate status while at the same 
time omitting much of the prerogative embedded in the nature of corporations. The traditional 
concepts of perpetuity, inalienability and irrevocability; the requirement that the mutawalli obey the 
founder’s orders to the letter; and the idea that the founder of a waqf should be a single individual 
are only  a few examples of carry-overs from traditional law contradicting a modern understanding 
of corporations. Additionally, the law has not  managed to take drastic measures to sort out  those 
laws related to the mutawalli. Therefore, the role of the mutawalli has become an incredibly 
peculiar one within the context of Iran’s modern laws. On the one hand, he is considered the 
administrator of a corporation, much like any other administrator; on the other hand, he does not 
have even half of the decision-making powers of his counterparts.
There are no official statistics concerning the true scale of waqf in Iran; however, during the land 
reforms of 1962, 25% of the country’s land was reported to be under the waqf’s lock.284  At the time 
of writing, the official statistics from the Awqaf Organisation of Iran found that the entire revenue 
of waqfs in Iran for the year 2000 was about 25 million dollars. The same report also noted that 
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283 Rouh-al-Amin (1998, pp. 72–3).  Stories and poems from Golestan of Saadi and Divan-e Hafiz 
speak of the theft of waqfed properties 
284 Arasteh (1970, p. 121). This is a very conservative estimate and the actual figure must be far 
larger.
about 51,000 square miles were created as new, resurrected waqfs.285  Furthermore, the world’s 
largest waqf complex, Astan-e-Qods-e Razavi—which allegedly has accumulated properties 
collectively larger than Germany, with an estimated value of 15 billion dollars—recently  announced 
with pride that it has a workforce comprising 20,000 people.286 These figures beg the question: why 
would one add to the size of an institution that has at least one quarter of the country’s land and has 
such a poor economic turnover?
As Acemoglu argues, the prosperity and poverty of nations lie heavily on their politics,, particularly 
those policies which involve institutions that provide incentives for innovation, investment or level 
playing fields. The majority  of institutions throughout history have been extracting institutions. 
These institutions generally  have been designed by a few members of the elite in society, who 
extract resources from the rest of the society. Furthermore, these extracting institutions do not 
generally  encourage innovation or investment, and they  certainly do not provide a level playing 
field for people to use their talents.287
The answer to the expansion of waqfs in Iran, perhaps, lies in politics. Historically, Iranian kings 
would establish waqfs in support of pilgrims going to Iraq in order that the preacher there might 
preach in the king’s favour and maintain his popularity among the masses. In the 20th century, the 
head of the Awqaf Organisation, which effectively has ultimate power and control over the waqf 
system, is directly appointed by the Shah and now by the Supreme Leader. This effectively gives 
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20–65). 
286 Mo’men (1969); Atarodi (2002). There is no official record of how much money this institution 
actually generates, and that is why the employment record was taken into account. The same is true 
regarding the actual extent of the endowments.
287 Acemoglu, Robinson (2012).
the leadership of the country ultimate control over the largest  share of properties in the country. The 
expansion of this institution only increases the power of leadership. 
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Appendix I
This is a summary  translation and an extraction of two lengthy Waqfnamehs (the manuscripts are 
attached), with some of the analysis of the waqf deed for Sahib Divan’s family’s two waqf 
complexes.
This can also be used as a case study, which incorporates almost everything discussed throughout 
the thesis.  The images are photographs of photocopies made in 2010 of the original Waqfnamehs in 
scroll format.  The original scrolls are privately  held by  the Sahib Divan family  in Shiraz, Iran. 
Following the images are translations by the author and analyses of the two Waqfnamehs.
1.Waqfnameh of a waqf in Varamin, single-sided, dated 1840, Tehran on right (more images of the 
scroll follow)
The 1840 waqf in Varamin
This is a waqf that was established by the son of Ebrahim Khan Kalantar in 1840. The mutawalli of 
this waqf is Parvis Sahebdivani, who is a descendant of the founder. An original copy of the 
Waqfnameh was produced for me, which can be found in the appendices.
The first step  is to review the entire Waqfnameh and identify all of the main players as well as the 
usage of the endowment. Additionally, the current state of this endowment was explored.
The founder comes from a wealthy family, one that has had many  endowments. Therefore, there is 
no evidence in the Waqfnameh of common errors such as are generally committed by a new 
founder. The aim is to address a few questions based on the Waqfnameh and my  meeting with the 
current mutawalli of the waqf.
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The first question is, what are the most likely reasons that motivated the founder to establish this 
waqf? Second, how efficient has the waqf been in fulfilling its intended purpose? Finally, what is 
the current state of the waqf?  
The founder
The waqf was established around 1840 by Haj Alireza, the father of Ebrahim Khan Kalantar.288 The 
Waqfnameh does not begin by indicating the full title of the founder; it is only  later, when the object 
of the waqf is described, that the founder is formally indicated, with his full title.
The act of founding the waqf
The first section of the Waqfnameh begins with a few verses from the Qur’an and the customary 
praise of those who are charitable and wish to leave a name for themselves long after they are gone. 
The document is decorated with many  signatures and stamps from a variety of witnesses and other 
sources, ratifying the authenticity of the document. The Waqfnameh begins, in fact, by stating that 
the waqf is correct and fully complies with Sharia law. 
The object of the waqf
This introduction is followed by a description of the waqfed objects (Raqabeh), which in this case 
are a number of properties, villages and five Qanats (traditional Iranian networks of wells for 
irrigation purposes). However, only one third (do dong) of these properties have been converted 
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288 Hajji Ebrahim Khan had been chancellor for Zand and Qajar rulers for some fifteen years. He 
played a very instrumental role in positioning three consecutive kings to achieve power: Lotf Ali 
khan Zand, Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar and, finally, Fath Ali Shah. His legs and hands were 
amputated and he was boiled alive. His sons were either killed or castrated, to ensure that his 
lineage did not survive him. 
into two waqfs—and these not in their entirety. The location of all of these properties has been 
identified as Varamin, which is located in the south of Tehran. The waqf’s deed continues by 
providing more information about and details regarding the designated waqf properties. The first 
part of the description indicates the names of the Qanats and notes that one of them is out of order. 
This is followed by information about some of the specific parts of this Vasat waqf. Identified 
specifically are an orchard, a castle with all its houses, and stables with the equipment that is kept 
there.
 
Statement of usage
The instructions for the use of the revenue generated by these objects begin with consideration of 
the orchards, the castle, and its belongings. The founder indicates his desire that the revenue (of one 
third of the endowments all together) be spent on providing light for the masses (Rowzeh) in 
honour of the Shi’ite imams. Moreover, the founder goes into great detail identifying how the 
lighting for these ceremonies should be carried out. The deed lists the relevant ceremonies in the 
order of their importance. The first  is the Rowzeh of the first Imam, Ali; this is followed by 
memorial ceremonies in honour of other Imams, including Imam Hossein, his uncle Abbas, Imam 
Javad, Imam Asgari, and, finally, the twelfth Imam.
In the next section, a statement regarding use finally appears. After a confirmation that this waqf 
fully  complies with the legalities of waqf, the statement of usage is presented. Any profit remaining 
after the waqf breaks even (this is, of course, referring to the one third of the properties that were 
converted), and after the costs of repairs and maintenance as well as the king’s taxes have been 
deducted (the tax for the entire estate is also noted here, which is paid partially in crops and 
partially in cash), is divided into ten shares. In other words, we have a waqf that comprises many 
farms, a castle with a few houses, stables, and five networks of wells (Qanats) for irrigation. In the 
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event that the estate makes any  profit (after paying taxes, maintenance fees, etc.), one third of that 
profit (in reality, the sum designated as waqf) must be divided into ten shares.
That these ten shares are necessary is explained next. The waqf’s mutawalli receives two shares. 
The Qazi (Nazir) receives another share. The remaining seven shares must be spent on providing 
the lighting for the memorial (Rowzeh) ceremonies. In this section, the founder expresses his desire 
that the candles used in these ceremonies be of pure wax. The two candles for Imam Ali, the two for 
Imam Hossein, and the one candle for Abbas should be large. Another two large candles should be 
used for the ceremonies honouring Imam Javad and Imam Asgari, and one large candle is 
designated for the place (Sardab). Finally, two large candles should be used for the ceremonies 
honouring Imam Reza. The founder provides further instruction that the candles should remain lit 
from sunset to sunrise.
In the next section, directions are given as to how any surplus money should be spent. The founder 
expresses his wish that any surplus money be spent on Ta’zieh (the condolence theatre). 
Furthermore, he prefers that the Ta’zieh plays be performed by “Khames Al Aba” productions.
Administration
The appointed mutawalli of the waqf is the nephew of the founder from his brother’s side. This is 
primarily  due to the fact  that the founder was a eunuch and could not have a child of his own. 
Furthermore, directions are given as to how the Towliat of the waqf is to transfer to Mir Fatah Ali 
Khan, the son of his nephew, after the founder’s death. The role of mutawalli should transfer to the 
first agnate, who should be honest, reliable, devoted, etc. In the event that the line of the agnates 
becomes terminated, this task should transfer to the eldest male from the cognates. Finally, in the 
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event that the family becomes extinct, the Towliat  of the waqf goes to the top magistrate of the 
Ulama from Tehran’s Dar al-Khalafe.
Judge (Qazi)
At this stage, the founder also appointed a supervisor. The one appointed is another relative of the 
founder, named Haji seyed Nasr allah. We find a very  similar provision concerning the Nazir (Qazi) 
as with the mutawalli in the event that he dies. Following his death, his duties transfer to his eldest 
son. Additionally, in the event that the agnate line in the family  terminates, his duties are transferred 
to the eldest male and then to the eldest son from the cognate line. 
Directions are provided regarding the duties of the Nazir. He should watch that the mutawalli does 
not rent out any of the waqfed properties for any period longer than three years. The founder 
indicated that if the rent went beyond three years, it would lead to corruption—in the event that this 
should happen, he hoped that the individual responsible would face the wrath of almighty God. 
However, in the next passages it  is explained that the mutawalli will probably  need to adjust the rent 
in line with taxes, as the low rent associated with the waqf since its founding would not be 
sufficient to meet any new taxes, which would probably cause problems.
The second set of instructions is directed toward cases in which the tenants are unable to pay the 
rent, or, more broadly speaking, the entire endowment is operating at a loss. If such a situation 
arises, the mutawalli and the Nazir should not draw any  salary. Furthermore, they  should buy the 
stipulated candles with their own money. There is also a long list concerning how these candles 
should be used under poor financial circumstances. For instance, certain Rowzehes have priority 
over others (those corresponding to the first imams, Ali and Hossein, have priority over the rest). 
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Likewise, the candles should only be lit for three hours in the evening and an additional hour near 
dawn.
The founder continues to provide direction in the next passage of the Waqfnameh. These paragraphs 
are essentially  his testimonial waqfs. He indicates that, following his death, one third of a village to 
be specified should be converted into a waqf. The purpose of that waqf will be to provide twelve 
candles to be lit during the same ceremonies. Additionally, the founder expresses his wish that the 
profits generated by the waqf be used to feed people on occasion, in connection with specific events 
based on the Islamic calendar. Finally, directions are provided indicating that any surplus should be 
spent on Ta’zieh and whatever else the mutawalli should select.
The second waqf in the same deed (testimonial waqf)
In the final passage, the founder notes the location of the designated village, which is not near 
Tehran but in the vicinity of Shiraz, the city from which the founder originally came. The founder 
adopts the position of mutawalli for this waqf for the duration of his life. Additionally, he appoints 
his other nephew, from a different brother, Mirza Mohammad Khan, to be mutawalli.
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The 1600 waqf in Fars province (the second waqf)
This waqf is the second-largest waqf that this study has considered (after the Rab-i-Rashidi’s waqf). 
The waqf is public and comprises many villages and farms, which the Waqfnameh describes in 
detail as to location and usage. There are two interesting aspects of this waqf. The first is that the 
waqf was initially established in the late Safavid period (probably around late 1600). It  originally 
comprised more than 50 villages and numerous farms, orchards, etc. Much of the waqf was later 
confiscated from the founder and his family during the reign of the Nadir Shah. The current waqf 
was re-established by a descendant of the founder. The second founder managed to convert  about 
half of the old waqf back to its waqf form. The second interesting aspect is that the administration 
of the waqf has remained in the family of the founder, and the current mutawalli is a direct 
descendant of the founder. The sheer size and scale of this complex means that most of the 
Waqfnameh is composed of a very long and detailed list of the properties and instructions regarding 
their intended purposes as well as how they shall be operated. The following are those extractions 
that are relevant to this thesis.
The waqf of Haj Ali Akbar Qavam
The founder
Haj Mirza Ali Akbar Qavam (Qavam al Molk Avval) was the fourth son of Haj Mirza Ebrahim 
Etemad al Dolleh. He was born sometime around 1820 and was the brother of Haj Mirza Alireza 
(the founder of the waqfs of Haj Alirezayee of Tehran). Furthermore, the founder had received the 
title of Qavam al Molk from Fath Ali Shah. Finally, the founder was appointed as one of the 
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mutawallis of Astan-e Qods Razavi for about three years before his death. He is buried in the Shrine 
of Imam Reza.
 The waqf objects (Raqabehes)
The properties converted into waqfs are mainly  in the province of Fars. The Raqabehes are in 
Kavar, Karbal, Sarvestan, Khafr, Simkan, Arsajan and Ramjerd. In total there are twenty-five farms, 
twelve entire villages and three mills that initially were converted into waqfs. Today there have 
been developments in some areas of these waqfs, and a few apartment buildings, shops and two 
Hosseiniehs have been established on these properties, as well. What is very important for us is that 
the entire waqf is over 168,000 hectares, which makes it  slightly  larger than the Kingdom of Fife, 
one of the provinces of Scotland. Finally, at this time there are nearly  150,000 people, mainly in 
farming communities, who live in these villages and work on the farms.
The usage of the waqf
According to the Waqfnameh, the income generated by the waqf must be spent first on its 
development, repair and maintenance. The generated profits then must be divided into ten shares. 
The mutawalli shall be paid one share as his salary. Furthermore, another half of a share shall be 
designated for the salary  of the Nazir. After deducting these salaries, the remaining profits shall be 
divided into twelve equal shares. The founder’s wishes are that most of the remaining money be 
spent on Ta’zieh and on feeding the congregation on the Thursday  nights of the months of 
Moharram and Safar as well as, of course, the day of Ashura. Furthermore, it is expected that the 
mutawalli spend one fifth of that  money on the repair and maintenance of a Hosseinieh, in addition 
to hiring a caretaker for that place (this man’s salary shall be covered from that same share of 
money). There is also another one-fifth share to be spent on the poor of a specified place (Zolham) 
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in any  way  in which the mutawalli decides. Moreover, another one fifth is to be spent subsidising 
the poor who want make a pilgrimage to Mashhad.
This leaves us with yet another share, which the founder wants to be divided into another eight 
equal shares. He wishes that seven and a half of these shares be spent on lighting (candles and oil) 
for the shrines of the Shi’ite imams in Iraq (all of which are described in detail). This sum of money 
also must be delivered to those shrines via a trusted man, as has been requested by the founder.
The remaining half-share is to be spent on the wages for a Rouzeh Khan for Friday nights, the Qads 
night and during the month of Ramadan.
Mutawalli
The founder appointed himself as mutawalli and his eldest son as Nazir. The son will take the 
father’s position after he is deceased. Mr. Sahib Divani in Shiraz is currently the mutawalli of the 
waqf and is a direct descendant of the founder.
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Appendix II
This appendix features some arguments from the Imami and other Islamic schools of law 
concerning the institution of waqf.
The legitimacy of waqf
The early legal formation of waqfs as an Islamic institution
Our first aim is to argue that the institution of waqf, in its current shape and form, had its beginning 
about a century or so after the beginning of Islam, at a time when Muslim societies were 
experiencing enormous social, cultural and political transformation. As a result of the new 
economic order, the institution of the waqf came to play a pivotal role. From a legal standpoint, the 
ratification of such an institution created certain challenges, some of which made the authenticity of 
waqfs questionable. However, there is no doubt that the institution of waqf gained legitimacy by, 
and was heavily anchored in, Sharia. 
Waqfs in Shi’ite jurisprudence
Every  institution needs legal backing during its period of formation. Furthermore, in most cases, 
socioeconomic and political forces exist behind the establishment of an institution. In the case of 
waqfs, two sets of arguments were made in terms of how the institution received its seal of approval 
during the early  days of Islam. The first  of these argues that waqfs, in their current shape and form, 
already existed in the earliest days of Islam and even date back to the time of the Prophet. The 
second set of arguments advocates that waqfs came about a century or so after the birth of Islam, in 
response to the new socioeconomic demands of the time. In the first case, it is sufficient to establish 
that waqfs existed at the time of the Prophet and that he gave the institution his seal of approval. 
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With respect to the latter, any explanation is somewhat more involved. Both set of arguments have 
been presented here.
To begin, the legitimacy of any institution in Islamic law must be ratified by  Sharia. All Sharia law 
is derived from two primary  sources—the divine revelations set forth in the Qur’an and the sayings 
and example of the Prophet Mohammad as expressed in the Sunnah. Fiqh, or jurisprudence, 
interprets and extends the application of Sharia to questions not directly  addressed in the primary 
sources, largely  by including secondary sources. These secondary  sources usually reflect the 
consensus of religious scholars as embodied in Ijma—that is, by drawing analogies with the Qur’an 
and Sunnah, what is known as Qiyas. Shi’ite jurists replace Qiyas—analogy—with Aql, or reason. 
Where it  enjoys official status, Sharia is applied by Islamic judges, or Qadis. Interestingly, the word 
“waqf,” never mind its legal parameters, is not mentioned in the Qur’an. Furthermore, the two 
words most closely associated with waqf, Sadaqeh (alms) and Habbeh (donation), also are not 
mentioned. Imami Shi’ite scholars argue for the legitimacy  of waqf on the basis of two sets of 
arguments: Adelle Aam and Adelle Khas.289 The former refers to arguments based on verses in the 
Qur’an, or recollections of the words of the Prophet Mohammad and/or the twelve Imams, what are 
known as hadith. Imami jurists have argued that the institution of waqf helps to improve the welfare 
of the community, and that the Quran in general—and many  specific passages in particular—
encourages deeds that improve general welfare. For example, Verse 90 states: “whatsoever ye spend 
for good, He replace it”; another verse states: “O ye who believe, When ye hold conference with the 
messenger, offer an alms before your conference”.290
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289 Alsivary (2000, p. 113)
290 Similar injunctions can be found in verse 20 of Al-Mozmal and verse 177 of Baqara.
Waqfs derive their legitimacy  primarily  from the hadith. Many related hadith are shared by both the 
Imami Shi’ite and the Sunni schools of law. However, the earliest records of Shi’ite versions of 
related  hadith date to the 10th century, whereas in the case of Sunni schools they date further back, 
to the 7th century.291  The earliest examples of recorded hadith in Imami Shi’ite writings are in a 
book called Al-Suna va al-Ahkam, which dates to the 10th century.292  Furthermore, all of the 
fundamental hadith that deal with the institution of waqf have been collected in a book called 
Vasael Shia.293  The importance of these sources for studying contemporary waqfs in Iran is that 
they  are still widely used in Iran’s legal system whenever there may be a shadow of a doubt 
regarding the authenticity of a waqf.
The most widely  cited hadith concerning the issue of a waqf’s legitimacy are those 
by Ali ibn Abitalib, the fist  Imam of Imami school: “When a man dies, only three deeds will survive 
him: alms [the actual word used here is Sadaqeh, not waqf], which continue to be paid; knowledge, 
which generates profit; and a child praying upon his soul”.294 The next hadith, again cited by Ali ibn 
Abitalib, states that paying alms and Habs (tying down wealth) are both ways of storing up wealth 
[points] for the next life.295  Two sets of challenges arise when it comes to accepting these hadith as 
good enough to attribute legitimacy to an institution. First, because these hadith were collected over 
three centuries after the earliest days of Islam, their authenticity  is questionable. There are many 
arguments whereby they are viewed as mere inventions, dating from later periods.296  Furthermore, 
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291 This is almost the same time as when Fiqh was written for the first time.
292 Saleki (2008, pp. 11–12)
293 Shirazi (1998, p. 257)
294 The same hadith is used by Sunni Muslims, only it is attributed to Ali and is referred to in the 
Sahih of Muslim Ibn Kudama al-Muqni, pp. 588–89. 
295 Tabrizi (1996 p. 511); Shirazi (1998, p. 292)
296 Schacht (1953, p. 444)
even if we closely adhere to the two hadith cited above, we might note that the word waqf is not 
mentioned in either of them. The first hadith uses the word Sadaqeh, which entails very different 
legal parameters then waqf. Likewise, in the second hadith the word Habs, although close to waqf 
in meaning, is still not close enough to arrive at a clear verdict.
The second line of reasoning, Adelle Khas, refers to the early days of Islam. The waqf system 
derives its legitimacy from the idea that the Prophet approved it. The earliest waqf-related story 
dates to the Battle of Khaybar, in connection with which Umar received a piece of property. The 
Prophet asked him to make this land Habs and use it as a Sadaqeh (Habasta Aslaha wa-Tasaddaga 
bihd). Obeying the Prophet, Umar turned the property into a Sadaqeh: “it shall not be sold, nor 
given away, nor inherited, and its usufruct should be spent (Tasaddaqa) on the poor, the relatives [of 
the Prophet] (Dhawi'l, Qurba), and those who fight in God's wars (Sabilu'llahi)”. The second story 
is about a well in Medina. The well and its surrounding land were converted into a Sadaqeh by  Ali. 
Its usufruct was given to three freedmen. Ali requested ink and a piece of parchment and wrote 
everything down. Although it appears that the three freedmen would have made a living working at 
the well and on the surrounding land, the first right to the usufruct was to pass to Ali's sons, Hasan 
and HusAyn; thereafter, it could not be sold and would be enjoyed by “the poor” and by the Abna 
al-Ablli. At this time Sadaqeh also had an aura of sanctity, or even taboo, as illustrated by  a tradition 
related to Hasan, Ali's son and grandson of the Prophet, who, upon putting into his mouth a date 
that belonged to the Sadaqeh, was promptly  admonished by the Prophet, who shouted:  “‘kakh 
kakh, spit it  out! Don't you know that you are not to eat Sadaqeh’? The Prophet would not eat 
anything that came from Sadaqeh, but only from a Hedyeh (a personal gift)”.
The main stories to which the Imami Shi’a refer are, first, that the Prophet converted one or more of 
his orchards into a waqf. However, his waqf was a family waqf, and only his children were 
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appointed as beneficiaries.297  Also, there is a story about a man named Abu-Taleh, who was from 
Madinah. He had a date orchard known as Birha. This property was located directly in front of the 
Prophet’s mosque. The Prophet often visited this orchard to drink water from its well.  One day 
Abu-Taleh went to the Prophet  and told him: “God says you have not yet understood the meaning of 
good deeds unless you pay  alimony. Thus, I am going to pay  the revenues of my orchard as alms 
(Sadaqeh). I would like to secure a place in heaven for my soul.” The Prophet liked his proposal 
and advised him to appoint his relatives as the beneficiaries of those alms. Abu-Taeh thus divided 
the orchard between his relatives and made sure that his cousins received larger shares.298
It can be concluded that  the earliest tradition concerning the conversion of one’s property into a 
waqf was for the purpose of supporting and financing jihad. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that, as with the hadith, none of the historical references to institutions similar to waqfs actually use 
the word waqf but instead use the word Sadaqeh or Habs.
Arguments aimed at proving that waqf is a legitimate institution based on Sharia law are not 
exclusive to the Imami Shi’a. Almost all Sunni schools of law have engaged in similar debates and 
make use of their own hadith. For example, the Shafei’ school of law refers to a hadith associated 
with the Prophet Mohammad which often is utilised to prove that waqfs are legitimate: all a man 
can take with him into the next life are his good deeds, his on-going alms (Sadaqeh) and his 
children’s prayers upon his soul.  In this passage, on-going or current alms are closely associated 
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297 Schacht (1953, pp. 995–96). Schacht elaborates on this story: in contrast to the admonition 
directed at Muslims who in their wills deprived their families of more than one-third of the wealth, 
it seems that Mohammad's own offspring were not permitted to inherit any of his property. 
Undoubtedly this was a result of the struggle that split the Muslim world, beginning with the war 
between Ali and Mu’awiya and continuing well into the Abbasid period. The resolution to limit the 
economic resources of Ali's descendants gave birth to traditions that were mainly generated by the 
alleged struggle of the Prophet's daughter Fatima to secure the inheritance of Fadak for herself. 
298 Ibid.
with waqf.299  Furthermore, by citing another hadith associated with the Prophet, in which 
conversion of a property’s revenue into Habs for someone’s welfare is encouraged, jurists legitimise 
the institution of waqf.300
  
As noted earlier, in almost all of the manuscripts featuring stories about waqfs, or from which 
relevant hadith have been extracted, the word Sadaqeh, not waqf, is used. It is important to consider 
in greater depth the word Sadaqeh, as well as its legal parameters according to Sharia, in order to 
see if Sadaqeh can, in fact, be considered synonymous with waqf. Those who argue that waqf and 
Sadaqeh are the same thing base their arguments on a consideration of the words’ respective roots, 
h-b-s and w-q-f, which in Arabic can constitute synonyms (likewise with respect to q-d-sh in 
Hebrew). Based on their literary  meanings, Sadaqeh, according to Sharia law, has very different 
legal parameters than those of waqf, something that sets them apart from each other. Important here 
is that we more closely adhere to the passages in which the word Sadaqeh is used, as well as the 
context in which it is used. It  appears that, during the early  days of Islam, the Prophet had 
established a tradition whereby he would provide material incentives to new converts to Islam. 
Hence, in one case he ordered that a certain person be given a flock of sheep belonging to a 
Sadaqeh. Thus we see that during the early period of Islam Sadaqeh, like its synonyms waqf and 
Habs, denoted property common to the Ommat, mail al-Muslimin. Whatever remained from the 
booty acquired in various expeditions after each fighter had received his individual share—likewise, 
after the Prophet received what was due to him—was effectively considered waqf.
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299 However, some argue that the word Sadaqeh (alms) has a very different meaning and different 
legal parameters than waqf. This argument has been challenged by making reference to the 
beneficiaries of waqfs who are not entitled to ownership of them. By contrast, the recipient of alms 
is the owner according to Sharia law.
300 Shirazi (1998, p. 255)
The initial reasons why these individuals stood behind the institution of waqf is not entirely clear. 
However, the practice of Sadaqeh during the earliest days of Islam—particularly Sadaqeh 
associated with the tradition of the Prophet—does not necessarily correspond to what today would 
be considered waqf. Timur Kuran demonstrates that the earliest waqfs did perhaps satisfy the 
definition given at the outset, which seems to date from about a century  following the birth of 
Islam. At some point  following the first few decades of Islam, privately  endowed organisations 
began to provide services that the original Islamic state had provided through property  expropriated 
from non-Muslims or taxes collected under the category  of Zakat. The juridical form of waqf took 
shape around the year 755, during the 2nd and 3rd Islamic centuries.301  The question remains: why 
might it be that Muslims of the 8th century granted Islamic legitimacy to an institution that played 
no formal role in the original Islamic economic system? 
By itself, the emergence of a demand for privately  provided public goods does not guarantee the 
requisite supply. Nor does it require the selection of waqfs, as opposed to some other delivery 
mechanism, as the solution to the problem. In any case, it is hardly obvious that the expansion of 
Islam should result in waqfs being the most efficient way of delivering almost all public goods in 
such a highly  decentralised manner. A clue to this puzzle might be the fact that the expansion of 
Islam fostered an increasingly  large class of major landowners. Whereas in 7th-century Arabia most 
wealth was held by  merchants and herdsmen in the form of movable commodities, in Syria and Iraq 
during the seats of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties that ruled much of the Arab world (661–750 
and 750–1258 respectively), agricultural land and urban real estate became the predominant sources 
of wealth. This transformation would have generated a demand for sheltering immovable wealth 
from arbitrary taxation and confiscation, two common dangers of the period. Significantly, the rules 
for establishing a waqf require that an endowment consist solely of immovable property. They also 
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301 Kuran (2001, pp. 841–98)
require the property  in question to be available forever with respect to the designated mission. 
Insofar as establishing a waqf provided advantages to the founder, the owners of the properties and 
buildings would have been the principal beneficiaries. Currency is movable, and its excess is more 
difficult to prevent. Earlier, when the seat of Islamic power was still in Arabia, the owners of easily 
concealed and movable wealth obtained analogous privileges. In the case of medieval Iran, as Ann 
Lambton shows, legally  it was only land that could be converted into waqf, the ownership  of which 
would remain with the founder.302
Thus far, it has been found that  there must have been charitable endowments during the early days 
of Islam that were approved by the Prophet. However, neither he nor any of the Imams of the 
Shi’ite school of law refer to those institutions as waqfs. They all use the word Sadaqeh or Habeh, 
both of which developed legal standings different from that of a waqf. Thus, assumptions whereby a 
waqf is considered to be synonymous with those charitable deeds are redundant. Waqfs most likely 
came about as a response to socioeconomic demands in the 7th century and are reflective of the 
changing lifestyle of the Muslim community, which transformed very rapidly  from nomadic to 
urban. This development put pressure on jurists, too, as will be seen in the next  section; they 
indicated their doubts regarding the authenticity  of the institution as far as the law is concerned. 
Based on what they say, it is evident  that, while they had doubts, they were also aware of the 
institution’s great importance and were reluctant to simply rule against it outright.
Disputes over the legitimacy of waqf
It is apparent that the institution of waqf does not have a solid base with respect to its legitimacy, 
which in theory should be based on the fundamental sources of Sharia law. This fact has not gone 
unnoticed by many Islamic jurists, both Imami Shi’ite and Sunni. There are many cases in which 
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302 Lambton (1997, p. 305)
jurists have expressed doubt regarding the authenticity of this institution. However, the interesting 
point here is that, in almost every case, jurists have been very careful not to challenge the institution 
as a whole while expressing their opinion. Perhaps this institution was carrying out a huge task to 
the benefit of society. Furthermore, the very  scale of the waqf system, and the level of public 
involvement in it, has been its strongest selling point. In other words, the jurists have had no option 
but to accept the legitimacy of this institution. Additionally, jurists have derived a fair share of 
income from their various affairs involving waqfs, from those endowments that make the Ulama or 
jurists their direct beneficiaries to all of the various legal proceedings involving waqfs that they 
have had to carry out. For example, Allameh Helli, in his monumental work Tazkerat al Foghaha, 
after explaining and arguing the positions of both Imami Shi’ite and Sunni jurists states: “All of the 
compatriots of the Prophet established their own waqfs. However, none of them stated that a waqf is 
not one of the commandments of the religion of Islam”. He then continues, in an ambiguous way, to 
argue that this only applies to the people of Kufeh and does not represent the popular view.303 
Moqineh also notes that some jurists only consider those waqfs that are related to mosques to be 
legitimate. At the same time, again, he notes that this is not  the popular view. In another view, Imam 
Shafie disagrees with those who consider waqfs an illegitimate institution. Shafei argues that  there 
are some who do not consider the waqf system to be fully  legitimate. He argues that the story  about 
the Prophet abolishing the perpetuity  of a waqf is only valid in some particular cases.304  Finally, 
Khomeni, when it comes to the question of legitimacy, argues that there are not any direct 
references to the institution of waqf in the Qur’an. However, because it  is a fine tradition and has 
roots in ancient history, it should continue to survive.305As a result, some modern puritanical sects, 
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303 Helli (1985, p. 445)
304 Shafei (1982, p. 52)
305 Khomeini (2007, p. 109)
including the Wahhabi sect of Saudi Arabia, treat waqfs as a heretical innovation (bid'a) that 
appeared after the time of the Prophet.306
Iranian civil law does not  make reference to any specific source in order to prove the legitimacy of 
waqf according to Sharia. However, it is generally  noted that the institution of waqf is anchored in 
holy Sharia.
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Appendix III
Waqf versus trust
A very common question in this section concerns how a mutawalli would function in another form 
of “waqf,” in a non-Islamic system. A logical comparison might be to contrast a waqf with 
England’s trust system. Although perhaps not fully relevant to our focus, which is waqfs in the 
contemporary  era, a study of Oxford’s Merton College produces very interesting findings that might 
shed some light on how an endowment would be administrated in England compared to Iran. At this 
stage, we consider those trusts in England that have carried out missions similar to those of waqfs.
There have been a few studies comparing waqfs with English trusts. There are some evident 
similarities between the two institutions, which have led some to conclude that English trusts were 
initially inspired by the institution of waqf. Under both concepts, property  is reserved and its 
usufruct appropriated for specific beneficiaries. Additionally, in both cases the property becomes 
completely inalienable. Estates for life can be created in favour of successive beneficiaries, both 
present and future. Finally, both institutions have very similar agents, waqif (the founder) or 
settlers, a mutawalli or trustee, and beneficiaries, both present and future. 
This, however, is the point at which the similarities between these two institutions end and 
fundamental differences begin to appear. The first significant difference is that, in the event that the 
beneficiary of a waqf ceases to exist, a waqf must immediately  find an alternative charitable 
purpose. For example, if because of a change made to a road a Caravanserai were no longer able to 
function as such, it could potentially be converted into a shelter for the poor. This second purpose 
might not necessarily be the most economically efficient or logical utilisation of the related assets. 
Nonetheless, as determined by  most Islamic schools of law, a waqf becomes invalid if it does not 
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have a recognisable beneficiary.307 Not having a recognisable beneficiary would violate the concept 
of perpetuity of an already-established waqf.308
The second major difference between a waqf and a trust is that the ownership of a trust transfers 
from the founder to the trustee. Unlike a waqf, for which even today the issue of its ownership  is 
subject to dispute, a trust has a clear owner. The trustee is the owner of the trust, and he or she is 
responsible for administering the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries.
Third, a trust can have a board of trustees with the power to alter its mission based on their 
judgment and changing circumstances. A waqf, on the other hand, though able to have a board of 
mutawallis, is heavily restrictive of its function; such a board would only  exist to execute the wishes 
of the founder, and it would be very  difficult, if not impossible, for them to change the respective 
waqf’s mission.
To illustrate these points, we look at a case study: the case of Merton College in Oxford. This case 
is important from several perspectives. First, it provides us with a good starting point and basis for 
comparison with equivalent institutions in the Islamic world. Second, it is relevant inasmuch as 
there have been several contemporary  debates regarding claims that English law has its roots in 
Islamic law.  This presents a good opportunity for taking a closer look at Merton College. 
The case of Merton College
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307 A proposed legal solution around this issue is the Monqateh waqf, which has not always been 
approved by jurists.
308 This is a case more often involving private waqfs than public ones.
Gaudiosi states that there is some evidence that Merton College may have been inspired by the 
Islamic institution of waqf.309  Walter de Merton established Merton College in 1296. His initial 
reason for doing so was to secure a good education for his nephews. He obtained a license from his 
feudal overlord to vest certain properties for the support of university  students. The establishment 
was perpetual as well as unincorporated. However, De Merton reserved for himself the right to 
modify  the terms of the ordination. Later, in 1264, he exercised that  right. Walter de Merton 
effectively reissued these statutes, apparently  to confirm the establishment of a trust, which was 
created during a period of civil strife. These statutes also added a number of properties to the 
existing trust but made no essential changes to the college’s structure or its governance. Later, in 
1274, a new set of statutes was adopted. The latter document is generally credited with establishing 
the modern college system. Prior to 1274, Merton College had been an unincorporated, charitable 
trust. In contrast, the statutes of 1274 allowed the academic community to govern itself.310
Two centuries previously, the great colleges of the Islamic world, such as Baghdad’s Madrasa 
Nizamiya, founded in 1065, had ceased to be a major source of scientific innovation. Having until 
then spearheaded a revival in interest in Hellenic philosophy, and contributed to advances in 
astronomy, optics and metallurgy, among other fields, the Madrasa lost intellectual leadership to the 
universities in the West. However, Western universities were very different organisations. To give 
an example of one revealing difference, only universities enjoyed legal personhood. When the 
institution granted degrees as an organisation, a successful Madrasa student would receive 
certificates of competency (ijaza) from his individual teachers.311
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309 Gaudiosi (1988, pp. 1231–61)
310 Prior to 1264, Merton College fit within the waqf tradition; however, after 1274, Walter de 
Merton’s trust moved outside of the waqf tradition, inasmuch as it was incorporated.
311 Makdisi (1981, pp. 140–52) 
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Appendix IV
Name of the Jurist Date of Birth and 
Death
Place(s) of Activity Title/ Info
Abu Jafar Mohammed 
ibne Ali ibne Moosa 
ibne Babawiya al 
Qummi al Khorasani 
ar Raazi
916-990 Qom Sheikh Saduq
Sheikh Mofid 949-1022 Ukbara (north of 
Baqdad)
Khawaja Muhammad 
ibn Muhammad ibn 
Hasan Tūsī 
1201-1274 Tus, Mosul Sheykh Tusi
Najm ul-Din Abul-
Qasim Ja'far bin al-
Hasan bin Yahya bin 
al-Hasan bin Sa'id
1205–1277 Al- Hilla Mohaqiq Helli/
Uncle and teacher of 
Allameh Helli 
Allameh Helli
Jamal ad-Din Hasan 
ibn Yusuf ibn 'Ali ibn 
Muthahhar al-Hilli 
1250-1325 Al- Hilla Student of Sheikh 
Tusi
Muhammad 
Jamaluddin al-Makki 
al-Amili
1334–1385 Jabal 'Amel/
Al-Hilla
“Shahid Avval” “First 
Martyr”  and the pupil 
of pupils of Allameh 
Helli
Ali ibn Abdul-Aal al-
Karki
14xx-1533 Jabal 'Amel, Qazvin, 
Isfahan
Mohaqiq Karaki/ 
Mohaqiq Sani
Zayn al-Din al-Juba'i 
al'Amili
1506–1558 Egypt, Syria, Hijaz, 
Baitul Muqaddas, Iraq 
Constantinople and 
Iran.
“Shahid 
Sani” ,Second Martyr
Sheikh Hasanali 
Esfehani Najafi
1862-19xx Najaf, Isfahan, 
Mashhad
Saheb-e-Javaher
Ayatollah Kazem 
Tabatabai Yazdi
18xx-1916 Yazd, Najaf
Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Musavi Khomeini
1902-1989 Najaf, Tehran Imam Khomeini
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